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3ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to provide a semantic account of belief ascriptions of the form ‘A 
believes that S’. It begins with a detailed discussion of Saul Kripke’s famous ‘Puzzle 
about Belief, and tries to unearth a fundamental but rarely explicitly articulated 
assumption that gives the steps of the derivation of Kripke’s Puzzle their intuitive 
plausibility. The assumption can be roughly stated as follows: belief ascriptions report on 
some single oritologically prior mental state which grounds the truth of a true ascription. 
A response to one form of Kripke’s Puzzle is suggested at the end of this discussion.
Several apparently diverse kinds of response to Kripke’s Puzzle are critically evaluated 
and are found to be unsatisfactory. Many of the problems with these responses are traced 
to the fact that they are built upon the assumption that I suggest is at the heart of Kripke’s 
Puzzle.
The beginnings of a positive account of the semantics of belief ascriptions are given. The 
account gives a central role to the fact that the truth-value of a belief ascription depends 
on elements of the conversational setting in which it occurs. It is suggested that belief 
ascriptions are essentially answers to questions asked by an audience who has specific 
interests and makes specific assumptions about the agent and the setting of the ascription. 
The interests of the audience and the background assumptions that she makes are two- 
distinct sources of the context-sensitivity of belief ascriptions. The account makes no 
appeal to any kind of inner mental representations, but instead says that the truth of an 
ascription depends in a complex way on the agent’s dispositions and capacities to do, say, 
think, and feel certain things.
The thesis ends with a discussion of the de dicto/ de re distinction, and suggests that the 
distinction does not provide the most useful way of understanding belief ascription. It is 
argued that truly de re ascriptions are probably very rare, and that this does not therefore 
mean that most ascriptions are de dicto.
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7Introduction
The object of study of this dissertation is the class of what I call ‘belief 
ascriptions’ or ‘belief reports’ which are utterances of sentences of the form 
‘A believes that S’, where A denotes an agent and S is to be replaced by a 
sentence of English. There is a vast and still expanding literature on this 
subject. Much of the literature has developed as a response to what appear to 
be philosophical puzzles arising from reflection on our belief reporting 
practices and the apparent truth-values that our belief reports have.
Frege was the first to put forward anything like a theory of belief report 
sentences, which fitted into his overall semantic project, and sought to 
explain the apparent failure of substitutivity of co-referring terms in the 
embedded sentence of the belief report sentence. There has been much 
criticism of the details of Frege’s theory, which despite its theoretical 
elegance seems to face many difficulties. Although Frege’s theory has, in 
many of its details, been generally rejected, there are certain assumptions 
that Frege makes that are still retained. Some of these assumptions are 
amongst those that this dissertation aims to cast doubt on. I shall discuss 
Frege’s theory in Chapter 3, and try to cast doubt on some conceptual 
connections that are generally taken for granted by Frege and also by later 
writers. In particular, I will use my discussion of Frege to try to clarify the 
relations between belief reports and questions to do with our epistemic 
attitudes to sentences, and to separate out belief conceived of as a topic in 
philosophy of mind from questions about belief ascriptions. I believe that 
these distinctions are often conflated, and that they should be considered 
separately.
Much of the more recent literature on the subject has emerged as a response 
to a famous puzzle developed by Saul Kripke in his landmark ‘A Puzzle 
about Belief (1979). I, therefore, give Kripke’s puzzle a very central role in 
this dissertation. Almost every theory of belief reports that has emerged in 
recent years gives a central role to Kripke’s puzzle. Philosophers have often
7
8used Kripke’s puzzle as a test case for their theory; the theory can only be 
acceptable if it provides a good solution to Kripke’s Puzzle. There is a great 
diversity in types of responses, and many very different perspectives on the 
puzzle are taken. Despite this diversity, I think that some assumptions are 
held in common by at least the vast majority of responses to the puzzle. In 
Chapter One I try to make it plausible that one particular, generally only 
implicitly held, assumption is at the heart of Kripke’s puzzle and is 
maintained by most theorists which discuss it. The assumption can be 
roughly stated as follows (although what the assumption actually amounts to 
will probably only become clear throughout the whole discussion of the 
dissertation): the truth of belief reports depend on the obtaining of a single 
cognitively specifiable fact about the agent, a fact which is ontologically 
prior to the belief report and serves to ground the truth of the report. In 
traditional theories, this fact is a purely context-independent fact about the 
agent. In more recent theories, which tend to accept that belief ascriptions 
depend for their truth on elements of the context of utterance, the cognitively 
specifiable fact does not by itself determine the truth-value of the ascription, 
but nevertheless there is thought to be some single cognitive fact which 
underlies the truth of the report.
I see this assumption as pervasive and as being the source of many 
difficulties. The central aims of this dissertation are:
1) to suggest that such an assumption is indeed at the heart of Kripke’s puzzle 
in the sense of providing the best explanation of the form of argument that 
Kripke uses to derive his puzzle about belief,
2) show that the assumption is pervasive and is the source of many different 
problems in a diverse range of different theories
3) provide at least the beginnings of my own account of belief ascriptions 
which abandons the central assumption in question.
I aim to provide a detailed analysis of Kripke’s puzzle in Chapter One. The 
actual puzzle is relatively well-known and tends to be stated very quickly in
8
9most writings which aim to offer a response to it, since familiarity with the 
puzzle is generally assumed. I intend to move slowly through a discussion of 
the derivation of the puzzle because I want to bring to the surface the 
assumption that I think underlies it, an assumption which is not generally 
articulated. I want also to bring out some features of the structure of 
Kripke’s argument and to try to suggest what assumptions Kripke was 
making but not articulating and explain why, given these assumptions, he 
had to argue in a very particular way. The chapter discusses in detail some of 
the principles that Kripke saw our belief reporting practice as embodying 
and tries to cast doubt on both the truth and the relevance of such principles. 
By showing that the principles are not quite as central as is generally 
thought, I try to deflect the source of the puzzle onto other assumptions. I 
discuss the distinction between describing and deriving the puzzle in a 
metalinguistic mode and a material mode, which corresponds to the 
difference between seeing the puzzle as a puzzle about belief-reporting and 
seeing it as a puzzle about belief. I suggest that if we focus on belief 
ascriptions rather than belief, the puzzle is less easily derivable. The idea 
that belief reporting is parasitic upon belief is closely related to the central 
assumption that I discussed above. Chapter Two will try to offer some 
support to the idea that we should focus on belief reports of the form ‘A 
believes that S’ rather than assume that we have some prior and independent 
notion of belief which serves to ground those reports.
Chapter One suggests that Kripke’s puzzle is essentially to be seen as an 
apparent tension in ascribing contradictory beliefs to an agent who is 
presumed to be rational.
Having isolated what I think are the key features in the derivation of 
Kripke’s Puzzle, I suggest my own response to the puzzle which involves 
denying the argument that leads to the attribution of contradictory beliefs. I 
also discuss the notion of rationality and suggest that it is not be understood 
in a way that depends on a prior grasp of what it is that an agent believes.
The sketch of a solution suggested in the last section of this chapter will
9
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hopefully be seen as a natural corollary to the more complete view of belief 
ascriptions that I develop in Chapter Four.
Chapter Two is a short interlude in which I discuss the ‘logical grammar’ of 
belief and look at various locutions involving ‘belief and its associated 
nominals and ‘believes that’. I use this section to suggest that ‘believes that’ 
is the basic expression in this family of related locutions and that sometimes 
philosophers use other locutions which may distort how we think about 
belief and belief ascriptions. I urge the methodological point that in trying to 
understand the phenomenon of belief we should focus on belief ascriptions 
of the form ‘A believes that S’. I finish this chapter with a short comment on 
the relation between the semantics and metaphysics of belief.
Chapter Three provides a critical evaluation of several apparently quite 
diverse theories of belief ascription, especially as they treat Kripke’s Puzzle. 
I begin this chapter which a discussion of Frege in order to allow me to 
make some conceptual distinctions that I think are necessary for a proper 
discussion of the subject. I then discuss what Frege could have said in 
response to Kripke’s Puzzle and suggest that while Frege’s theory has the 
resources to block the derivation of Kripke’s Puzzle it is in the end far too 
restrictive and makes the successful reporting of others’ beliefs a complete 
mystery. Next I discuss Nathan Salmon’s (1986) theory of belief ascriptions 
which is standardly seen as being in sharp opposition to Frege’s theory. This 
theory will be seen as having some very counter-intuitive consequences 
regarding the predicted intuitive truth-values of our ordinary belief 
ascriptions. I will argue that such counter-intuitive results are not to be 
explained away as not semantically relevant. In the next section I discuss a 
theory which involves a radical rejection of a central assumption held in 
common by almost all other contemporary theories, namely the view that 
belief reports relate agents to a content. However, I will argue that there are 
considerable similarities between this view and Salmon’s, and so the 
theories have many of the same counter-intuitive results. The theory also has 
other problems of its own, again having to do with the fact that the central 
assumption is still retained even by this no-content theory. Finally, this
10
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chapter discusses Mark Richard’s theory of belief ascriptions, which 
provides an account which makes belief ascriptions context-sensitive. 
According to this theory, even a belief ascription which contains no 
obviously indexical elements, other that tense, may be true with respect to 
one context and false with respect to another context, at a given time. One of 
the main objections to the other theories considered is avoided then. Despite 
having this considerable virtue, Richard’s theory will be seen as having 
serious difficulties of its own, several of these stemming from the fact that, 
in spite of its context-sensitivity, the theory still retains the fundamental 
assumption that I wish to criticise. I will explicitly contrast Richard’s theory 
with my own context-sensitive account in the final chapter, where I will try 
to explain how the context-sensitivity has a very different source in my 
account than it does in Richard’s.
Chapter Four sets out the beginnings of a positive account of the semantics 
of belief ascriptions. It begins by providing some desiderata for a positive 
account, and by giving a description of the general kind of semantic project 
that I see myself as engaged in. The next section provides what I consider to 
be a useful way of thinking of belief ascriptions; I suggest that belief 
ascriptions should be seen, not as general bare descriptions of an agent’s 
inner mental state, but essentially as an answer to a question that arises in a 
certain context for a speaker with a specific interest and background 
knowledge. It is only in relation to such a question that a belief ascription 
can properly be assessed for truth or falsity. I use such a consideration to 
justify a rejection of Kripke’s puzzle in one of its forms.
I provide a brief description of the metaphysical presuppositions of my 
semantic account of belief ascriptions, which involves a discussion of an 
agent’s behavioural, cognitive and other dispositions and capacities. I 
explain the relevance of such dispositions to the semantics of belief 
ascriptions. I explain what I consider to be the two separate sources of 
context-sensitivity of belief ascriptions. One has to do with the focus of 
interest of the speaker who poses the question to which the belief ascription 
is an answer; the other has to do with background assumptions that the
11
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speaker asking the question has. I provide a statement of the truth-condition 
for a belief ascription of the form: ‘A believes that S’ is true in a context c iff
The theory is applied to several examples which I discuss in detail. Each 
example is designed to bring out a different fact about the theory of belief 
ascriptions. The examples are designed to show, among other things, how 
varying the interest of the audience to the report is semantically relevant; 
how varying the background knowledge of the audience is semantically 
relevant; and explaining the (mistaken) appearance of the context- 
msensitivity of belief ascriptions. In the final section I discuss the so-called 
de dicto/ de re distinction, suggest that it is generally misconceived and that 
the way it is generally conceived suggests a false dichotomy which obscures 
how belief ascriptions really work. I suggest that de re reports are not as 
common as generally thought, and deal with several arguments which 
suggests that they are an important form of report. I explain why this does 
not mean that all belief ascriptions are therefore de dicto. I think that very 
few are de dicto, at least as this is traditionally understood.
12
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Chapter One: 
Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief
U .
Introduction
This chapter examines a well-known ‘puzzle’ with which, it has been said, any 
satisfactory account of belief and belief reporting must come to grips. It is also 
impossible to ignore this puzzle since it looms so large in the literature on the 
semantics of belief reporting; it often plays the role of a test case for one’s 
theory of belief and belief reporting and it is often seen to support one theory 
rather than another if it can be shown that one theory deals with the puzzle better 
than another. My own interest in the so-called ‘puzzle about belief resides 
largely in the fact that I think by examining the derivation of the puzzle we are 
able to see what are the fundamental assumptions that lie behind it, assumptions 
which tend to be shared also by the rather diverse responses to the puzzle that 
have appeared in the literature. One such assumption is that belief ascriptions 
report on some single psychologically specifiable fact about an agent which is 
ontologically independent o f the report and independent o f  other such 
psychological facts about the agent and this is the central thesis that this 
dissertation aims to cast doubt on. This chapter aims, in Sections 1.2-1.4 to 
examine the derivation of Kripke’s puzzle and show what is relevant and what is 
not strictly relevant to the puzzle. Section 1.5 tries to expose a possible flaw in 
Kripke’s reasoning and 1.6 suggests what picture of the relation between belief 
and belief ascription is behind this reasoning. Sections 1.7 and 1.8, and 1.9, 
suggest a response to Kripke’s puzzle which abandons the assumption that was 
identified as lying behind the puzzle in Section 1.6.1 hope, then, to make some 
positive remarks in this chapter as how we are to respond to the puzzle in a 
natural way. And I will offer some considerations to support the kind of solution 
that I suggest. I will, in Section 1.10, briefly show how it fits into what has come 
to be seen as the logical space for possible responses to the puzzle and how it 
contrasts with other popular responses to the puzzle.
13
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How Kripke Derives the Puzzle
What exactly is the puzzle and what should its import be taken to be? These 
questions are pertinent because the puzzle occurs in a paper, Kripke’s ‘A Puzzle 
About Belief, which has a philosophical agenda of its own and many 
philosophers have responded to the puzzle as a defence of this agenda, 
specifically the defence of the claim that belief contexts are transparent with 
respect to proper names. Kripke himself says in the paper, however, that “as a 
philosophical puzzle it stands on its own”. And it is from this perspective that I 
want to consider the puzzle. I first want to understand what the puzzle is in its 
own terms. This is what this first section is about.
Schematically, the puzzle comes about like this. Kripke provides us with a 
scenario which involves a description of an agent, his physical environment and 
his linguistic behaviour, that is to say his utterances and his assents to certain 
sentences. The description is, in itself, taken to be unproblematic in the sense 
that it is wholly consistent, not too improbable and not too hard to imagine. We 
are then invited to consider what we might say about what this agent believes.
Or rather, we are first invited to agree that our ordinary belief reporting practices 
ordinarily embody certain principles. Then arguments are constructed to show 
that if we apply such principles to the agent in question then we are inevitably 
led to say things about what the agent believes which are either intuitively false 
or, even worse, paradoxical, perhaps even flatly contradictory.
The scenario is this. Pierre is a normal French speaker who lives in France and 
who speaks French, but not a word of any other language, including English. He 
has heard of London, but only by hearing of it under its French name ‘Londres’. 
On the basis of what he has heard of it, he is inclined to say, in French, “Londres 
est jolie”. We are to suppose that Pierre satisfies all the criteria (whatever they 
may be) we ordinarily use to judge that a Frenchman uses ‘Londres’ to talk 
about London and uses ‘est jolie’ to attribute prettiness to a thing. Later Pierre
14
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moves to London, to an unattractive part of the city where his neighbours are 
fairly uneducated, do not speak a word of French, and rarely leave their part of 
the city. He learns English directly by mixing with his monolingual neighbours, 
and learns to call the city he now lives in ‘London’. He does not make the 
connection between ‘London’ and ‘Londres’; that is, he does not come to realise 
that the names are codesignative.
Based on what he hears from his neighbours and what he sees around him, he 
comes to be inclined to assent to the English sentence ‘London is not pretty’, but 
has no inclination to assent to the sentence ‘London is pretty’. He has no 
inclination to withdraw his assent from the French sentence ‘Londres est jolie’, 
having not made the connection between the two names. Pierre satisfies all the 
criteria that we would ordinarily use to judge that an Englishman uses ‘London’ 
to refer to London and uses ‘is pretty’ to attribute prettiness to a thing.
I have presented the scenario in a way which leaves out some things which we 
could still, apparently fairly unproblematically say about the scenario, things 
which involve statements about what Pierre believes. I do this because I want to 
capture all the salient facts that go into describing Pierre’s scenario which 
remains as close as possible to all that Kripke includes, except that I want a pure 
description in the sense of one that does not risk prejudging anything about what 
we might say that Pierre believes. For Kripke himself slips in this: “On the basis 
of what he has heard of London, he is inclined to think that it is pretty”. We 
lose nothing important by omitting this at this point.
Kripke then adds on top of this pure description, the stipulation that Pierre is 
presumed to be rational. This stipulation also appears to be unproblematic in that 
its truth is consistent with the pure description given so far. Rationality is, 
importantly, not defined here, but there is supposed to be a clear intuitive sense 
in which we would be happy to say that Pierre is rational, based on what we 
have so far. (The relevant concept of rationality will be discussed later, in 
Section 1.9)
15
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As I understand it, Pierre’s presumed intuitive rationality forms a central 
element in the sense of paradox which Kripke wants to derive.
The other central element in the sense of puzzlement has to do with what we say 
that Pierre believes, specifically involving certain belief ascriptions of the form 
‘A believes that S’. Kripke argues that there are some very plausible and 
intuitive principles that our ordinary practice of belief reporting includes that 
lead us to say something apparently in tension with the assumption of Pierre’s 
rationality. The principles in question are the Translation Principle (henceforth 
‘TP’) and the Disquotation Principle (henceforth ‘DP’) which can be stated as 
follows:
(TP) If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in that language, then 
any translation of it into any other language also expresses a truth (in that 
other language).
(DP) If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to ‘p’, 
then she believes that p.
In (DP), ‘p ’ is to be replaced inside and outside the quotation marks by any 
appropriate standard English sentence.
Both of the above principles must, Kripke insists, be qualified so as to be strictly 
true, but he insists that taken in their obvious intent, they seem to express almost 
self-evident truths. The argument taking us from the facts involved in the pure 
description of the scenario I presented above to apparently puzzling belief 
reports (puzzling, that is, when held in conjunction with the assumption of 
Pierre’s rationality) then goes as follows:
Pierre assents first to ‘Londres est jolie’. He counts as a normal French speaker, 
and we can assume that his assent to this sentence is reflective and sincere. We 
can apply a French version of (DP), for if there is such a true principle for 
English, there must surely be one for French speakers as well. Applying the 
French analogue of (DP) we are entitled to infer the truth of the sentence ‘Pierre
16
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croit que Londres est jolie’. We then use (TP) to infer the truth of ‘Pierre 
believes that London is pretty’. We have an argument then that takes us from the 
pure description of the scenario, using only very plausible principles taken to be 
embodied in our practice of belief reporting, to the conclusion that
(1) Pierre believes that London is pretty.
Pierre later assents to ‘London is not pretty’. It is assumed that he counts as a 
normal speaker of English; at least, it is stipulated that he satisfies all the normal 
criteria for counting a native English speaker to count as a normal speaker of 
English. We can assume that his assent to the sentence ‘London is not pretty’ is 
sincere and reflective, and so we can apply (DP) to derive
(2) Pierre believes that London is not pretty.
The puzzle stems from the fact that we are to suppose that (1) and (2) are true 
together. This is important, for the same puzzle cannot be derived if we allowed 
that (1) and (2) were both true, but not true together, if, for instance, they were 
true at different times. For in that case we could simply say that Pierre had 
changed his mind.
Kripke makes a superficially plausible case that (1) and (2) are indeed true 
together. He argues that it is unquestionable that Pierre once believed that 
London is pretty; he differed not at all from his countrymen in any relevant 
observable way and so we would have exactly the same grounds to say of him 
that he believes that London is pretty; nor, Kripke adds, is there any plausibility 
in the idea that we should retroactively judge Pierre never have to believed that 
London is pretty, for do so would endanger our belief ascriptions to all 
monolingual Frenchmen. Kripke also argues that Pierre still believes that 
London is pretty since he has not changed his mind, since he still forcefully 
assents to ‘Londres est jolie’. (2) cannot be denied, Kripke insists, just because 
(1) is true. He says that we cannot deny him his later belief just because of his 
French past. In support of this, Kripke says that if an electric shock had wiped 
out all French memories he would be indistinguishable from his English
17
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neighbours in all relevant observable ways, including his verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour. He adds that it surely has no plausibility to assume that an electric 
shock, which destroys part of his brain, gives Pierre new beliefs. His French past 
is therefore irrelevant, says Kripke. We cannot deny Pierre both his beliefs for 
this combines the difficulties of denying (1) and denying (2).
It seems that we are forced to conclude then that (1) and (2) are true together. If 
they are true together then that undoubtedly entails that (3) (below) is true, since 
this simply involves an application of the law of conjunction to (1) and (2). It 
might also be supposed that (4) (below) is true, although this does not logically 
follow, unless we assume that belief factors out of a conjunction, but this is 
generally assumed and nothing important rests on the distinction between (3) 
and (4) in the sense that the same problems arise whether we take (3) or (4) as 
the ascription we are warranted in asserting.
(3) Pierre believes that London is pretty and Pierre believes that London is 
not pretty.
(4) Pierre believes that London is pretty and that London is not pretty.
Given the truth of (3) or (4), it seems natural to say that Pierre has contradictory 
beliefs. In fact, Kripke does not distinguish between saying that (3) is true and 
saying that Pierre has contradictory beliefs. And I suspect that this is why he 
thinks that we have a puzzle about belief This is important because sometimes it 
is said that we do not, strictly speaking, have here a puzzle about belief, but 
rather a puzzle about belief ascriptions. From a formal point of view, this is a 
distinction that certainly can be made and as we shall see later (in Section 1.6) 
this alleged distinction has been put to philosophical work in several types of 
response to the puzzle. My first substantial point, however, which I shall defend 
later, is that I think that the distinction is unnatural and positively misleading. 
For, what could be more natural than saying that having a belief report of the 
form exhibited in (3) is true of an agent is just the same as saying that an agent
18
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has contradictory beliefs. I think that it does not matter whether we see the 
puzzle as a puzzle about belief or as a puzzle about our talk about belief.1
The puzzle can then be put in the following way. We seem to have compelling 
grounds to say that Pierre has contradictory beliefs and we seem to be 
unprepared to say that Pierre is not rational. Yet there seems to be a conceptual 
connection between rationality and belief which does not allow that a rational 
agent can have contradictory beliefs. Kripke says:
“Pierre is a leading philosopher and logician. He would never let contradictory beliefs pass. And 
surely anyone, leading logician or no, is in principle in a position to notice contradictory beliefs 
if he has them. Precisely for this reason we regard those who contradict themselves as subject to 
greater censure than those who merely have false beliefs. But it is clear that Pierre is in no 
position to see, by logic alone, that at least one of his beliefs must be false. He lacks information 
not logical acumen. He cannot be convicted of inconsistency: to do so is incorrect.”
Kripke does not put forward a resolution of this puzzle. He simply raises the 
puzzle and forestalls some possible natural responses. In particular, he makes a 
great deal out the fact that the situation can be completely described in a 
consistent way and that there, as he says, “in this sense no paradox”. This way, 
however, evades the question of whether Pierre believes that London is pretty.
In fact, Kripke says that the puzzle is to answer the question ‘Does Pierre or 
does he not believe that London is pretty?’
But, nothing, I think, could be more important at this stage, than the observation, 
that this puzzle is, strictly speaking, a distinct puzzle from the puzzle that 
seemed to emerge earlier and what characterised (two paragraphs above) as a 
tension between two very plausible theses.
The puzzle put in the form of the tension of two compelling conflicting claims 
presupposes that we have an answer to the question that the second 
characterisation of the puzzle says we cannot answer!
1 The view that I want to defend downplays the distinction and suggests that to understand our 
ordinary notion of beliefs we look to our belief ascriptions, rather than assume we have a clear 
notion of what beliefs are and then build our theory of ascriptions on top of that.
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To clarify, I think that there are two distinct puzzles posed by Kripke. One is 
how to reconcile the intuitive truth of ascriptions which seem to ascribe 
contradictory beliefs to Pierre with his intuitive rationality. This puzzle is dealt 
with in this chapter. Another puzzle stems from the fact that we apparently 
cannot directly answer the simple question ‘Does Pierre, or does he not, believe 
that London is pretty?’. This puzzle is dealt with in Chapter Four.
I want to focus on the former version of the puzzle, firstly as it has a structure 
will facilitates a clear discussion, but more importantly, because the second 
version of the puzzle has the appearance of a trick question. I mean this 
seriously and literally. I think that holding on to this insight is the key to a 
natural resolution of the alleged paradox. In itself, the fact that we cannot 
answer a question of a certain specific grammatical form (in this case a question 
of the form "Does A or does he not believe that S?') with an answer of a specific 
grammatical form (in this case an answer of the form 'A believes that S ’) in a 
non-misleading way, it not paradoxical. It is not even an unusual situation to 
find oneself in. (I give a more detailed response in Chapter Four).
I have described the derivation of Kripke’s puzzle in a rather conventional way;
I have said that it relies on an argument which involves principles that Kripke 
thinks our ordinary belief reporting practice embody. But now I want to look 
more closely at the structure of the argument and try to see what is really 
absolutely essential to the derivation of the paradox, as I think this is the way to 
see what the most basic assumptions presupposed in the derivation of the puzzle 
are. I want to make it seem plausible that the argument that Kripke actually uses, 
understood in the way I have characterised it so far, is too specific for us to see 
what the assumptions are that we must ultimately reject if we are to have a 
natural resolution of the puzzle. I see this strategy as basically a reapplication of 
a strategy that Kripke uses himself in the paper. For Kripke argues that trying to 
show that (TP) is false is not the right way to tackle the puzzle about belief, for 
(TP) is not actually essential in the argument at all, even though some 
philosophers have continued to blame the paradox on (TP), for example, D.
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Over (1983). He does this by showing that a strictly analogous puzzle can be 
derived from a description of a scenario which only involves one language being 
spoken so that a principle can have no application here. I want to reapply this 
strategy by showing that a strictly analogous puzzle can be derived even without 
the use of either (DP) or (TP). If this can be done successfully then it would of 
course show that a fully satisfactory solution to the puzzle cannot be one which 
works merely by showing that (DP) is false. (Let me make it clear that I do 
think, nonetheless, that (DP) is in fact false and I will present reasons for 
thinking this in some detail later on because seeing why (DP) is false can further 
illuminate what is being presupposed by Kripke at the deepest level.)
L3
The Irrelevancy of the Disquotation Principle
I believe that we often do ascribe beliefs without relying, even tacitly, on 
anything like a disquotation principle, and, moreover, that an analogous puzzle 
can be created using an argument based on such beliefs. I shall now describe a 
scenario in which we would feel justified in ascribing a certain belief to Pierre 
where Pierre does not provide us with an utterance which allows us to disquote 
him.
Suppose that Pierre is at home watching television and sees a documentary 
featuring London and that he seems very impressed with what he sees on 
television (images of London’s lovely green parks, the Thames, St. Paul’s 
Cathedral.) He says: ‘Quelle belle ville!’. If we know French we would surely 
feel justified in saying, on the basis of his utterance: ‘Pierre believes that 
London is beautiful’. I take it that someone who objected to such an attribution, 
saying, perhaps, that we should instead say that ‘Pierre believes that the city he 
sees on the television in front of him is beautiful’ thinking that this is a more 
accurate description of Pierre’s belief than the ascription ‘Pierre believes that 
London is beautiful’ has some theoretical considerations in mind. I wish to
2 A Fregean, for instance, might be tempted to make such a claim if he thought that belief reports 
must relate agents to thought-contents which contain descriptive senses and that such senses 
must appear in the embedded clause of the report if it is to be strictly true.
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emphasise however, that it would be absolutely natural to say that he believes 
that London is beautiful and I take it as a datum that we would say such a thing 
without taking ourselves to be saying anything inaccurate, non-literal or 
elliptical.
It seems, furthermore, that we could make such an attribution on the basis of 
other purely non-verbal behaviour. For Pierre could have given some other sign 
to show that he believed the same thing. Facial expressions and other bodily 
movements can often guide us to what a person thinks. Further support for the 
claim that we often ascribe beliefs without relying on a principle of disquotation 
comes from the observation that we ascribe beliefs to those who have not 
spoken on topic, perhaps because they can’t. We are often willing to say of a 
dog who has been chasing squirrels across the lawn and then suddenly stops and 
barks furiously up a tree, for example, that it believes that the squirrel ran up the 
tree, or of a small child who we see has got separated from her father in a 
supermarket that she believes that she has been abandoned. It is expected that 
one might object to taking these kinds of belief ascriptions seriously and that 
they may be theoretical reasons for doing so. On such a view, the ascriptions are 
to be treated as useful, but non-literal ways of talking about beliefs. It is of 
historical interest to note here that Frank Ramsey allowed that we might ascribe 
beliefs to non-verbal animals and that we might be speaking non-metaphorically 
in doing so, but that we must then admit that the term ‘belief is semantically 
ambiguous and that in his philosophical work on belief he was only interested in 
beliefs of linguistically sophisticated animals. Both types of responses bring in 
theoretical considerations to partition off the belief reports which should inform 
a proper philosophical study of belief reports. It would be too quick to say that 
this is methodologically improper, but I suggest that we gain real insight by 
taking the data seriously and only trying to develop our theory of belief and 
belief reporting later. The data in this case are that we often issue belief reports 
about animals and non-verbal humans.
3 1 do not think that we want an a priori argument for this methodological claim here. Rather, the 
rightness of the claim can only be judged in light of the success or otherwise of a project, such as 
mine, which employs this methodology.
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If we take seriously such belief attributions not based on verbal behaviour, there 
may still be a temptation to say here that such behaviour would necessarily 
underdetermine exactly what belief we are entitled to ascribe. I suggest that it is 
some such consideration which lies behind Kripke’s use of the disquotation 
principle, because if we are using the principle then that would seem to fully 
determine the belief held. For, on this picture, if the agent says S then we say 
that she believes that S. On this traditional view, the content that she asserts is 
taken to be the very same thing that the belief report is taken to relate her to.
This is why the question of underdetermination cannot arise here. I want to draw 
attention to the way in which such an objection as the underdetermination 
objection only seems to even make sense on the assumption that there is a fact 
of the matter about what content an agent is psychologically related to and that 
the belief sentence aims to specify that content.
It might also be thought that such ascriptions based solely on non-verbal 
behaviour are necessarily provisional in the sense that further evidence could 
lead us to revise our view that the original ascription was true. But, while this 
may be true, it is also true that any belief ascription is provisional in this sense, 
even one based on assertion of or assent to a particular sentence. But this point 
is, I think, often obscured by the way in which (DP) is often qualified. For the 
antecedent of the conditional principle says: ‘If a competent, sincere and 
reflective speaker... ’ And this can make it seem, as it has seemed to many, 
virtually a truism. But, it is important to note that in any actual application of the 
principle, we do not, and cannot, know that the agent is fully competent, is 
trying to speak the truth and is taking a certain minimal expected amount of care 
over what she says. The assumption that these conditions are fully met in any 
real case is always defeasible. The difference between belief reports based on 
utterances and belief reports based on only non-verbal behaviour with respect to 
whether or not they are revisable in light of further evidence should not be over­
emphasised. My point is that in both kinds of cases we are entitled to have 
confidence in the ascription at least until we have reason to attribute another 
belief which is a contradictory of the belief originally ascribed, or is , say, a 
better explanation of the agent’s behaviour. So, in this respect, the situation with
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respect to the two kinds of reports is parallel. The difference is, at most, a matter 
of degree.
I would like to say then that our intuitions about what could be the case about an 
agent’s beliefs does not depend upon our assuming a principle like (DP). Even if 
my arguments supporting this claim have been accepted, it must be recognised 
that I have still not shown that Kripke’s puzzle can be derived without such a 
principle. For it is conceivable that while we often make attributions without 
relying on (DP), there is something special about the kinds of scenarios that are 
involved in generating the paradoxes that means that in these cases we must rely 
on (DP).
I think that there is something very importantly correct behind this doubt, and I 
shall return to this shortly. But it does seem that we can generate a puzzle 
without using (DP). For imagine a story such as the one Kripke tells about Pierre 
which is different in that Pierre does not or is not heard to make any 
proclamations about London, but that he exhibits non-verbal behaviour which 
allows us to feel justified in saying, when thinking about the first half of his 
story, ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ and, when thinking about the 
second half of the story, allows us to feel justified in saying ‘Pierre believes that 
London is not pretty’. Can we imagine such a story? If we can, then we can 
simply say that (DP) is not essential to the derivation of the puzzle, and that we 
must look elsewhere for the source of the trouble. If we cannot, then this must 
be because the difference in defeasibility of the two types of evidence for the 
reports (one an assertion that appears to be sincere and based on competence and 
sufficient reflectiveness, the other based on purely non-verbal behaviour) does 
play a significant role. It would be as if the evidence which is an assertion is not 
outweighed by other considerations deriving from our overall view of Pierre’s 
situation, whereas the evidence for a belief attribution which is solely non­
verbal behaviour is outweighed by such considerations. I see no reason to 
privilege verbal behaviour to this extent. (Discussion in Chapter Four will show 
the limited relevance of verbal behaviour to belief ascriptions).
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I think that someone who accepts the reasoning that Kripke employs taking us 
from a pure description of Pierre’s scenario to a paradox would be very likely to 
accept similar reasoning that takes us from a description of the scenario to a 
paradox but which does not involve the use of (DP). If this is correct, then in 
this sense (DP) is inessential to Kripke’s puzzle.4 Before I say what I think 
really is essential to the derivation of the puzzle, however, I want to be more 
clear about what the status of (DP) really is. This is the only way to see what the 
underlying structure of Kripke’s puzzle really is. Kripke and others seem to see 
(DP) as expressing some kind of conceptual truth, provided that it is suitably 
qualified. It is not claimed that (DP) provides a reductive analysis of belief in 
terms of assent to a sentence, since it seems clear that the qualifications 
contained in the antecedent of the conditional principle themselves involve the 
concept of belief. Nevertheless, it has been assumed that belief and assent are 
conceptually connected in a way that satisfies the principle. It is natural to think 
of the principle as expressing a conceptual truth. Consider the qualifications 
employed in the antecedent of the principle; the speaker must be linguistically 
competent, sincere and reflective. Being linguistically competent means having 
enough true beliefs about the English language to be able to express one’s 
beliefs in English. Sincerity entails the desire to speak only in accordance with 
one’s beliefs. Reflectiveness requires that the agent makes sure that what she 
says does in fact express her beliefs. Given these qualifications, then, there 
seems to be no room for a counter-example to the principle.
I think that this is why Kripke and others regard (DP) as a self-evident truth. But 
if we think that this is a principle that we actually employ, then it cannot be an 
analytic truth, for as I have said earlier we could never know that the conditions 
in the antecedent are fulfilled in any real case. Taken as an analytic truth, we 
should challenge whether it should be taken to be applicable in any real case. 
Taken as a principle that we actually employ to arrive at what an agent believes, 
we should understand the principle as embodying the idea that there is an
4 Prominent examples o f  philosophers who seem to think that the paradox can arise with the use o f (DP) are Keith 
Donnellan (1979) whose paper ‘Belief and the Identity of Reference’ seems to argue that a paradox can arise without 
(DP), and Genoveva Marti and Joseph Almog, both of whom have verbally expressed such a view to me.
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evidential relation between assent and belief, rather than the tight conceptual 
connection that is widely believed to hold.
When we think of (DP) as a principle of evidence that we actually use, then we 
are more likely to think of assent to a sentence as defeasible evidence. Since the 
principle can easily seem to be self-evident, I think it is useful to have in mind 
an example where assent to a sentence is at best a privileged guide to what an 
agent believes, but certainly not an automatically overriding form of evidence. A 
man who works in a residential home for the old, when being asked about why 
he chose his career, says ‘Old people deserve respect.’ Suppose that in saying 
that the man seems sincere, and that we generally think of him as being sincere; 
that he seems to be reflective and that he seems to use the word ‘deserves’ as all 
other competent English speakers. Suppose that his behaviour seems to us very 
disrespectful so that we might say that his actual treatment of the elderly gives 
the lie to what he says. What are we to make of this? We might very naturally 
refuse to say that he believes that the elderly deserve respect, for if he really 
thought that then he just couldn’t treat them the way he did. Are we then forced 
to say that he is either being insincere, unreflective or linguistically 
incompetent?
My intuition is that we are not forced into saying any one of these. One could 
say one of these things, or one could talk of self-deception, false consciousness.
I do not know what we should say in such a case; whether we must chose one of 
the above options or whether these options do not exhaust the possibilities. Nor 
am I sure that an analytic philosopher bent on defending (DP) could not show 
either that one of the conditions met in the antecedent was not in fact met or that 
further restrictive conditions could be included in the antecedent so that it was 
made immune to counter-example. The main point of my example is to 
encourage us to think that in realistic cases, the most natural thing to say is that 
behavioural evidence is not superfluous to our judgements about what an agent 
actually believes, and that assent to a sentence is only one form of evidence that 
counts towards our judgements.
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If neither (TP) nor (DP) is strictly essential to the derivation of the puzzle, then 
the question is; what is at the core of the puzzle? This is the question that I now 
try to answer.
14
The structure of Kripke’s argument
First I want to draw attention to the fact we need some argument involving some 
specific assumptions about belief reporting in order to get as far as making the 
ascription : ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty and that London is not pretty’. 
Many thought-experiments in philosophy of mind or language having to do with 
belief ascriptions simply start with a stipulation about what an agent believes. In 
discussions of substitutivity, for instance, it is simply assumed that an agent can 
believe, for instance, that Hesperus is shiny and Phosphorous is shiny. Intuitions 
about the possibility of an agent having such beliefs do not seem to depend on 
any specific assumptions about an agent’s assertions or other behaviour. It is 
supposed that an ascription like ‘John believes Phosphorous is shiny and that 
. Hesperus is not shiny’ is not considered, pre-theoretically puzzling. It only 
seems to become problematic when we make theoretical assumptions which 
seem to commit us to a principle of substitutivity, for then we are led to say that 
if this last ascription is true then so must this one be true: ‘John believes that 
Phosphorous is shiny and that Phosphorous is not shiny’ and this ascription does 
seem puzzling. My point here is that this ascription and the structurally similar 
one ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty and that London is not pretty’ seems 
immediately puzzling. This form of ascription just does not seem to be one we 
can make sense of straight off. This is why Kripke needs an argument to derive 
the claim that Pierre believes that London is pretty and that London is not 
pretty’.
The question then becomes: What is the argument that would establish such a 
conclusion if it does not necessarily involve either (DP) or (TP)? I shall try now 
to say what I think the underlying argument structure is, before defending this 
construal and, then saying what picture of belief and belief reporting lies behind 
it.
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An argument like Kripke’s occurs in two parts, and this is important5. First, we 
consider an agent and we are encouraged to think that we have sufficient 
grounds for attributing to him the belief that London is pretty. The grounds here 
(which may include sincere assertions, but need not) are considered sufficient to 
establish that the agent has that belief. Importantly, the grounds have only to do 
with what we learn about the agent in the first part of the story. Next, we 
consider the agent with respect to another context, and we are encouraged to 
think that we again have sufficient grounds for ascribing to him a certain belief, 
namely, the belief that London is not pretty. We are invited to consider various 
facts about the agent, but we are required, it seems to me, not to consider the 
earlier facts which were taken to provide the grounds for the claim that he 
believes that London is pretty. In particular, we are not to consider the fact that 
we earlier decided to say of him that he believes that London is pretty. The 
grounds underlying the first ascription and the grounds underlying the second 
ascription are taken to be independent of each other. The argument requires that 
they are independent in the sense that each of the set of facts constituting the 
grounds for each ascription is simply irrelevant when it comes to deciding the 
truth of the other ascription. This independence is required for each of the 
grounds to be sufficient grounds for each ascription. The attribution which says 
‘Pierre believes that London is pretty and that London is not pretty’ does not 
seem to be derivable if we let each of the grounds interfere with the other. In 
other words, once we are put in a position in which all the facts are considered 
together, neither of the ascriptions seem particularly plausible. But if they are 
both implausible considered individually then we lose our reason for saying that 
the conjunctive report is true. For, given the observation made in the previous 
paragraph that the conjunctive report is prima facie puzzling, we would have to 
derive the conjunctive report from the two other reports.
This, I think, is the basic structure of the argument for the conclusion that 
‘Pierre believes that London is pretty and that London is not pretty’ is true. It
5 Keith Donnellan in his paper ‘Belief and the Identity of Reference’ (1979) is, as far as I know, 
the only philosopher who has drawn attention to this very important structural aspect of Kripke’s 
derivation of the puzzle. I believe that this structure is crucial, as I explain.
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does seem absolutely essential to the puzzle that we are to consider the scenario 
in two parts which we the reporters must keep apart when considering our 
intuitions about what to say about Pierre’s beliefs. And it seems essential that 
the factors we consider are sufficient to determine what Pierre believes, 
otherwise our acceptance of each of the individual reports would not hold. It is 
this requirement of sufficiency, I suggest, that lies behind Kripke’s insistence on 
using (DP) and his insistence in claiming that (DP) is conceptually true. But it is 
not (DP) per se that is essential to the derivation, but the notion of sufficient 
grounds. I claimed that the idea of sufficiency relevant here entails that, for both 
of the reports, considered individually, the truth of the other report and the 
allegedly sufficient grounds for it must be independent. I take it that this idea of 
independence lies behind what Kripke is arguing for when he argues 1) that we 
cannot retroactively judge that Pierre never believed that London is pretty 
because of ‘later vicissitudes’ (thus showing the independence of the first report 
from the grounds for the second) and 2) that we cannot withhold our attribution 
of Pierre’s belief that London is not pretty on the basis of facts deriving from his 
earlier and quite separate life in France because Pierre is indistinguishable from 
his English neighbours (thus showing that the later facts are independent from 
the grounds for the first ascription.)
In summary, the paradox arises because we have two sets of facts both of which 
when we consider them each by itself seem warrant to a certain conclusion 
about what Pierre believes. It is further made to seem that each set of facts 
exhausts all the relevant information about Pierre’s beliefs, so that each set facts 
is independent from the other. The conclusions which seem to be independently 
warranted, however, seem highly problematic when considered together when 
we hold the additional claim that Pierre is rational.
L5
Exposing A Possible Flaw in Kripke’s Reasoning
I now want to focus more closely on the structure of Kripke’s argument and to 
try to find a fallacy in the argument. It seems to me that there is a fallacy in the 
argument, but that it is almost invisible from a certain perspective, specifically
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from a perspective which involves talking about Pierre’s beliefs rather than 
talking about which ascriptions are true of him.
Let us focus on Kripke’s argument for the claim that we are bound to say that 
Pierre believes that London is pretty. The argument can be reconstructed as 
follows:
1. We would say, truly, given the information about Pierre’s life in France, 
and given no other information, ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’.
2. We should not retroactively judge that Pierre never believed this.
3. It would be wrong to say that Pierre has changed his mind.
Therefore,
4. We must now say that ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ is true.
I think that this is a fair reconstruction of the reasoning that Kripke employs. 
Moreover, stating the premises and conclusion in a metalinguistic mode is 
designed to bring out the fallacy in the argument. Stating the argument in the 
metalinguistic mode also has the advantage that the premises are all plausible 
even once the whole argument of Kripke’s paper has been given. (If the 
argument had instead been from the premises 1 ’) Pierre believed that London is 
pretty and 3’) Pierre has not changed his mind to the conclusion 4’) Pierre now 
believes that London is pretty, then the argument is less plausible as the first 
premise would be rather certain, given the paradox eventually arrived at). The 
premises all appear, then, to be true. Premises 1 and 3 certainly seem beyond 
doubt, although 2 may give us some pause. But, Kripke does say in support of 
this claim that if we were to allow such retroactive judgements then all our 
belief attribution would, as long as the future is uncertain, be put in danger. This 
in itself is not a convincing reason to ban retroactive judgements, since surely all 
our empirical claims are defeasible in light of what we may learn in the future. 
So I assume that Kripke must mean that only certain kinds of future findings can 
be considered relevant for the truth of our belief attributions and that these kinds 
do not include the kinds of findings that we have presented to us in the 
description of Pierre’s situation. The ban on retroactive judgements about belief 
attributions is to be understood in a sense in which it would follow from the
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claim that the information we are given about Pierre in the first part of the story 
exhausts what is relevant for the truth of the ascription ‘Pierre believes that 
London is pretty’.
I assume that the premises can be understood, then, in a way which makes them 
all true. But is the argument valid? It seems to me that it is not, for it seems clear 
to me that the conclusion is false. At least, it seems clear to me that we would 
not find it at all natural to say, when we have the whole story before us, that 
Pierre believes that London is pretty. One might think that it would be better to 
be more tentative here, and instead of saying that it is false, to say that it feels 
like a strange, misleading thing to say. It is, of course, not unusual in philosophy 
of language to find philosophers saying things which fall short of attributing a 
truth-value to a particular statement. But I see no good reason not to say that 
‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ is not true, no good reason, that is to say, 
in the absence of an argument such as the one considered here. I will now focus 
on why I think that this argument is invalid.
It obviously does not follow from the fact that it would be correct to utter a 
sentence in a certain context that it would be correct to utter that sentence in a 
different context, even if it were also true that the state of affairs allegedly 
described the first utterance had not changed between the two contexts of 
utterance. To make such an inference would obviously be fallacious in the case 
of utterances involving the explicit use of indexicals such as in the following 
argument:
I believe it’s going to rain (spoken by Gary)
Gary has not changed his mind about this 
Therefore,
I believe it’s going to rain (spoken by Leah)
This might seem an irrelevant counter-example involving explicit indexicals as 
it does, although it should be noted that there is however a sizeable amount of 
recent work on the semantics of belief reports according to which belief
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ascriptions involve tacit elements of indexicality6.1 wish to dissociate myself 
from such accounts however and I will explain why in the second part of this 
chapter. For now I wish to point out that Kripke’s argument as I have 
reconstructed it above is fallacious and suggest that this is because the context of 
utterance of a belief ascription can be relevant to the truth-value of a report even 
when the report does not exhibit explicit elements of indexicality. In fact, I do 
not think that the contextual-sensitivity of belief reports has anything to do with 
indexicality as this notion is usually understood. (My account of the contextual 
sensitivity of ascriptions will be explained in chapter Four).
Anyone who believes that the argument I reconstructed above is fallacious for 
something like the reason I have indicated can be said to hold a ‘contextualist’ 
thesis about belief sentences.7 ‘Contextualism’ can be defined thus:
It is possible that a belief-sentence containing no obvious indexical expressions is true of an 
agent relative to one context, and simultaneously false of the agent with respect to another 
context.
Contextualism is certainly an interesting thesis and does not seem to be among 
the possibilities that Kripke considers when addressing the question of how the 
puzzle might be solved. I now want to explain why contextualism did not, I 
think, occur to Kripke.
L6
Foregrounding the most basic assumption
I think the most plausible explanation is that Kripke presupposes a certain 
analysis of belief reports sentences as well as a certain relationship between a 
belief report and belief itself, (not that this assumption entails, by itself, that 
contextualism is false, since as I will mention below, contextualism can be 
incorporated into theories which maintain the basic assumption). Although he
6 Crimmins (1992) and Crimmins and Perry (1989) are prominent examples o f a so-called hidden-indexical theory, as is 
Schiffer (1977). I do not discuss these theories in die dissertation, but note that they each embody the coitral assumption 
that I want to cast doubt on, and do so in a particularly tendentious way.
7 Joseph Moore (1999) has used the label ‘contextualist’ to describe such views, and my definition o f it is derived from 
his.
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does not explicitly distinguish between the psychological phenomenon of 
believing and the semantic issue of belief ascriptions, it seems to me that he 
does presuppose that belief ascriptions are true (when true) because they 
explicitly relate an agent to a representation which the agent is as a matter of 
(psychological) fact related to. My reason for saying that Kripke presupposes 
these two things is that this seems to be the best explanation of why he employs 
the form of argumentation that he does employ. Specifically, consider the point 
in the argument where Kripke gives us a reason for thinking that the conjunctive 
report ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty and that London is not pretty’ is 
true. He cannot simply ask us to consult our intuitions about what we would say 
using such a form of sentence, given all the information about Pierre. For then 
we would certainly not want to issue or endorse the conjunctive report. He is 
instead forced to proceed indirectly. He says he has established that Pierre 
believed that London is pretty and that Pierre has not changed his mind. He then 
concludes that Pierre still believes that London is pretty. Now, in this 
formulation, the reasoning seems very plausible. Notice, however, that if we put 
the same argument in the metalinguistic mode, it immediately seems less 
plausible. If we move from ( l) ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ was true, 
together with (2)‘Pierre has not changed his mind’ is true, to (3) ‘Pierre believes 
that London is pretty’ is now true, it seems to me that we now feel less sure that 
we have arrived on firm ground. Why should this be the case?
I think that the plausibility of the first argument derives from our tacit 
assumption that we report on a fact about Pierre which is (ontologically) prior to 
our report, namely, the fact that Pierre stands in a certain relation to a particular 
proposition, specifically the proposition expressed by ‘London is pretty’. Pierre 
has not changed his mind. This is assumed to mean that he has not ceased 
standing in that same relation (of acceptance) to that same proposition. We feel 
bound then to say that he still stands in that relation to that proposition. And this 
fact (again thought of as a real fact about Pierre which is independent of what 
we would naturally want to say about him using belief sentences of a certain 
form) is thought to ground our saying that Pierre still believes that London is 
pretty. The same picture seems to be at work when Kripke tries to establish that 
Pierre has later come to believe that London is not pretty. Pierre is then thought
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of as standing in a real psychological relation to the proposition expressed by 
‘London is not pretty’ which is the contradictory of the one expressed by 
‘London is pretty’. If we think of these facts as prior to the reports, then it can 
seem that the facts are independent of each other. This is why it seems 
metaphysically possible that Pierre can have contradictory beliefs.
By contrast, the argument formulated in the metalinguistic mode allows us to 
focus our attention on what we would naturally want to say to describe Pierre’s 
situation and this allows our intuition that belief reports are context-sensitive to 
come to the surface. Also, from this metalinguistic perspective, it seems that the 
reports are not likely to be independent of each other. While the two reports 
‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ and ‘Pierre believes that London is not 
pretty’ seem natural when considered individually, their conjunction seems 
anything but natural. It seems, to naive intuition, to be the kind of thing we 
would never say.
Nevertheless, the presuppositions in question (that belief reports report on a 
prior fact about what proposition an agent is related to in the relevant way) do 
not, by themselves, entail that contextualism is false. The only way that 
contextualism could be true, however, given these assumptions, is if the overall 
semantic contribution of an utterance of the subsentence S, in the context of the 
report, itself differed from one context to another. Kripke, of course, did not 
think that this was the case, thinking that ‘London is pretty’ always expresses a 
univocal content to which the belief report reports Pierre as being related to in 
the relevant way. And this is the very assumption that recent work in the 
semantics of belief reports has been aimed at criticising. (I will critically 
examine one such theory in Chapter Three). The theories which do this are 
rather diverse from a purely semantical perspective, but they all have in 
common that they try to account for contextualism with respect to belief reports 
by showing how certain features of the context of utterance of the belief report 
contribute to what is said in uttering it on a given occasion by altering the entity 
that the agent is said to be related to by the relevant acceptance relation. What is 
left in place are the two assumptions that I mentioned above, namely, that belief 
reports report on a prior psychological fact and that this prior fact consists of an
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agent standing in a certain relation to a representational entity. I do not want to 
criticise these views here. I merely want to suggest that this may be an 
alternative way to account for contextualism. The remainder of this chapter tries 
to suggest how an alternative picture might address the puzzle about rationality 
and belief reports.
L I
Desiderata for a Resolution of the Puzzle
I am now in a position put forward what I consider to be the main desiderata for 
a resolution to the version of Kripke’s puzzle that I have focused on in this 
chapter (that is, concerning the relation been Pierre’s rationality and the 
argument which leads to his being attributed contradictory beliefs. The puzzle 
should be addressed in its both of its two guises, that is to say, both when 
presented as a puzzle about belief and when seen as a puzzle about belief 
ascriptions. I want an account which can accommodate, first, the felt 
incompatibility of an agent’s rationality with her having contradictory beliefs, 
and secondly, the felt incompatibility of saying of an agent presumed to be 
rational that she believes ‘that S and that not-S’. The intuition that a rational 
agent cannot have contradictory beliefs is to be taken seriously and assumed to 
be true (so that there is no question of a revisionary proposal according to which 
a rational agent can, after all, have contradictory beliefs). The account, in 
explaining the incompatibility, should not rely either on 1) the claim that belief 
reports are to be understood ‘de re’ so that the belief ascriptions are somehow 
not reflective of the real underlying cognitive facts about the agent, nor 2) the 
claim that the belief ascriptions are superficially misleading as to the real nature 
of the beliefs they allegedly talk about. There should be no reliance on the 
principle in philosophy of mind that says that ascribing contradictory properties 
to an object in thought depends on the agent have two distinct ‘ways of 
thinking’ of the object in question. There should be no reliance on the claim that 
our belief reports somehow manage to achieve reference to the ‘ways of 
thinking’ that the philosophy of mind principle says mediates betweens agents
35
36
and the objects their beliefs are about. (Arguments for these desiderata will be 
given in Chapter Three).
The response to the puzzle should be able to account for the apparent 
plausibility of Kripke’s arguments at each stage, in particular, why it seems, 
first, true to say ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ and then later to say 
‘Pierre believes that London is not pretty’ without it ever being right to say 
‘Pierre believes that London is pretty and that London is not pretty’. The 
account must then be contextualist (in the sense defined in 1.5), so as to avoid 
the radically revisionary proposal that the law of conjunction does not apply in 
the context of belief reports.
The account should not rely on discrediting (DP) or (TP) since both of these 
principles have been seen to be inessential to the derivation of the puzzle.
L8
Suggesting A New Response to the Puzzle
Introducing a Principle Which Governs our Practices
My response to the puzzle starts from the empirical observation that the 
following generalisation is true of our belief reporting practices:
For any agent A whom we consider to be rational, and for any sentence S, we do 
not issue a report of the form ‘A believes that S and that not-S’.
Postulating that our belief-reporting practices embody (PRRA) is not arbitrary.
Q
The constraint has an important function, as Joseph Moore (1999) observes . It 
serves to distinguish between two kinds of epistemic situation which we surely 
do want to distinguish. On the one hand there are situations structurally like 
Pierre’s where the agent thinks that there are two objects when in fact there is
8 Moore does not draw the strong conclusions about the existence of this principle that I do.
36
37
only one and so can attribute contradictory properties to the object in thought 
and in speech (since the agent does not realise that the names he uses are 
coreferential.) but where the agent’s ascribing such conflicting properties arises 
from his false empirical beliefs. We might say that external circumstances have 
conspired against him. On the other hand, there are those situations of genuine 
irrationality which would have to arise through carelessness in thought or 
‘cognitive dissonance’. These involve not a conspiracy in external 
circumstances, but some kind of failure of internal functioning. It is plausible 
that our ordinary belief-reporting practice would track such a distinction, for 
even though both types of case would require the agent to reorganise his 
thoughts, in the former type of case, exemplified by Pierre, she could in 
principle do this by learning new facts. In the latter type of case, she should in 
principle be able to do this by purely a priori means.
Here are examples which I think exemplify this distinction and which are in 
accordance with (PRRA). Pierre is intuitively rational, he is a leading logician, 
and given the story about him we understand that he finds himself in a non-ideal 
epistemic situation due to a conspiracy of circumstances which have resulted in 
him not realising that ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ name one single city. We have a 
strong inclination not to say ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty and that 
London is not pretty’. Kripke expresses this intuition when he says: “We cannot 
convict him of inconsistency. To do so is incorrect”. (The weak conflicting 
inclination to say that the report is true seems to derive entirely from Kripke’s 
argument where he argues that it is true that Pierre believes that London is pretty 
and argues separately that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. Once the 
contextual-sensitivity of the reports is made explicit the inference that Kripke 
actually makes is revealed as fallacious, since it does not follow from the fact 
that ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ is true in one context and that ‘Pierre 
believes that London is not pretty’ is true in another context, that there is a 
context in which they are both true. I submit that our practices embody a surface 
constraint along the lines of (PRRA)).
An example of the other type of case is one I heard in conversation recently. ‘He 
believes that The Earth was created two thousand years ago and that it was not
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created two thousand years.’ It occurred in the context of talking about a friend 
who seemed to have ‘compartmentalised’ his religious beliefs. The point of the 
report was to draw attention to the agent’s irrationality and conveyed a degree of 
epistemic censure which seemed appropriate because the reporter thought that 
the agent should surely be able to see for himself (by a priori means) that he 
needed to change his beliefs.
Why a rational agent cannot have contradictory beliefs
I claim that a rational agent cannot have straightforwardly contradictory beliefs 
because our practices of ascribing beliefs embody a constraint which prohibits 
the attribution of contradictory beliefs to an agent who is intuitively rational. Or 
at least there is a constraint that says we can never say of an agent presumed to 
be rational something of the form ‘A believes that S and that not-S’, without 
immediate further qualification and explanation. (So, I concede that we may 
occasionally be able to say, of Pierre, for example, ‘Pierre believes that London 
is pretty and that London is not pretty, but this is only because he thinks that 
there are two Londons, etc....’ but this addition to the ascription would be a 
necessary part of the context of the belief ascription).
The ‘because’ in the first sentence of this subsection is meant seriously. The 
coherence of this explanation depends on saying that what an agent believes, or 
what beliefs he has, depends on what our practices allow us to say in the form 
‘A believes that S’. This is an inversion of the standard picture which I argue 
against, according to which what beliefs an agent has is ontologically prior to 
our belief ascriptions and grounds their truth or falsity as the case may be. I 
intend that the discussion in Chapter Three and the view I defend in Chapter 
Four should make this picture seem more plausible than it might otherwise be.
The Notion of ‘Rationality’ at the Centre of the Puzzle
I need to say something more about the notion of rationality at the centre of this 
discussion, for the Principle of Reporting Rational Agents would seem to
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require (and I believe that it does) that we can have a grasp of whether or not an 
agent is rational which is prior to deciding whether he has contradictory beliefs 
or not (since I have deliberately conflated the distinction between having 
contradictory beliefs and having a report of the form ‘A believes that S and that 
not-S’ be true of one.) Notice also that Kripke’s argumentative structure also 
seems to depend on a notion of rationality that does not rule out simply by 
definition that Pierre has contradictory beliefs. For there really does seem to be a 
difficult question about whether Pierre has contradictory beliefs; it is a matter of 
some debate whether we, on the one hand, reject the conceptual connection 
between rationality and contradictory beliefs (and this option seems to 
presuppose that we can still make some sense of the intuitive notion of 
rationality even while allowing that the agent in question does have 
contradictory beliefs), or on the other hand, reject the principles that lead to a 
contradictory attribution.
I believe that there is such an intuitive notion of rationality according to which 
Pierre does count as rational and which does not definitionally entail that the 
agent does not have contradictory beliefs.
The idea of being a good reasoner is at the centre of the notion. Rationality 
seems to require that one is able, by introspective means, to correct any 
epistemic tensions that arise in one’s cognitive situations, but only where this 
does not essentially depend on the agent being in possession of particular 
empirical knowledge. The intuition that Pierre is a good reasoner then is not 
impugned by the fact that he ascribes in thought contradictory properties to one 
object, for he is in no position to see, by introspection alone, that he is ascribing 
contradictory properties to a single object. If we direct attention away from the 
alleged contents of Pierre’s mind, since what the contents of his beliefs are is the 
very question at issue in Kripke’s discussion, and onto how we (as outside 
observers of his history) understand Pierre, we can see that it is very easy to 
make sense of Pierre. His verbal behaviour is readily intelligible to us; we know 
that he assents to contradictory sentences, that he does so because he does not 
know that they are contradictory and that his not knowing this is not due to lack
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of attention to detail, carelessness or cognitive dissonance. His actions appear 
coherent to us.
\
An agent is rational in the relevant sense if her overall behaviour is coherent, 
given an overall view of her situation. Pierre’s behaviour is coherent from an 
overall perspective. The emphasis on overall behaviour is important, for in 
Pierre’s case, his verbal behaviour, taken in isolation, appears not coherent. The 
notion of coherence is admittedly vague, but I think that it is already a familiar 
notion to us. It is clear that the notion requires more of an agent than having 
consistent beliefs; it requires also that her non-verbal behaviour is not dissonant 
with her verbal behaviour. Consider again the agent who (apparently sincerely) 
avows that she believes that elderly people should always be treated with 
respect, and yet whose behaviour in relation to them seems dissonant with these 
avowals. Or Ruth Marcus’ case of the woman who seems, on paper, an expert 
mathematician, always saying ‘yes’ to a whole range of true sentences of 
artithmetic and always saying ‘no’ to the false ones, and yet who always counts 
things wrongly and who always gives the wrong change when working in her 
shop. Her overall behaviour is incoherent. And we would say that she is not 
rational.
It is important to notice that the notion of rationality suggested here avoids some 
of the metaphysical assumptions about mind that have been explicitly or 
implicitly assumed in classical responses to Kripke’s puzzle. One very important 
assumption is that a rational agent can both believe and disbelieve that certain 
object or property x is such and such, or ascribe in thought contradictory 
properties, p i and p2, to an object only if there are distinct ways of thinking of 
the object, call them ml and m2, such that the agent believes x to be such and 
such under ml and disbelieves that the object is such and such under m2, or that 
believes that x has p i under ml and has p2 under m2. On Frege’s classical view 
these ways of thinking are part of the content of the belief; on more recent 
views, there are not part of the content (where belief is seen as a two-place 
relation) but nonetheless are mental representations which constitute one of the 
elements of the belief relation (where belief is seen as a three place relation). 
What these views have in common is that belief is seen as a relation to a
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representation and that ascribing contradictory beliefs to an object in thought 
involves distinct representations.
It has been usual to add on top of this metaphysical view a view about belief 
ascriptions according to which a belief report of the form ‘A believes that S’ is 
true when it relates the agent to the relevant inner representations. According to 
these views then a report which is true of a rational agent must relate her to 
distinct representations. A philosopher who holds this must explain how a belief 
sentence can achieve this.
This traditional notion of rationality sees rationality as having to do with the 
representations inside the agent’s head as opposed to the intelligibility of the 
agent to a reporter on her beliefs. The traditional view of ascriptions sees them 
as somehow referring to these representations.
The notion of rationality that I have discussed makes no assumptions about the 
nature of the psychological states which are alleged to underlie the belief 
ascriptions. The focus is placed instead on the intelligibility of the agent to the 
reporter. The sentences of the form ‘A believes that S’ that the reporter uses to 
talk about the agent are not assumed to make reference to such underlying states 
as it does not assume that there are such underlying states.
Nothing in what I have said implies that there is nothing going on inside the 
agent’s head which is relevant to the truth of the belief reports. There is clearly a 
functioning brain and there may be all kinds of mental goings on including 
mental images and sounds, other kinds of phenomenal experiences. I only deny 
that we need to assume that there is any systematic unity of inner representations 
which belief reports are somehow targeted on.
JL9
How mv response relates to other popular types of response
I want to conclude this chapter with some remarks about how my response to 
the puzzle fits into the logical space of possible solutions to the puzzle as it is
41
42
construed here. I have said that the puzzle is best characterised as involving the 
tension between Pierre’s presumed rationality, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, a seemingly plausible characterisation of our belief reporting practices 
which apparently leads us to attribute contradictory beliefs to Pierre, or at least, 
issue belief reports of the form, ‘Pierre believes that S and that not-S’.
Responses to the puzzle can be grouped, first of all, according to whether or not 
they accept that there is a genuine tension here. Consider those views which 
deny the tension. This can be done by focusing on the ascriptions and saying 
that the ascriptions themselves are somehow not suitable for assessments of an 
agent’s rationality. This is a well-known strategy and can be developed along 
several different lines. One way is to invoke the so-called de dicto/ de re 
distinction and say that the ascriptions in question are to be understood de re. 
There is, then, still thought to be a level of mental representation at which 
assessments of rationality can be made, but the de re reports are thought of as 
abstracting away from this content in such a way that they fail to fully specify 
the content of the belief held, and so by themselves cannot be used in 
assessments of rationality. The advantage of this view is that it allows the 
philosopher of mind to maintain his view that Pierre does not after all have 
contradictory beliefs, where beliefs are thought of as having a content which is 
transparent to the agent in such a way that he can see, by mere introspection, 
that his beliefs are contradictory and so incorrect. Nathan Salmon can be seen as 
offering a view that falls into this category, and I examine his view in Chapter 
Three.
Then there are those views according to which the belief report is thought to 
need supplementing with a logical form which somehow makes semantically 
relevant mental representations which are part of two non-contradictory 
contents. A wide variety of semantic and/or pragmatic mechanisms have been 
suggested to account for how the representations which form part of the content 
of the beliefs (the level at which rationality is to be assessed) are put at semantic
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issue. Mark Richard’s is one such view and the one which I shall discuss in 
Chapter Three.9
The views above rely on a distinction between beliefs proper and the sentences 
we use to talk about those beliefs and it is assumed that there is a level of 
content, not visible in the surface of the reports, which nevertheless restores 
rationality to the agent.
Another quite different view denies the tension between rationality and the truth 
of an ascription of the form ‘A believes S and that not-S’, but only by proposing 
a radical revisionary view in epistemology, according to which it is simply not 
the case that rational agents cannot have contradictory beliefs. This is sometimes 
argued for by claiming that since extemalism about the content of belief states 
(and other mental states) is determined by factors outside of the head, then an 
agent can have contradictory beliefs simply if he is ignorant of the factors 
determining the content and that in general he would not have such knowledge 
by mere introspection and so should not be convicted of irrationality just 
because external circumstances have conspired against him in such a way that 
he has a pair of contradictory contents has contents of two of his beliefs. It is 
sometimes said by proponents of such a view that the idea that rationality and 
having contradictory belief are incompatible rests on a faulty Cartesian 
epistemology which fails to acknowledge the truth of extemalism.
I shall not discuss any such theory because the main motivation of such a theory 
seems to be to account for a false datum, specifically that we can 
unproblematically ascribe contradictory beliefs to a rational agent. If the 
arguments and claims of Section 1.8 are correct this is not the case, and so is not 
a fact that needs explaining. Furthermore, the delicate issues in the epistemology 
of belief that are raised by such theories are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.10
9 Crimmins (1992) and Crimmins and Perry (1989) offer another such theory. David Sosa (1996) offers another variation 
on this idea.
10 Owens (1989) is a prominent example o f such an approach. Although I do nottreat such epistemological theories 
here, I must admit that the view I advance in Chapter Four would seem have consequents for the epistemology of 
belief, and I would ultimately like to try to work out some o f these conseqjences. Considerations in epistemology have 
not constrained my view.
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What each of the above types of view have in common is that they all try to 
reconcile the truth of the belief ascriptions with the fact of the agent’s presumed 
rationality, but if what I say above about our never making belief ascriptions of 
the form ‘A believes that S and that not-S’, then this is simply not a task that we 
should set ourselves. I take seriously the empirical observation that we never say 
such things of an agent presumed to be rational. If this datum is taken as a 
starting point that it alters the shape of the task before us. My view does not 
depend on the standard distinction between belief states and the ascriptions we 
use to talk about them, but instead depends on a deliberate conflation of these 
two things. And this conflation allows me to account for the incompatibility of 
the belief ascriptions with an agent’s rationality without relying on a Cartesian 
epistemology. On my view, the incompatibility does not rest on any 
epistemological view, but on a feature of our belief ascribing practices.
The task before us becomes the task of explaining why our belief reporting 
practices do not allow us to make ascriptions of the form ‘A believes that S and 
not-S’ of a rational agent.
But even those philosophers who have seen the task in this way have responded 
to it in a way which is tightly constrained by the combination of the view in 
philosophy of mind, described above in Section 1.8, according to which an agent 
can attribute in thought contradictory properties to an object only if she thinks of 
the object in two different ways, and the view in philosophy of language that 
such representations are referred to by the embedded clause in a belief report. 
Frege’s original theory would be a theory which embodied such a view. The 
argument for the truth of the report ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty and is 
not pretty’ is then thought to fail when it is held that such sentences do not 
manage to secure reference to the relevant representations.
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1.10
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to move slowly through Kripke’s puzzle in order to 
draw out what I think is really at stake. I have argued that Kripke’s puzzle does 
not really depend on the principles he says it depends on, but rather on a certain 
picture of belief and belief-reporting, according to which belief is a relation to a 
contentful representation and that belief reports report on this relation, the 
relation being thought of as a real psychological relation which obtains between 
the agent and the content, prior to what a reporter might want to say about the 
agent. I have suggested how Kripke’s derivation of the puzzle can be blocked by 
reversing the picture: what an agent believes depends on what ascriptions are 
true of him in a given context, and the truth of these ascriptions does not depend 
on relating him to the content of his allegedly prior belief. This reversal of the 
picture suggests that we should consider first the puzzle in its metalinguistic 
guise, and when we do that we see that the puzzle does not seem to arise. I have 
maintained the view that rationality and having apparently contradictory reports 
true of one are incompatible by, instead of trying to explain why a rational agent 
cannot have contradictory beliefs, trying to suggest why contradictory belief 
reports can never be true of a rational agent. In order to make good on this 
proposal I have discussed a notion of rationality which is not defined in terms 
merely of what an agent believes, but has to do with intelligibility to a belief 
reporter.
The next chapter is a critical evaluation of several theories which I take to 
exemplify a good range of diverse theories which all embody the assumption 
that I have said lies behind Kripke’s puzzle.
45
46
Chapter Two:
A Grammatical Interlude
21
Introduction
In this section I want to consider the grammar of ‘A believes that S’ and its two 
nominalisations ‘A’s believing that S’ and ‘A’s belief that S’. I shall also 
consider one other nominalised form of this verb, that is, expressions which 
include ‘state of belief. Each of these expressions is commonly found in the 
philosophical literature on belief and belief ascriptions.
I examine the grammar and meaning of the above verbal expressions because I 
think that we can draw some tentative conclusions about how to think about 
belief and belief ascriptions from considering the grammar of such expressions. 
I say ‘tentative’ conclusions, because there are no straightforward entailments 
between facts about the grammar of ordinary constructions and conclusions 
having to do with metaphysics, or the relation between metaphysics and 
semantics and methodology (the kinds of conclusions that I am ultimately 
interested in). Nevertheless, I think I can offer some support to some of the 
central claims that I wish to defend.
Ultimately, I wish to defend the view that our study of belief ascriptions should 
not presuppose that belief ascriptions depend for their truth on the existence of 
an independently specifiable set of beliefs that an agent has. I think that such a 
picture of independently specifiable beliefs is encouraged by focusing on 
philosophers’ talk of beliefs using some of the nominalisations that I will 
suggest are unnatural or derivative upon locutions containing ‘believes that’. I 
will draw, in Section 2.2, a tentative conclusion about the ontology of believing. 
I will also argue, in Section 2.3, that some other substantial metaphysical theses 
about belief are not supported by what we ordinarily say (not that there are not 
other reasons for these substantial metaphysical positions).
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Zeno Vendlers’s classification of verbs
When a philosopher is said to be working on the semantics of belief ascriptions 
it is usually meant that the object of his inquiry is really something narrower: 
sentences of the form ‘A believes that S’, where ‘A’ is a stand-in for an 
expression that refers to an agent (paradigmatically a normal human being) and 
‘S’ is a stand-in for a sentence. So, for example, ‘Robert believes that animals 
should never be killed for food’ serves as an instance of the phenomenon he is 
interested in. It is usually assumed that such sentences occur absolutely naturally 
in ordinary English. Ordinary usage is supposed to be the object of his inquiry. 
With this in mind, it is worth noticing that sentences containing ‘believes that’ 
can often sound cumbersome in a natural context and that one is more likely to 
hear sentences of the form ‘A thinks that S’, ‘A thinks S’ or ‘A believes S’ (in 
these last two there being no explicit occurrence of ‘that’). Everything that I say 
about belief ascriptions in this thesis is to be understood as applying to 
utterances of each of the three sentence forms mentioned in the previous 
sentences, and may even sound more natural when directly applied to those 
forms.
‘Believes’ is standardly classified as a stative verb, other standard examples of 
stative verbs being ‘having’, ‘wanting’, ‘being green’. Zeno Vendler (1957), for 
example, classes such verbs together and contrasts them with what he calls 
‘verbs of activity’, ‘verbs of accomplishment’ and ‘verbs of achievement’. His 
basis for this classification has to do with the way they relate to time. Vendler 
says that the question ‘For how long did he V?’ can only sensibly be asked when 
‘V’ is replaced by an activity verb, e.g. ‘For how long did he sing?’ and that the 
question ‘How long did it take to V?’ can only sensibly be asked when ‘V’ is 
replaced with an accomplishment verb, e.g. ‘How long did it take him to recite 
the poem?’ Both types of verbs admit of continuous tenses ( e.g. ‘he was 
singing’, ‘she was reciting the poem’), but neither stative verbs nor verbs of 
achievement do. It makes no sense to say ‘I was believing that S’ (a stative verb) 
nor ‘I was recognising him’ (an achievement verb). Associated with such types
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of verbs are the question forms ‘Do you V?’ and ‘Did you V?’. Stative verbs are 
distinguished from achievement verbs, according to Vendler, by the fact that 
stative verbs are not predicated for specific moments of time but rather for 
periods of time, although these periods are rarely specified precisely. It is much 
more usual, for instance, to hear someone say ‘he believed that Vermont is 
liberal for years’ than to hear someone say ‘I believed that from 8pm until 
midnight’. Vendler applies a simple linguistic test to distinguish achievement 
verbs from stative verbs. The question ‘At what time did you V?’ only makes 
sense for achievement verbs.
As we have seen, Vendler uses the criterion of whether a verb admits of a 
continuous tense form to distinguish between verbs of activity and verbs of 
accomplishment on the one hand, and verbs of achievement and stative verbs on 
the other hand. I suggest, however, that we should see stative verbs as an even 
more fundamentally different category than Vendler’s use of this criterion 
suggests. I suggest that we should modify his criterion to distinguish stative 
verbs from all other kinds of verbs. Instead of asking ‘Does ‘V’ ever usually 
admit of a continuous tense?’, which seems to be Vendler’s real question, we 
should ask ‘Does it ever make sense to use ‘V’ in a continuous tense form, 
whatever the perspective we have on what it is that we are describing?’ If the 
answer to this question is ‘No’ then we have a stative verb. Application of this 
criterion will have different results from Vendler’s, for even those verbs which 
he classifies with stative verbs since they do not usually appear in a continuous 
tense form, will count as having a perfectly natural continuous tense usage when 
the action is described from a certain perspective. Let me provide an example.
Presumably, ‘spitting out a button’ would count as a verb of achievement for 
Vendler since it would not normally occur in a present tense form, for the simple 
reason that it is a relatively instantaneous act, not normally something that one 
could be thought of as being in the process of doing. But I say ‘relatively 
instantaneous’ because it must be conceded that any action which might, for 
ordinary purposes, count as instantaneous could be viewed from a perspective 
from which it did not appear so. Suppose, for instance, that a video recording is 
made of a child spitting out a button and that this is played back to an audience
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at slow motion. It would seem to make perfect sense, to say, pointing at the 
screen, ‘The infant is now spitting out the button’. Anything we would normally 
count as instantaneous -  explosions, coughs, sneezes, blinking - can be viewed 
in such a way that they do not appear instantaneous. I submit that there is, 
however, no context in which it makes sense to say ‘the agent is now believing 
that S’.
Perhaps an ontological conclusion can be tentatively drawn here. Vendler 
observes that the fact that certain verbs do not admit of continuous tenses 
suggests that those verbs do not designate processes going on in time. If we 
agree that there is no context in which it makes sense to say ‘A is now believing 
that S’ and we agree that any event which may appear instantaneous from one 
perspective can be viewed from another perspective in which it is not counted as 
instantaneous, then we can see that the reason that ‘A is now believing that S’ 
never makes sense it not because believing happens instantaneously. Believing 
is not an event or enduring process of any kind. If this is true, then, a fortiori, it 
is not an event or process that underlies the truth of an ascription.
23
Nominal forms
I now move on to consider the nominals ‘belief (that S)’ and other less common 
nominalisations. Lynne Rudder Baker (1995) says that the term ‘belief is a 
nominalisation of ‘believes that’. She does not say precisely what she means by 
‘is a nominalisation o f ,  but she makes many remarks throughout her book 
‘Explaining Attitudes’ which suggest that she has in mind the view that in an 
important sense locutions which contain ‘believes that’ are more basic than 
locutions which contain ‘belief that S’. I shall explain what I mean by ‘more 
basic’ shortly.
‘Believes that S’ can be nominalised in various ways. The first two ways that I 
wish to inspect are 1) the gerundive nominal ‘believing that S’ and 2) the 
derived nominal ‘belief that S’.
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Concerning the former, philosophers often try to use ‘A’s believing that S’ as if 
it were a count-quantifiable noun. Several philosophical theses are standardly 
explained by using it in this way. Despite the prevalence of this usage in the 
literature, this usage seems very awkward and is (almost) never encountered in 
ordinary contexts. The linguistic apparatus of pluralisation, quantification, 
demonstration and identification and the use of definite and indefinite articles do 
not seem to apply at all naturally to the gerundive nominal form ‘A’s believing 
that S’;
*A’s believings that S 
* There is a believing by A that S 
*That believing by A that S
*A’s believing that S is identical to A’s being in neural state XYZ 
all sound extremely odd.
‘A’s believing that S’ only seems to occur at all naturally in subject position 
with such predications as ‘was very surprising’, ‘is useful to us’, etc. Any 
sentences containing ‘A’s believing that S’ involving one of these predications 
(let ‘F’ stand for any one of them), which seem at all natural here seem naturally 
paraphrased by ‘The fact that A believes that S is F’. This strongly suggests that 
‘A’s believing that S’ normally designates a fact or state of affairs. Notice that 
the normal way of designating this fact involves the reappearance of the verbal 
form ‘believes that’.
There is also the noun ‘belief. This noun can be naturally understood both as 
mass-quantified and as count-quantified. It is mass-quantified as it occurs in ‘the 
phenomenon of belief ‘A Puzzle about Belief, ‘the metaphysics of belief, ‘her 
belief in ghosts’. I mention this usage merely to set it aside. I doubt that it enters 
into any of the ambiguities and possible confusions which I shall discuss next.
I wish to focus more attention on ‘belief as it is understood as a count- 
quantified noun. Many have noted that ‘belief understood as a count-noun is
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ambiguous. The point is usually put like this: Sometimes ‘belief refers to the 
proposition believed and sometimes it refers to the state of believing. Some 
philosophers try to disambiguate this by using the term ‘object of belief to 
designate the proposition believed and try to use ‘the belief that S’ to refer to the 
state of believing. (I shall say more about this ‘state o f  locution shortly). 
Unfortunately, ‘object of belief is itself ambiguous. Sometimes it means the 
object thought about and sometimes the proposition believed. So, for example, if 
one believed that the moon is a planet, then the object of belief could either be 
the moon or the proposition that the moon is a planet. I shall avoid the 
expression altogether and use the unambiguous ‘what is believed’, which is also 
more neutral about the correct analysis of the metaphysics and semantics of 
believing.
It is often said that the expression ‘the belief that p’ designates the content of the 
belief. This view seems to gain support when we consider that beliefs can be 
true, false, verifiable or unverifiable, that beliefs can be consistent or 
inconsistent, and that one belief can logically entail another. These semantic or 
logical properties are ones that we naturally ascribe, in the first instance, to 
propositions. So, perhaps ‘belief that p’ can be used in such a way that it is 
synonymous with ‘the proposition that p’.
On the other hand, it is common to hear philosophers talk of the ‘content of a 
belief and this must mean that the belief in question is not to be identified with 
its propositional content, but rather as something that can be thought of as 
having a content. On this understanding, where a belief is still thought of as an 
abstract entity, beliefs are not wholly individuated by their content. The hope 
that p is clearly not the same thing as the belief that p. On this understanding, 
the belief that p is what is sometimes called a ‘propositional attitude’, as 
opposed to a propositional content. It is important to remember that, on both 
understandings of ‘the belief that p’, where belief is a count-noun, the 
expression designates an abstract entity. Philosophers often seem to run these 
two obviously different usages together, talking of them as attitudes and then 
saying that they are abstract entities individuated by their content. To avoid 
possible confusion, I will use the expression ‘the belief that p ’ to designate the
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attitude not the proposition. And I will avoid predicating logical or semantic 
properties of these attitudes for that encourages us to think that we are talking 
about the contents that those attitudes are attitudes towards rather than the 
attitudes themselves. I think that both these usages exist in ordinary use and that 
they are not clearly distinguished there either.
There seems to be a third distinct possible understanding of the nominal ‘belief 
that p’. It seems, as Helen Steward (1994) has noted, that we sometimes have a 
need to distinguish beliefs held by one person from beliefs held by another 
person where those beliefs have the same content. George’s belief that Mr.Y 
will be proved innocent is well-grounded whereas Jane’s belief that Mr. Y will 
be proved innocent is not. In a sense, these beliefs must be distinct; they have 
different subject-relative properties, and, after all, one is George’s and one is 
Jane’s. This supports the idea that there is a reading of ‘belief that p’ (where it is 
used in a possessive construction of the form ‘A’s belief that p’) according to 
which the identity of the agent is an essential part of the individuation of what it 
is that is designated by the expression. It is tempting to think that such 
possessive constructions are never confused with the two described in the 
previous paragraph. The very use of the possessive might be thought to show 
that we are referring to the subject relative belief, but this seems not to be the 
case, for we can also talk about A’s belief that p being true. This suggests, I 
think, that it is the belief conceived of as a proposition that is in question, rather 
than the fact that it is A’s belief.
It is essential to mention here that expressions of the form ‘A’s belief that p’ 
have really taken on a life of their own in recent philosophy of mind.
Expressions of this possessive form are sometimes taken to designate what Mark 
Crimmins and John Perry has called ‘cognitive particulars’. This choice of 
expression is revealing, for they do mean to use ‘particulars’ in the 
philosophically standard sense of that term. They mean that they are not abstract 
entities and that they are the kind of thing that can be referred to in indefinitely 
many non-analytically connected and non-relational ways. The move from 
thinking of beliefs as subjective relative to thinking of them as cognitive 
particulars is a fairly subtle move, but it is a move nonetheless. For there is
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nothing in the idea that sometimes we need to distinguish between A’s belief 
that p and B’s belief that p that leads us directly to the idea that A’s belief that p 
and B’s are cognitive particulars.11 All that we are led directly to is the thesis 
that the fact that A believes that p is distinct from the fact that B believes that p.
It is worth remembering that the kind of locutions which led to us needing to 
distinguish different subject relative beliefs were predications like ‘is (not) well- 
grounded’ or ‘was formed yesterday’. On the other hand, recently, philosophers 
have assumed that other locutions are readily intelligible, locutions like ‘A’s 
belief that p is identical to the neural state XYZ’ or ‘A’s belief that p caused her 
to duck’ (where ‘caused’ is further construed in a particular tendentious way). 
While the second grouping presuppose the particularity of the subject-relative 
belief in question, the first ordinary usage grouping is, I think, most naturally 
dealt with by paraphrasing. ‘John’s belief that p is well-grounded’ is naturally 
paraphrased as ‘John believes that p but he is not warranted in that’, where 
‘believes that’ re-emerges and there is no suggestion that a cognitive particular 
is at issue.
Locutions involving ‘state o f
There is also a nominalisation of ‘believes that p ’ which has the form ‘the state 
of belief (or believing) that p’ or ‘a belief state’. These expressions occur rarely, 
if ever, in ordinary usage. So, if we wish to understand these expressions we 
must try to find out what philosophers mean by them.
Since philosophers of mind so often talk of identifying belief states with brain 
states we could easily be led into thinking of these expressions as having the 
same logical structure. They do have a superficially similar structure, but we can 
very readily see a deeper difference.
I suggest that to find the most natural understanding of the expression ‘belief 
state’ we can look at other natural expressions involving ‘state’. We can speak
II Crimmins and Perry (1989) think that there are other, metaphysical reasons for positing beliefs as cognitive
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of ‘a state of health’, or ‘a state of fitness’, ‘a state of anger’, ‘a state of 
agitation’, ‘the state of being undressed’, ‘the state of an economy’, ‘the state of 
my bedroom’. Even this short list shows that what follows ‘state o f  is a motley 
of expressions. We have derived nominals referring to properties (the first two) 
and then expressions referring to the state types themselves (‘anger’ and 
‘agitation’), we have a gerundive nominal referring to a state (‘being 
undressed’) and we have nouns referring to concrete entities (‘the economy’, 
‘my bedroom’). In the case of the last two, what follows ‘state o f  is the thing 
which is in the state in question, but what that state is not itself specified by the 
use of the expression ‘state of..’. I would say that ‘brain state’ is most naturally 
classified with ‘the state of my bedroom’, where the noun ‘brain’ is to be 
understood as the object which has certain properties, and that its having certain 
properties is almost certainly to be thought of as its having certain of its parts in 
a certain configuration and/or exemplifying certain properties. (Steward 1997)
A brain-state, then, is a state of the brain, that is to say, it is a state that a brain is 
in, and the state a brain is in (at a time) is a matter of what properties it has (at 
that time). A belief-state, however, is not a state of a belief. It has nothing to do 
with what properties the belief in question has. Nor is it clear the ‘state of belief 
can be classified along with any of the other locutions in the list above, for 
‘belief is neither to be understood as a property or state type itself, for while we 
can say that ‘A is in a state of anger’ for instance, we cannot say that ‘A is in a 
state of belief or in a belief state. It seems incoherent to assume that A can be in 
a belief state simpliciter. It makes sense, although it is awkward, to say ‘A is in 
the state of believing that S’. The only natural way to express this seems to be 
with a gerundive nominal, and this suggests that the verb, as it were, does not 
want to be suppressed with a nominal expression. The verbal form ‘A believes 
that S’ seems to be the basic form.
None of the above proves, of course, that ‘brain states’ cannot be identified with 
‘belief states’. I have simply tried to show what this claim might involve. I have 
tried to suggest that it involves the claim that the fact that an agent’s brain has a
particulars. Although this is beyond the scope of this thesis to argue this, I think the arguments are unconvincing.
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certain (complex) configuration or set of properties is to be identified with the 
fact that the agent believes a certain thing. This view will itself be attacked later 
on.
The conclusions I wish to draw are that ‘A believes that S’ is more basic than 
any use of its associated nominals, that ‘belief that S’ is three-ways ambiguous 
and these usages are often not sufficiently distinguished in the literature, that all 
claims involving the expression ‘believes that S’ or its associated nominals are 
best understood as facts about the agent, except that ‘A’s belief that S’ may 
simply mean to refer to the proposition believed. I have used considerations of 
naturalness as a methodological starting-point. I have not argued that such 
considerations are necessarily decisive. By themselves they are not.
2.4
A qualification about ‘facts’
I have suggested that most of the awkward sounding locutions such as ‘A’s 
believing that S’ should be understood as, if they designate anything, 
designating facts. But I wish to emphasise that this is not meant to imply that 
belief ascriptions are made true by facts about what an agent believes if this is 
understood as meaning there are determinate context-independent facts about 
what an agents believes that ground the truth of the report. (My talk of facts was 
meant to be understood in as deflationary a way as possible). What I have tried 
to prepare the ground to suggest in this chapter is that we should look at our 
ordinary belief ascriptions using the verbal form ‘believes that S’ if we want to 
understand our ordinary concept of belief, rather than reify beliefs and then ask 
questions about how we manage to report on those beliefs.
2J>
Conclusion
In this chapter I have looked at several different types of expression involving 
‘belief, ‘believing’ or ‘believes’ and suggested that ‘believes that S’ is a 
fundamental form. This suggests, to me, that in order to understand belief 
ascriptions we should focus on exactly that, belief ascriptions, and not depend
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on unusual locutions which may support what I think is a mistaken picture of 
belief reporting. I have briefly argued that believing is not a matter of having 
anything going on inside one, no event or process. Moreover, there is nothing 
about any of the locutions I have examined which supports the view that there is 
an independent metaphysics of belief to ground our practice of belief reporting.
Most of the considerations in this chapter are not decisive with respect to what I 
ultimately want to argue. However, the next chapter aims to criticise a range of 
theories with I think have as an assumption an independent and constraining 
metaphysics of belief.
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Chapter Three: 
Evaluating Other Theories
M
Introduction
In this chapter I will critically examine several quite diverse theories of 
belief ascriptions. I will try to explain how they apply, or could be applied, 
to Kripke’s puzzle. I will present criticisms of each theory and try to show 
how they each embody the crucial assumption that this dissertation aims to 
cast doubt on, and that the way they embody this assumption is central to 
their failings. The theories that I select are, of practical necessity, only a few 
of the many different theories that are to be found in the literature, but I 
think that many of the theories I do not treat directly can, to some extent, be 
seen as variations on the ones I discuss. I start, in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 with a 
discussion of Frege, at least under a very popular and influential 
interpretation. Before I discuss (in Section 3.3) how Frege could have 
responded to Kripke’s puzzle, I want to articulate some Fregean assumptions 
about the nature and structure of belief ascriptions, in particular how they 
relate to simple sentences and issues connecting to substitutivity, since it is 
with Frege and subsequent discussions of Frege that some very fundamental 
assumptions about belief ascriptions have their source. I will use this section 
to try to emphasise that these assumptions, although plausible, are 
nonetheless substantial assumptions that we should be sensitised to in 
thinking about belief ascriptions. In Section 3.4,1 look at Nathan Salmon’s 
theory of belief ascriptions, a theory which was developed in response to a 
then new theory of the semantics of simple sentences which rejected Frege’s 
account of simple sentences. It will be seen that although Frege’s semantics 
for simple sentences has been rejected some basic assumptions about the 
structure and function of belief ascriptions was left in place. In Section 3.5 I 
discuss a more radically different theory of belief ascriptions according to 
which belief ascriptions do not relate agents to any kind of thought contents 
at all. It will be seen that this theory faces very serious problems and still,
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despite its radical nature, retains the basic assumption I want to cast doubt 
on. Section 3.6 discusses a ‘contextualist’ theory of belief ascriptions which 
avoids some of my main objections to the other theories discussed, but has 
different problems of its own.
M
Frege on Simple Sentences
According a very popular and influential interpretation of Frege, due mainly 
to the work of Gareth Evans (1982) and of Michael Dummett (1973), Frege 
was the first to formulate a systematic theory of meaning for a fragment of 
natural language whose aim was to explain how the meaning of sentences 
depends upon the meaning of their parts. The focus was ultimately on the 
meaning of sentences because Frege noticed that it is only sentences that can 
be used to say things capable of being true or false. Frege, then, wanted to be 
able to explain how the meaning of components of a sentence contributed to 
how a sentence could be true or false (given the way the world is). He 
assigned non-linguistic entities to subsentential expressions in order to 
explain how a sentence would say what it said. These can be called the 
‘semantic values’ of expressions since they contribute to the meaning of the 
sentence. In his earliest work he concentrated on extensional fragments of 
language (i.e. fragments in which any two coreferential expressions can be 
intersubstituted anywhere salva veritate) and so it was natural to make the 
decision to assign expressions their referents as semantic values.
In very general and abstract terms, what I have said so far can be thought of 
as a description of a semantic theory having only to do with the relation 
between linguistic expressions and the world. The idea of users of a 
language has not even entered the picture yet, and neither has the idea of the 
use and understanding of the language. Another distinct level of theory and 
description having to do with use and understanding was necessary in the 
semantic theory. To appreciate why Frege thought that such a level of 
description was necessary we need to look in more detail at two things. We
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need to understand, in general terms, what Frege saw his semantic project as 
being about. Secondly, we need to see why this goal is not met by the theory 
discussed so far.
To appreciate Frege’s overall project and starting point is to see that there 
could be no question for Frege of regarding a potential language user’s use 
and understanding of her language as separate from an account of the 
relation between language and the world. For what Frege was primarily 
interested in was the structure of thought. Thoughts, for Frege, are abstract 
objects which are the primary bearers of truth and falsity. The meaningful 
sentences of a language are meaningful only in virtue of expressing 
thoughts, and sentences are bearers of truth-values only derivately. Thoughts 
are what we think when we think something. The thought that a sentence 
expresses is what we grasp when understand a sentence. Thoughts are non­
mental and are essentially public as they are what is conveyed when one 
speaker of a language says something to another by uttering the sentence 
expressing the thought and when the other understands what is being said by 
grasping the thought.
Since Frege’s primary interest was in thought so understood, his interest in 
language was in a sense derivative. But he had to be interested in language 
nonetheless since it is not possible to investigate thought without 
investigating language. Frege believed that we cannot refer to, express or 
convey a thought except linguistically and that we cannot have a thought 
that we cannot in principle express, at least to ourselves. He also believed 
that any attempt to investigate thought without studying its linguistic 
expression would inevitably lead to confusing the psychology of thinking 
with the study of thought (Dummett 1973).
The study of language, then, does not presuppose the study of thought. On 
the contrary, the latter is, in fact, impossible without the former. It is 
absolutely central to Frege’s philosophical project, then, that language and 
thought should be unified. Frege’s theory of meaning was a unified theory in 
the sense that it aimed to provide for each sentence of the fragment of
59
60
language under investigation a content which is the meaning of the sentence 
that expresses it as well as what we think when we think the thought that the 
sentence expresses. Frege’s project was, as Joseph Almog (2004) has 
recently labelled it, ‘translational’. This means that giving a semantic 
account of a sentence is giving a synonymous sentence which unpacks the 
meaning of the target sentence. It gives, as it were, the speaker’s perspective 
on the sentence.
So far, I have tried to explain, in general terms, why Frege’s treatment of 
language and thought was (and had to be) unified. Next I will discuss a more 
specific constraint on that distinct level of theory and description.
Frege begins one of the most famous passages of analytic philosophy with 
the following:
Identity  challenges reflection through questions w hich are connected w ith it and are not 
altogether easy to  answ er . .. .  ‘a= a’ and ‘a= b ’ are obviously sentences o f  a  d ifferent cognitive value: 
‘a=a’ holds a  p riori and is according to K ant to be labelled analytic, w hereas sentences o f  the form  
‘a= b ’ often contain very valuable extensions o f  our know ledge and are n o t alw ays to be grounded a
p rio ri I f  w e w anted to  view  identity as a relation betw een that w hich the nam es a  and b signify then
‘a= b’ and ‘a= a’ w ould  seem  to be potentially not different, in case that is ‘a= b ’ is true. T here w ould be 
thereby expressed a  relation  o f  a thing to itself, one in w hich each th ing  stands to  itself, but no thing 
stands to  ano ther.12
What exactly is the nature of the problem Frege is describing here? Frege 
asks: how can a sentence of the form ‘a=b’ if true, differ in cognitive value 
from a sentence of the form ‘a=a’? To say that they differ in cognitive value 
means that someone who does not already know the truth of ‘a=b’ could 
rationally have different epistemic attitudes to the sentences at a given time, 
accepting one as true and taking the other as false, or be agnostic about its 
truth value.
That is the form of the basic question, but where is the philosophical 
problem? To see the problem here it is necessary to state the assumptions
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that lead Frege to ask his question. Frege explicitly held (1) that 
understanding a sentence is grasping the thought that it expresses upon 
reading it. It can also be assumed, from his overall form of argument in 
describing his puzzle, that he also held that (2) meaning is transparent in the 
sense that if a language user attaches a single meaning to each of two 
expressions, then she must know that she does so. Frege also implicitly held 
(3) a principle of compositionality according to which if thoughts tl and t2 
have the same structure and are composed of the same elements then tl is 
t2.13 As we have seen, Frege held that the semantic value of a singular term 
is to be identified with its referent. The question that Frege poses raises a 
problem then on these three assumptions, since if ‘a=b’ is in fact true, ‘a=a’ 
and ‘a=b’ will express thoughts composed of the same elements in the same 
structure. By (3), then, the thoughts expressed will be identical. By (1) and 
(2), in understanding the two sentences the language user will see that the 
same thought has been expressed by the two sentences. She could not, 
therefore, rationally have different attitudes to the two sentences. But it 
seems an undeniable fact that she can do.
The problem as originally stated by Frege (1948) is presented as a problem 
about identity, or the identity predicate, but there is a consensus these days 
that the problem has nothing to do with identity, since the same set of 
philosophical issues arise for any pair of sentences that differ only in that 
they contain different coreferential singular terms14. For example, one could 
believe that ‘Hesperus is a very shiny star’ were true and not believe that 
‘Phosphorous is a very shiny star’ were true, and yet be competent with the 
names. On the same assumptions as presented in the paragraph above it is 
puzzling how a language user could rationally have different epistemic 
attitudes to each of the pair of sentences.
Frege’s response to this puzzle was to invoke another level of semantic 
description to account for the possibility that an agent could rationally have
12 Frege (1948, pg. 209)
13 Assuming that Frege implicitly held this assumption seems necessary to reconstruct the argument of the first 
paragraph o f ‘On Sense and Reference’ quoted above, although it is in prima facie tension with Frege’s claims that 
thoughts are essentially unstructured. (Frege 1956).
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different epistemic attitudes to any pair of sentences which differed only in 
that they contained different coreferential expressions in the same position in 
a given structure of a sentence.
As formulated above, Frege’s Puzzle (as I shall call it after Nathan Salmon’s 
popular coinage) has to do with epistemic attitudes to sentences (believing 
the sentence to be true or false, or being agnostic as to its truth-value). There 
can be no doubt that a rational individual can have, in the relevant sense, 
different epistemic attitudes to the individual sentences of the relevant kinds 
of pairs. But it is common to find in the literature an importantly different 
formulation of the puzzle, one which describes the puzzle by asking: how 
can one think that, say, Hesperus is Hesperus without thinking that Hesperus 
is Phosphorous?
According to this different formulation, there is no mention of sentences and 
no direct reason therefore that an answer to this puzzle should require a 
solution in terms which makes reference to linguistic meanings. But this is 
not quite the way Frege puts his puzzle. He talks explicitly of sentences and 
our understandings of them and that is why his problem, understood in the 
light of his assumptions, requires a semantic solution. Given these 
assumptions, Frege asks, equivalently by his own lights, how can ‘a=a’ and 
‘a=b’ express different thought contents? But it is important to note that this 
is an equivalent question to the original question only on the assumption that 
understanding a sentence means grasping its content so that a difference in 
possible epistemic attitudes to sentences is understood as a derivative 
phenomenon, being dependent upon different epistemic attitudes to the 
contents that sentences express.15
If two sentences express distinct thoughts, yet agree in point of reference and 
structure, then the thoughts cannot be fully determined by the identity of 
their referents and mode of combination. The identity of thoughts must 
therefore be determined by something else. This something else Frege called
14 Nathan Salmon (1986) was the first to make this point.
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‘sense’. Frege spoke of sense of an expression as a mode of presentation of 
the expression’s referent, the particular way that a referent is thought of. 
Essential to Frege’s idea of sense was that it had to be a property of an 
expression of a public language and that in order to understand utterances 
containing the expression the language users must all associate with the 
expression a single particular way of thinking of the referent. The reason for 
this is that Frege wanted to ensure that, when communicating, a speaker 
would transmit and the hearer receive a single thought.
In explaining how this notion of sense addresses how pairs of sentences like 
‘Hesperus is shiny’ and ‘Phosphorous is shiny’ can differ epistemically, it is 
enough to point out that the two sentences express different thoughts since 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ express different senses. And it is not trivial 
that the two distinct ways of thinking associated with the two names 
determine the same referent.
It is difficult to give more of a positive account of how postulating distinct 
senses explains the relevant epistemic differences without falling into the 
trap of making it sound as though what one grasps when grasping, say, an 
informative identity sentence like ‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’ is the fact that 
the distinct senses associated with the two names determine the same 
referent. This makes it sound like the sentence is about the senses of the 
names. But this is not the case. The sentence is about the planet Venus. 
Informativeness then is not to be understood as having to do simply with 
what the sentence is about, but rather what the thought is constituted out of, 
and Frege was original in suggesting that these two things are distinct.
Frege’s notion of sense arose, I think, primarily out of a concern to address 
the puzzle just discussed, although the great power of the concept can only 
really be seen in how it relates to other theoretical issues which are not 
directly relevant. What is relevant to this project, though, is how it plays 
another closely related role in his theorising, that is, in his semantics for
13 That these two questions are equivalent only under such theoretical assumptions is a point that was first 
discussed by Howard Wettstein (1989). I will return to the significance of this observation later.
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psychological report sentences, including belief ascriptions, and that is what 
I shall now turn my attention to.
3.2.1
The semantics for belief sentences and the issue of substitutivitv
In this section, I will look at a question of substitutivity in belief ascriptions. 
It is often assumed that the problem I am about to discuss is necessarily 
closely related to Frege’s Puzzle discussed in 2.1. Often, it is explicitly said 
to be the same problem posed in a different way. In the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy in a section on ‘Propositional Attitudes’, it says 
“Frege’s puzzle can be posed as a question about propositional attitude 
reports”. I want to use this section to show why, although on Frege’s picture 
this seems to be the case, we have good reason to deny the tight connection. 
This will provide a motivation for focusing only on belief ascriptions and 
not questions concerning the cognitive value of simple sentences if it is 
belief that we are primarily interested in.
Apart from the problem of explaining how a pair of sentences of the forms 
‘a is F’ and ‘b is F’ can differ in cognitive value, there is an allegedly closely 
related problem of explaining how belief ascriptions such as (1) and (2) 
below can differ in truth-value when ‘a’ and ‘b’ are coreferential 
expressions.
(1) Jane believes that a is F.
(2) Jane believes that b is F.
For it is widely assumed that such pairs can differ in truth-value. The 
‘problem’ here is that the difference in truth-value would seem to be a 
violation of the principle of substitutivity. The principle is a rule of inference 
that sanctions the validity of arguments of a certain form. In particular, it 
sanctions the inference from the premises ‘a is G’ and ‘a is (identical to) b’ 
to the conclusion ‘b is G’, where ‘a’ and ‘b’ stand for singular terms and ‘is
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G’ is any predicate, so that ‘Jane believes that.... is bald’ could be a relevant 
replacement for ‘is G’. The principle is thought to receive considerable 
intuitive support from an apparently solid intuitive assumption about what 
has been called the ‘aboutness of language’ together with the assumption 
that the role of terms whose standard function is to designate. The 
assumption in question is that the use of a singular term enables a speaker to 
affirm or deny something about the entity designated by the term and the 
truth-value of what would thereby be asserted would depend only on 
whether the object in question has the property it is said to have, or lacks the 
property it is said not to have (Marti 2007). The principle would also receive 
more theoretical support from the notion of propositional content and the 
thesis of compositionality. Two terms which expressed the same content 
would seem to be interchangeable in the sentence if compositionality were 
true. In recent discussions of substitutivity, the assumption that names and 
indexicals are directly referential leads to the thesis that substitutivity holds 
for these kinds of expressions. This will be explained in Section 3.4.
An apparent violation of the principle thus needs to be accounted for. Frege 
offered a solution that involved the idea the apparent violation of the 
principle is merely apparent. Frege held the view that singular terms in the 
position occupied by ‘a’ in ‘Jane believes that a is F’, do not have their usual 
referents, but instead refer to the senses that they usually have as they occur 
unembedded. Much has been written about the difficulties of such a change 
in reference. Some have argued that there being such a systematic change of 
reference is in itself theoretically undesirable, and some have worried about 
how the new reference is actually achieved. It is alleged that Frege’s 
solution, would, if not for these difficulties, and possibly others, be a very 
elegant solution. For, as we have seen, in Section 3.1, Frege’s theory for 
simple sentences assigns to them thought-Qonivnts. So, a semantic account 
of belief report sentences which syntactically embed them, according to 
which ‘A believes that S’ is construed as a relational statement, with ‘A’ a 
singular term, ‘believes’ a dyadic predicate, and ‘that S’ a second singular 
term which refers to the thought-content expressed by ‘S’, can seem very 
natural. It can seem very natural because there are independent grammatical
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reasons for holding that ‘A believes that S’ is a relational form of statement. 
Secondly, there is, allegedly, an independently popular metaphysical picture 
of belief according to which believing is standing in a relation to a 
representational entity of some kind.
Frege’s theories of simple sentences and of belief sentences are, it seems, 
implicitly accepted in some contemporary discussions of opacity16 when it is 
acknowledged to be a sufficient condition of its being a non-sequitur to 
move from ‘A believes that a is F, to ‘A believes that b is F’ given the 
identity of the referent of ‘a’ and ‘b’, that ‘a’ and ‘b’ differ in sense, where 
sense, even if it does not have all the properties that Frege says it does, is 
what is taken to solve Frege’s Puzzle. That this is implicitly accepted in 
contemporary work is evidenced, I think, by the fact that apparent counter­
examples will be explained away either by saying that the apparent counter­
example is merely apparent because it is either a pragmatic phenomenon or 
that the belief sentences in question are to be understood as having a de re 
profile. Jennifer Hornsby (1997) exemplifies the former approach when she 
says: “of course, in practice we often feel justified in moving from ascription 
of a belief with one content to ascription of a belief with what has to be 
counted another content. It may be in a strict sense a non-sequitur, but 
nonetheless a safe bet to move from ‘Harriet believes that the present British 
Prime Minister is uncompromising’ to ‘Harriet believes that Margaret 
Thatcher is uncompromising’. It can often be taken for granted that if 
someone believes one thing she often believes another.” (pg.202, italics 
added).
Of course, if one has already accepted Frege’s theory of belief sentences and 
his theory of simple sentences, then one will see the idea that the 
substitutions that are strictly speaking permissible depend on Frege’s notion 
of sense as developed in response to Frege’s Puzzle as self-evident, but if a 
philosopher were looking for independent support for Frege’s account of
16 A context is opaque if  substitutions there do not guarantee truth preservation.
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belief sentences, then she would have to look at the substitutivity data 
impartially. I think that this is rarely done.
It is possible, I think, to cast doubt on the idea that facts about what are seen 
as acceptable substitutions are such as to support Frege’s theory of belief 
sentences by pointing out that there are many examples in which it is 
legitimate (that is, really, strictly, semantically legitimate, as opposed to 
apparently or merely pragmatically legitimate) to interchange terms which 
cannot be counted as having the same sense. In the remainder of this section, 
I want to suggest that it is possible that the substitutivity data are not such as 
to support Frege’s theory of belief sentences, and this will involve trying to 
remove one potential a priori obstacle to this possibility by questioning what 
has become a standard and deeply entrenched, but not usually articulated, 
view of the relationship between Frege’s Puzzle and the substitutivity 
‘problem’. Discussion of the apparent counterexamples will be deferred to 
chapter four.
It is often assumed that Frege’s Puzzle (construed in its generalised form, 
and not as restricted to identity) and the substitutivity ‘problem’ are 
essentially the same problem, maybe just expressed in different ways, the 
latter just being the former recast in the formal mode. This can seem natural 
enough when we think that Frege’s puzzle is concerned with an important 
aspect of the individuation of expressed belief contents, and belief sentences 
ascribe beliefs. As Jennifer Hornsby (1997, pg. 202) says:
“Frege held that it is a sufficient condition of the difference of two thoughts that it be 
possible for a person to have some attitude towards one and not the other [...]. We cannot be 
indifferent to whether we attribute (say) the belief that p or the belief that q to a person if we 
know that that person might believe that p and not believe that q; and we must use a notion 
of content which precludes such indifference.”
Presumably Hornsby is thinking, in the first part of the quote, of the notion 
of though-content that Frege developed as a response to Frege’s Puzzle. She 
then goes on to draw a conclusion from the observation that two thoughts 
cannot be the same if an agent can have different attitudes to them. This
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reasoning would seem to involve nothing more than the principle of the 
indiscemibility of identicals. The conclusion is a claim about ascribing 
beliefs, and it seems extremely plausible. Of course, we cannot be 
indifferent about which of two distinct beliefs we ascribe, if we want to 
ascribe the right one! A conclusion about failures of substitutivity then 
seems not far away. The conclusion relating to the case in hand would be 
that ‘p’ is not intersubstitutable with ‘q’ salva veritate, when ‘p’ and ‘q’ are 
sentences to which a speaker can rationally have different epistemic attitudes 
in the sense discussed in Section 3.1.1 will return shortly to explain why, if 
this is the line of thought, it is too quick.
Gareth Evans (1982) is very explicit about the connection between ascribed 
beliefs and Frege’s Puzzle. What Evans says further encourages the line of 
argument that I described above, and which I wish to question. He observes 
that, although Frege said rather little about the notion of sense, he did link it 
to notions ordinarily employed in propositional attitude psychology in such a 
way that there will be a very tight restriction on the individuation of senses. 
Evans calls this restriction ‘Frege’s Intuitive Criterion of Difference’. The 
criterion says that the thought-content associated with one sentence S as its 
sense must be distinct from the thought-content associated with another 
sentence SI as its sense if it is possible for someone to understand both S 
and S1 and rationally have different epistemic attitudes to them. One could 
go so far as to say that this criterion does not just happen to be true of the 
concept of sense, but is (at least partially) definitional of the notion, since it 
was exactly this problem of cognitive difference that the notion of sense was 
designed to account for.
It can seem (wrongly, I believe) that the Intuitive Criterion of Difference has 
straightforward implications for the issue of substitutivity. If its connective 
is taken as a biconditional, then it appears to give necessary and sufficient 
conditions for when two terms can be intersubstituted salva veritate. If it is 
taken as a one-way implication, as Evans puts it, then it appears to give 
sufficient conditions for the failures of substitutivity. I think that no such 
tight connection exists between Frege’s Puzzle and the issue of
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substitutivity, even if we accept Frege’s Intuitive Criterion of Difference. In 
order to make sense of this challenge, I think that it is important now to 
mark a three-way distinction so that we do not conflate issues which are in 
fact quite separate and assume that there are implications where in fact there 
are not.
1. As we saw in Section 1.1, Frege’s Puzzle is, in its pure form, about 
sentences of a language: how can an agent understand pairs of sentences 
differing only by different codesignative singular terms and think that one is 
true but not that the other one is? Thought of like this, it is a question in the 
philosophy of language or semantics and is not (in the first instance) a 
question about belief individuation, although the type of answer that Frege is 
bound by his theoretical framework to give, makes us tend to think that the 
question is simply a question about belief contents.
2. Next, there is an issue about belief contents and what an agent can 
rationally believe. This would most appropriately be seen as an issue in the 
philosophy of mind, or psychology.
3. Next, there is the question of substitutivity. This is a thesis, not about 
mind, but about what patterns occur in our belief ascriptions. So, it is a view 
in semantics, but not in the semantics of simple sentences.
Given Frege’s theory and the underlying picture which has been inherited by 
most philosophers working in this area, the three can seem to be inextricably 
connected. But that is why it is important to try to disentangle the issues.
3.2.2
Separating issues in simple-sentence semantics from issues about thought
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My ultimate object of interest is the semantics or ordinary belief ascriptions. 
There is an orthodox, but rarely spelled out, chain of reasoning connecting 
Frege’s Puzzle to thought content individuation and then that to issues about 
substitutivity in belief ascriptions. What I will try to do in this section is 
break, or at least give some cause to question, the link between Frege’s 
Puzzle and thought content individuation.
The distinction between the question of informativeness as applied to 
sentences and the question of the individuation of thought-contents has been 
clearly articulated throughout essays in a book by Howard Wettstein6. The 
two questions, 1) how can ‘a is a’ and ‘a is b’ have a different epistemic 
status for a speaker? and 2) how can ‘a is a’ and ‘a is b’ express different 
thought-contents? are only equivalent on the assumption that understanding 
a sentence is grasping the content that it expresses. That this is a substantial 
assumption and is not in any way truistic is made clear by considering that 
one could give an answer to the former question without invoking any 
notion of content at all.
The answer to the question of how ‘a is a’ and ‘a is b’ can differ in 
informativeness would be a fundamentally different kind of explanation 
from the Fregean kind. Roughly speaking, ‘a is b’ could be informative if 
whatever conditions are sufficient for counting as competent with the terms 
did not necessarily suffice for knowledge that the terms are coreferential. 
The idea would be that to count as competent with a term requires relatively 
little; one could simply pick up and start using the names intending to use 
them with the same references as those from whom one picked them up, and 
be able to use them in the appropriate grammatical way and be able to ask, 
for instance ‘Who is a?’. There is nothing in these conditions that requires 
that the speaker should know a priori that ‘a is b’ is true. On such a view, 
there is no presumption that the speaker should know that a is b even while 
he can use both terms. The idea of content has no place in such explanations,
17 Wettstein (1995)
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which have been described as ‘anthropological’, as opposed to traditionally 
semantic.
Whether such explanations are acceptable as replacements of explanations 
which utilise the notion of content is not at issue here, but I observe that 
such putative explanations would need to be properly assessed and not 
dismissed a priori, and that is enough to show that the two questions are 
distinct.
It is not automatic then that we are in a position to draw any conclusions 
about what an agent may rationally believe from observations about what 
epistemic attitudes she has towards sentences. For while it is obvious that 
one can have different epistemic attitudes to the members of the pair 
‘Hesperus is bright’ and ‘Phosphorous is bright’, it is not clear that we can 
always say of such an agent that he believes that Hesperus is bright, but does 
not believe that Phosphorus is. In a context in which the names are being 
used by people who ordinarily use both names interchangeably, such an 
attribution can sound paradoxical. If we imagine the use of the names in 
these ascriptions to be accompanied by a pointing, then it can seem as if we 
are ascribing contradictory beliefs to the agent. There may be some contexts 
in which the ascriptions are understood unproblematically and others where 
they are not, whereas saying that the agent has different epistemic attitudes 
to the sentences is always unproblematic. If we consider Kripke’s Pierre 
who has different epistemic attitudes to the sentences ‘London is pretty’ and 
‘Londres is pretty’, believing the latter but not the former, can we say, 
straightforwardly, that Pierre believes that Londres is pretty but that London 
is not? Not necessarily, for we have the difficulties with giving any simple 
straightforward statement of what Pierre believes, even though there is no 
difficulty in saying what his epistemic attitudes to the sentences are.
More abstractly, if, as was suggested in Chapter 1, what beliefs we can say 
that an agent can have is a context-sensitive matter (the case for this will be 
developed in detail in the final chapter), then that observation itself is 
sufficient to cast doubt on the assumption of such a close connection
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between epistemic attitudes to sentences, for what epistemic attitudes an 
agent has to sentences that he understands would not appear to be a context- 
sensitive matter.
I think that nothing other than the Fregean assumption that understanding a 
sentence is just grasping the thought-content it expresses would suffice to 
ensure the assumed connection between attitudes to sentences and beliefs 
held. One other candidate would be a principle very much like the 
disquotation principle (which was discussed in detail in Chapter One). I f  
such a principle were true then we would be able to draw conclusions about 
beliefs held. The disquotation principle is a principle linking assent to a 
sentence with holding a belief expressed by the sentence. Presumably, 
though, for one to understand and accept a sentence as true would be enough 
for one to be in position to assent to a sentence in a way that satisfied the 
antecedent of an instance of the disquotation schema. But, as I suggested in 
Chapter, and as I will argue in more detail in Chapter 4, when I discuss the 
relation between saying and believing, there is reason to think that the 
disquotation principle is false. The reasons for thinking that it may be false 
would also apply to this related principle.
It is important to remind ourselves that the Intuitive Criterion of Difference 
does, as Evans observes, tie the notion of sense to the concept of belief 
definitionally, but, if we are mindful of the distinction that Wettstein 
articulated, then we will see that epistemic attitudes to sentences involve the 
notion ‘believes .... to be true’ rather than the simple ‘believes’. Of course, 
most philosophers will agree that that these are definitely two distinct 
notions, but they say this, I think, because they want to be able to say that 
one can accept as true a sentence that one does not understand. That is no 
doubt true, but I question whether understanding the sentence fills the gap
between ‘believes to be true’ and the simple ‘believes’ that allows us to
move from the former to the latter.
So far I have tried to question the relation between Frege’s Puzzle and the 
individuation of beliefs. What I have said is meant to imply that there is no
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simple direct route between the two issues. In particular, there is no simple 
direct route from the observation that one can have different attitudes to a 
pair of sentences ‘a is F’ and ‘b is F’ to the claim that one can believe that a 
is F and fail to believe that b is F.
3.2.3
Separating issues about belief in the theory of mind from the semantics of 
ordinary belief ascriptions
I now turn my attention to trying to cast some doubt on the link between 
thought content individuation and issues about the semantics of ordinary 
belief ascriptions.
Epistemic attitudes to sentences are, to speak metaphorically, relatively ‘out 
in the open’. Beliefs themselves, thought of as the subject matter of 
psychology or philosophy of mind, are not out in the open. If there is no 
direct and simple route between epistemic attitudes to sentences and beliefs, 
one might wonder whether there is anything else ‘out in the open’ from 
which there is a direct route to beliefs.
i  o
Nathan Salmon suggests that there is a very direct connection between our 
ordinary everyday belief ascribing practices and claims about the 
individuation of belief contents. He proposes such a connection in what he 
calls the ‘thesis of the substitutivity of co-informational sentences in belief 
contexts’. The principle is:
I f  the inform ation that S is identical to the inform ation that S I , then som eone believes that S i f  and 
only if  he  or she believes that S I.
Salmon uses the expression ‘the information that S’ to mean the content of 
the belief expressed by S. It is true that Salmon has a different conception of 
content from Frege’s. Although the difference is very important for many
18 Salmon (1986) pg. 80
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discussions and will be addressed as such later on, it is not relevant for the 
discussion here. For what I want to examine here is only the alleged 
connections between belief ascriptions, Frege’s Puzzle, and the notion of 
belief contents (however that notion is to be explicated).
Salmon says that this principle is “virtually a logical consequence of the idea 
that the object or content of a given belief... is a piece of information and 
that a sentence encoding that information thereby gives the content of the 
belief’. I do not know exactly what Salmon means by “virtually” here, but it 
is certain that the substitutivity thesis is not a logical consequence of these 
ideas. That is it not a consequence is clear if we are again mindful of the 
distinction between (1), (2) and (3). For ‘the idea that the object or content 
of a given belief is a piece of information’ is a thesis in philosophy of mind 
or metaphysics, and the idea that ‘a sentence encoding that information 
thereby gives the content of that belief is a thesis in the semantics of simple 
sentences. Salmon would require an assumption about the structure of belief 
ascriptions to forge a connection between the views in metaphysics and 
simple sentence semantics. In particular he would require the assumptions 1) 
that a belief ascription relates an agent to the content of his belief and 2) that 
the content of ‘that S’ is the content that ‘S’ normally expresses. These 
assumptions are not inevitable.
I want to go further now though, and question whether, even if we grant 
these assumptions, we automatically have a simple procedure about how to 
individuate belief contents. I think that perhaps the answer to this could be 
‘no’.
Before I explain why I think that the answer may be ‘no’, I want to say why 
this is so important. It is on the basis of his substitutivity thesis that Salmon 
goes on to draw an important methodological conclusion. He says that 
insofar as the substitutivity thesis is accepted as a plausible principle 
concerning pieces of information contained in a sentence and the content of 
a belief, we have an important procedure for establishing that two given 
pieces of information are distinct. He says: “One may simply rely on our
74
75
ordinary everyday criteria, whatever they happen to be, for correctly saying 
that someone believes or knows something or does not believe or know it. 
We do not have to be able to specify these criteria, we need only to be able 
to apply them in paradigm cases.. I take Salmon here to be making a 
methodological point. It is plausible to assume that Salmon thinks that 
looking at our ordinary everyday criteria for reporting beliefs is an 
“important procedure” for establishing distinctness of belief contents 
because of the advantage that would have a pre-theoretical way of 
establishing distinctness of beliefs, pre-theoretical because one would only 
need to know when we would attribute certain beliefs without additionally 
having to know how we do this.
One could doubt whether our ordinary belief ascriptions could be expected 
to give us the relevant notion of thought-content. Of course, if we start off 
with a theoretical notion of content, suitable for solving Frege’s Puzzle, or 
governed perhaps by other theoretical constraints, and assume that our 
ordinary belief ascriptions are targeted on relating agents to contents 
appropriately individuated, then there can be no gap between our ordinary 
belief ascriptions and a philosopher’s belief ascriptions. However, if we take 
our ordinary belief ascriptions as the primary data from which we draw 
conclusions about belief content individuation, then we have to face up to 
the possibility that we might be unable to extract any conclusions about 
content individuation that meet various theoretical strictures.
One way to argue that the philosopher’s theoretical notion of belief content 
is different from our everyday concept of belief implicated in our ordinary 
belief ascriptions would be to show that there is a constraint on one that is 
not a constraint on the other. I suggest that there is a constraint on the use of 
philosophers’ use of ‘believes’ that is absent from our everyday use of belief 
ascriptions. Philosophers are guided by theoretical constraints that the 
person on the street may not be. Philosophers are guided, claims Gareth 
Evans (1982), by what he has called the Generality Constraint. According to 
this constraint, we (as philosophers) cannot attribute the thought that a is F 
to an agent unless we are prepared to attribute to the subject a capacity to
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entertain indefinitely many thoughts expressed with the name ‘a’ and also 
indefinitely many thoughts expressed with the predicate ‘is F’. It makes 
sense to think that philosophers of mind and language are governed by this 
constraint, at least once certain assumptions are made about the goal and 
proper form of a theory of language and mind. The fact that a subject can 
understand indefinitely many sentences of a language in which she is 
competent, including ones that she has never encountered before, must mean 
that those sentences are structured, otherwise one would need infinite 
resources to understand the sentences. If we assume, with Frege, that 
understanding a sentence involves associating with it the thought that the 
sentence expresses, this fact about the systematicity of language has its 
counterpart in thought. Thoughts will be then conceived of as having the 
same structure as the sentences that express them. Indeed, it might be said 
that the idea of systematicity is what gives sense to the idea that thoughts are 
essentially structured. From a theoretical point of view, it may be that the 
idea of explaining an agent’s competence with language or, more generally 
his ability to think things, plays a role here. The idea of thoughts as 
structured plays a role in explaining an agent’s capacities, since the idea 
would be that there would be a common explanation of an agent’s being able 
to think that a is F and that a is G. There would be a single cognitive state 
whose possession would be a necessary condition for the ability to think 
both thoughts (Evans 1982). Once one assumes a certain function for 
sentences of the from ‘A believes that S’, namely relating an agent to a 
thought, conceived of as above, that is to say, functioning as predicates in a 
philosophical psychology, then the Generality Constraint will be a constraint 
on belief ascriptions. But, the Generality Constraint is, in and of itself a 
constraint on the concept of thoughts, or as Evans says, ‘conceivings’, and it 
may be the case that our ordinary belief ascriptions are not always to be so 
understood. I will not argue here that ordinary belief ascriptions do not 
function as predicates in philosophical psychology, but have merely tried to 
show that the assumption that they do is crucial to link what a philosopher 
might want to say about belief with what we might ordinarily say with 
sentences of the form ‘A believes that S’.
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I submit that understanding our belief sentences is a distinct project from 
developing a theory of thought.
In this section I have aimed to distinguish three separate issues, often 
insufficiently distinguished, and trace out their real connections. I have 
distinguished issues about the informativeness of sentences from issues 
about thought-contents and I have separated issues about though-contents 
from ordinary belief ascription sentences. I have indicated what assumptions 
would connect the three separate topics, and I have suggested that these 
assumptions are by no means trivial. In particular, I have tried to correct the 
common view that Frege’s puzzle and the substitutivity ‘problem’ are 
closely connected. One should not draw conclusions about substitutivity 
patterns from facts about informativeness of sentences. And if it is really 
ordinary discourse that we are interested in, one should be wary of assuming 
a philosophical theory of thought, and then further assume that ordinary 
ascriptions relate agents to thoughts (in the theoretical sense).
Relatively few philosophers today think that Frege’s theory of simple 
sentences is correct. The dominant view regarding names and indexicals is 
that they contribute to the content of sentences containing them, not a 
Fregean sense, but the individual that they refer to (in a context, for 
indexicals). Nor is Frege’s elegant theory of belief ascriptions widely held. 
Some of the objections about to be discussed in the next section account for 
the unpopularity of his theory of ascriptions. Nevertheless, some deep 
assumptions which have been discussed so far continue to be widely held. 
Now, having discussed Frege, I shall try to say what these assumptions are.
• First, there is the very basic idea that sentences express contents, and that 
giving a semantic account of a language involves allowing us to associate 
with an arbitrary sentence of the language under study its semantic content. 
That is to say, most semantic work still takes place within the ‘translational’ 
paradigm. In Section 2.5, however, I shall look at one account which rejects 
this paradigm. In Chapter 4 ,1 shall try to present at least the outlines of a
77
78
positive account which also rejects the paradigm, and hopefully avoids some 
of what I see as the undesirable consequences of the theory examined in 2.5.
• There is still the idea that something like Frege’s Puzzle needs a 
solution. I say ‘something like’ Frege’s Puzzle, because now the question of 
‘informativeness’ is not seen as having to do with the Fregean content of a 
sentence. The idea of informativeness may or may not be seen as a question 
in semantics. Where it is seen as a question in semantics, the semantic 
account of a sentence must be designed so that it is consistent with the 
insight that names and indexicals introduce their referents into the content of 
a sentence. But, it can be seen instead as a question in psychology. The idea 
is that a thought is informative only if it involves distinct representations of 
the objects and properties it is a thought about.
• The basic idea that a belief ascription is some kind of a relational 
statement is also preserved. Although Frege’s simple idea that ‘A believes 
that S’ simply relates an agent to the thought expressed by ‘S’ is abandoned, 
the idea that a belief ascription somehow manages either to specify a 
representation, or to quantify over representations. The relevant 
representations are those consistent with the above-mentioned requirement 
that informative judgements require distinct representations.
I am about to look at four theories of belief ascriptions and focus on how 
they can be applied to Kripke’s Puzzle. The first is the theory of Frege 
himself. The others are chosen for their apparent diversity. There is Nathan 
Salmon’s theory, which I consider as an example of a direct reference 
theorist’s take on Kripke’s Puzzle. It is sensitive to some of the criticisms I 
make of Frege in the next section. In Section 2.5,1 look at a theory 
developed by Joseph Almog and independently by Erin Eaker. Radically 
different though it (apparently) is, I will argue that it inherits the most 
significant problems of Salmon’s account, and has other problems of its 
own. In Section 2 .6 ,1 look at an account which seems promising in that it
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seems sensitive to some facts about belief ascriptions that Eaker and 
Almog’s theory seems rather insensitive to.
Each of the above theories retains, I will argue, one very basic assumption, 
which runs deeper than the three assumptions mentioned above. In fact, 
Eaker and Almog’s theory rejects each of these assumptions, and so is 
indeed fundamentally different from most theories and the other three I 
discuss in this chapter. Nevertheless, it retains this one assumption which I 
think is mistaken. Exactly what this assumption is will, hopefully, become 
clear in the course of this chapter, but it can provisionally be stated as 
follows: there are certain context-independent cognitive facts about agents 
which are independent o f  each other and ontologically prior to belief 
ascriptions and which ground the truth o f belief ascriptions. The function o f  
a belief report is simply to describe these facts.
33
What Frege might have said in response to Kripke’s Puzzle
In this section I want to consider what Frege could have said in response to 
Kripke’s puzzle. It will be seen that while Frege’s theory has the resources 
to stop Kripke’s argument to the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that 
Pierre has contradictory beliefs even though he is rational, it can only do so 
in a very counterintuitive way.
Frege could have stopped Kripke’s argument after the point when Kripke 
disquotes Pierre’s utterances about London in French by invoking a French 
language version of the disquotation principle to get ‘Pierre croit que 
Londres est jolie’ and then applies the translation principle to get ‘Pierre 
believes that London is pretty’. To remind ourselves, the translation 
principle says that i f  a sentence o f  one language expresses a truth in that 
language, then any translation o f  it into any other language also expresses a 
truth in that other language. Of course, what is meant is that a correct 
standard translation which aims at preserving literal meaning preserves truth, 
rather than any translation.
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Frege’s theory, taken strictly, would prohibit this use of the translation 
principle. Frege would have observed that ‘Londres is London’ is an 
informative identity sentence and the explanation of its informativeness 
would be essentially the same as the explanation of the informativeness of 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’, that is to say, ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ would be 
taken as expressing distinct senses. If we assume that ‘a correct standard 
translation which aims at preserving literal meaning’ must preserve sense 
between translations, as would seem plausible from Frege’s perspective, 
then we already have a restriction on the use of the translation principle. But, 
even if this were not the case in general, it would surely be the case for 
belief report sentences, for on Frege’s theory the function of a belief report 
is to relate the agent to the content of his belief which is expressed by the 
embedded sentence. So, in translating from ‘Pierre croit que Londres est 
jolie’ to ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ we would be relating Pierre 
to two distinct thoughts, so not only would the translation not preserve 
sense, it would not even preserve the reference of all expressions in the 
sentence, and that must be a condition on translation. In this particular case, 
we would be moving from a true belief ascription in French, to a false one in 
English.
One quick objection to this Fregean strategy would be the observation that 
the response does not work to the argument leading to apparent paradox in 
all its forms. We saw in Chapter One that Kripke is careful to show that the 
translation principle is not essential to the derivation of the puzzle since the 
puzzle can also be created in a monolingual scenario. But whether or not this 
objection is satisfactory depends on how we read Frege. If we take Frege to 
have held that a proper name has a single sense which everyone who 
understands sentences containing it associates with it, then Frege’s 
objections to translation would only apply to translations between languages.
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It is a question whether or not Frege did hold this view19, even though he did 
say that in a perfect language a single name should have a single sense. But, 
whatever Frege’s intentions, it is now often convincingly argued that senses, 
in the sense of ‘a way of thinking’ are almost bound to be idiosyncratic in 
the sense that different speakers can, and often will, associate different 
senses with names and still count as competent with a name (Richard 1988). 
For on any plausible way of understanding ‘way of thinking’ that is relevant 
to whether a given sentence is informative or not (we now have to add: ‘for a 
given speaker’) it seems implausible that all competent speakers would 
associate the same ‘way of thinking’ with a given name, even though there 
may be some, albeit rather exceptional cases, where there may be a well 
established convention of associating a particular way of thinking with a 
name, for example, ‘Hesperus’ being associated with the sense of ‘the star 
that can be seen in such-and-such a position in the sky in the evening’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ being associated with the sense of ‘the star that can be seen in 
such-and-such a position in the sky in the morning’ (Kripke 1988).
If we do treat senses as idiosyncratic the original objection becomes relevant 
to more than just the bilingual form of argument in Kripke’s paper, that is, to 
more than just translations between intuitively individuated languages, 
because differences in senses associated with given names yield, strictly 
speaking, different idiolects. The Fregean who allows that senses vary 
between speakers then could restrict the use of translation by saying that we 
must 1) count different idiolects as different languages, and 2) only admit 
translations which preserve sense.
This would have the consequence that the translation principle will apply 
even to monolingual scenarios since even when one intuitively regards 
others as speaking the same language as oneself one would be tacitly 
invoking a homophonic translation of their language into one’s own. This 
new restriction is very restrictive and counter-intuitive. Not only would it 
mean that we cannot translate many names, it would also mean that in most
19Joseph Almog (2005) argues that he may not have.
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cases we would not know whether we are translating correctly or not since 
we often do not know what senses a speaker attaches to a name. Moreover, 
the restriction would affect, not only the applicability of the translation 
principle, but also the applicability of the disquotation principle, since that 
principle would now be revealed as implicitly assuming a homophonic 
translation principle.20 For example, suppose Smith, who associates with the 
name ‘London’ the sense of ‘the city where Buckingham Palace is to be 
found’, says ‘London has a population of seven million’. When the reporter 
ascribes the relevant belief to Smith, he must make sure that he associates 
the same sense with the name ‘London’ otherwise, on Frege’s theory, he will 
be ascribing the wrong thought-content to Smith.
And even if, by luck, he happened to associate exactly the same sense with 
the name, that would still be insufficient for an actual belief report to be of 
any use, for while it may be a true report, it still would not communicate the 
right information unless the audience to the report also associates the same 
sense with the name.
So, it seems that if we read Frege in a way that allows his theory to restrict 
translation so that it not only blocks intuitively bilingual forms of argument, 
but also blocks the monolingual form, as it would have to do if it were to 
solve Kripke’s puzzle in its more general form, we are left with some very 
counter-intuitive restrictions on translation, on disquotation and, most 
relevantly, on belief ascriptions in general.
I think that the restrictions on translation and disquotation are very worrying. 
I would argue against the restriction on disquotation even though I have 
argued in Chapter One, and will argue again, in more depth, in Chapter Four, 
that the disquotation principle is false. This is because, I think that, while 
strictly false, or not generally applicable, something like the disquotation 
principle is used as a principle which provides prima facie and defeasible 
evidence for a belief ascription. The problem with Frege’s theory is that we
20 Richard (1988) convincingly argues that if senses are idiosyncratic it will often be a matter of luck if  we manage 
to report correct thought content.
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would hardly ever be able to rely on it in practice even as a defeasible 
principle. So, while I too believe that disquotation should be restricted I do 
not think that it should be restricted in the same ways that Frege would, nor 
for the same reasons.
Throughout the discussion so far in this section, the focus has been on 
Frege’s theory of language, especially for simple sentences. It is the idea that 
speakers associate different senses with names as their meanings and the 
idea that utterances of those sentences express the speaker’s beliefs that has 
dominated the discussion. With this in mind, two things can be said in 
response. First, in Section 1.2,1 urged a sharp separation between the 
semantics of what a speaker says, and what belief ascriptions are true of her. 
In Chapter One, I argued that an analogue of Kripke’s puzzle can be created 
without assuming that an agent has spoken on a given subject. If this is 
correct, then, even if Frege’s theory did not force problematic restrictions 
upon us, it would still not address Kripke’s puzzle in its most general form. 
For in the case where an agent has not spoken on a subject, translation and 
disquotation do not apply. We can not appeal to any facts about the 
semantics of the agent’s words to block the puzzle. In a way, this is just as 
well, since Frege’s theory has become rather unpopular as a theory of the 
semantics of names.
The possible Fregean response looked at in this section has focused only on 
circumstances where an agent has spoken on a topic, and then it has been 
argued that the translation principle and the disquotation principle do not 
apply, so that we cannot derive an ascription of belief from what an agent 
has said. But we can ascribe beliefs to agent even if he has not spoken on a 
topic. The focus in this section has, then, so far been too narrow. The 
problem arising from Kripke’s puzzle is quite general and so a solution that 
limits itself to blocking derivations from what an agent has said will not in 
general be adequate.
The problem with Frege’s theory of belief ascriptions, I have claimed, is not 
that it does not have the resources to block even those derivations from what
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has been said, but that that it seems that if we take Frege’s notion of sense 
seriously then the majority of uses of disquotation and (homophonic) 
translation would be suspect. Similarly, when we try to apply Frege’s theory 
to block versions of Kripke’s Puzzle that do not depend on an agent’s initial 
utterance, then we see that Frege’s theory is, in general, implausible, and 
that its implausibility has nothing special to do with our not knowing what 
sense an agent attaches to a given expression. The difficulty has instead to 
do with the fact that we often will not know how an agent thinks of the 
objects and properties that he has a belief about. To remind ourselves, the 
‘that-S’ clause of a belief ascription names, in Frege’s theory, a thought. The 
question is: what thought is named in a given belief ascription? There seems 
to be a dilemma here. If, on the one hand, the thought is the one that the 
belief reporter associates with ‘S’, then it seems that a belief report that is 
intuitively true could count as false in many cases where the agent does not 
think of the relevant objects and properties in the same way as the reporter. 
Surely, not everyone of whom it is true to say ‘A believes that London is 
pretty’ thinks of London in the same way.
If, on the other hand, however, the thought referred in the embedded 
sentence of the belief report is stipulated to be the one that the agent is 
related to, then there is the puzzle of how this reference is achieved. One 
could say that the embedded clause is stipulated to have the right reference, 
but one would generally left in the dark as to which thought this actually is.
If belief ascription necessarily involved ascribing to an agent a Fregean 
thought then belief reporting would be much more difficult than it actually 
is. It would require us to know much more about the minds of others than we 
actually do.
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3.4.1
Nathan Salmon’s theory of belief ascription
In this section I will describe and evaluate Nathan Salmon’s theory of belief 
ascriptions, which he consciously develops to deal with a puzzle which is 
very similar to Kripke’s Puzzle about Pierre. His is a radical attempt to solve 
his puzzle within a direct reference framework and so avoids the criticisms 
that Frege faces due to his positing of senses as the meaning of expressions 
in simple sentences. Salmon’s theory also avoids the main criticisms that I 
made of Frege’s possible response to Kripke’s Puzzle, specifically, the 
criticism that it implies unacceptable restrictions on translation and 
disquotation.
Salmon is a direct-reference theorist. He takes the content of a simple 
subject-predicate sentence consisting of a name followed by a predicate to 
be a singular proposition, so that the proposition expressed by ‘Socrates is 
wise’, for instance, consists of the man Socrates and the property of being 
wise ordered in the appropriate way. This is, of course, fundamentally 
opposed to Frege’s theory, according to which, in place of the individual 
Socrates we would have a purely conceptual representation which 
semantically determined the individual Socrates as the referent of ‘Socrates’.
On the other hand, while he is working within a fundamentally different 
framework for simple sentences, Salmon retains the assumption that the 
content of ‘Socrates is wise’ is the content of the belief that one expresses in 
competently and sincerely asserting the sentence, and that an ordinary belief 
ascription of the form ‘A believes that S’ is a relational statement, simply 
relating the agent to the content of ‘Socrates is wise’.
On these assumptions, all a speaker does when she says ‘London is pretty’ is 
to ascribe a certain property to a certain place. We can accurately translate if 
we also utter a sentence which ascribes the same property to the same place. 
If she sincerely and competently asserts ‘London is pretty’, then we can 
disquote her, since homophonic translation is unproblematic. Words are
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treated, in Salmon’s theory as public shared items available for us to use, not 
merely to mention, in ascribing thoughts to others. These are attractive 
consequences since they are more in keeping with our ordinary practices of 
translation and disquotation as they seem to be.
Since Salmon’s theory does not appear to have the resources to block the 
argument that Kripke uses to derive his conclusion that ‘Pierre believes and 
London is pretty’ and ‘Pierre believes that London is not pretty’ are both 
true of a rational Pierre, one difficulty that Salmon faces is to explain the 
apparent conflict, for we do, on Salmon’s view ascribe contradictory beliefs 
to Pierre. The singular proposition that London is pretty is the contradictory 
of the singular proposition that London is not pretty. I will return to how 
Salmon aims to resolve this apparent conflict in the context of discussing his 
own puzzle, which raises another apparently even more puzzling difficulty 
closely related to this one.
Another difficulty is that Salmon’s theory has the consequence that if ‘Pierre 
believes that Hesperus is shiny’ is true then so is ‘Pierre believes that 
Phosphorus is shiny’, since both ascriptions relate the same agent to the 
same thought by the same relation, and that is all there is to the truth- 
condition of the report, on Salmon’s view. Salmon’s theory implies a thesis 
of substitutivity for coreferential names in the embedded sentence of belief 
reports. This is thought to be a bad result, because there are robust intuitions 
that belief reports that differ only by different coreferential names in the 
embedded clause can differ in truth value. Actually, I think that this problem 
is a much more serious problem than it is often taken to be. In fact, Kripke’s 
arguments in ‘A Puzzle About Belief are often taken to show that assuming 
that substitutivity is false is not as compelling as it is often taken to be. I will 
now digress a little to discuss this because it is of great importance to decide 
to whether or not substitutivity is true for belief ascriptions, and this is an 
issue that will remain relevant throughout the dissertation.
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Digression on the status of substitutivity failures
There are several arguments in the literature which are presented as 
supporting the idea that substitutivity fails in belief ascriptions. There are 
then other arguments which try to show that these arguments (the main 
argument in Kripke’s ‘A puzzle about belief, in particular) are not so 
compelling as they seem to be. If our belief in the failure of substitutivity 
required these arguments to support it then any counter-arguments would 
affect our belief. However, I do not think that we require these arguments. I 
will return to explain this, but first I will consider the arguments often given.
The structure of the argument that philosophers find in Kripke for this 
conclusion that perhaps substitutivity failures are not so obvious as has been 
supposed is as follows. Reductio ad absurdum arguments can be given 
against the idea that substitutivity is true. This is prima facie support for the 
view that substitutivity is false. However, when we reflect on these 
arguments we see that they invoke at least one other principle (specifically, 
the disquotation principle) which, along with other compelling assumptions, 
can be used to derive a paradoxical result, even without the use of 
substitutivity. The idea is then that it is wrong to blame the paradoxical 
result on substitutivity. The reductio arguments do not then work against the 
conclusion that substitutivity is not true. The prima facie support for 
substitutivity vanishes.
It is common to find in the literature two other arguments for the failure of 
substitutivity. One argument relies on a strengthened biconditional version 
of the disquotation principle. It is clear than an agent Tom can assent to 
‘Hesperus is shiny’ and fail to assent to ‘Phosphorus is shiny’ even though 
he is sincere and competent, so we can conclude, using the biconditional DP 
that ‘Tom believes that Hesperus is shiny’ is true and that ‘Tom does not 
believe that Phosphorus is shiny’ is also true. If we take the latter as the 
negation of ‘Tom believes that Phosphorus is shiny’ then we can take the 
latter ascription as false. Another argument again uses the simple 
disquotation principle to conclude from Tom’s assent to ‘Hesperus is shiny’
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that ‘Tom believes that Hesperus is shiny’ is true, and from Tom’s assent to 
‘Phosphorus is not shiny’ to ‘Tom believes that Phosphorus is shiny’ is 
false, on the additional assumption that Tom is rational and would therefore 
not believe that Phosphorus is shiny.
Kripke’s puzzle casts sufficient doubt on the assumptions used in the above 
arguments to make us wonder whether we could find these arguments 
compelling. However, as I said above, I do not think that we require these 
arguments because the assumptions on which they rely are more 
questionable than the conclusion they argue for, more questionable even 
before we consider Kripke’s puzzle. I think we should take as a hard datum 
that ‘Tom believes that Hesperus is shiny’ can be true in some contexts even 
while ‘Tom believes that Phosphorus is shiny’ is false in the same contexts.
When I say we should take substitutivity failures as a datum I mean we 
should reflect on particular examples which provide us with the firm 
intuition that interchange of corefrential names can result in a change in 
truth-value. I provide such examples in Chapter Four. We do not need 
arguments for the failure of substitutivity. We only need intuitions about 
particular cases, The failure o f substitutivity is therefore a datum that needs 
explaining. That is the end of my digression on the status of our belief in 
substitutivity failures.
Salmon offers a new analysis of belief ascriptions which is designed to 
resolve a puzzle that he invented. In Salmon’s puzzle, an agent, Elmer is 
determined to apprehend Bugsy Wabbit, a notorious jewel thief. Elmer 
learns much about Bugsy from FBI files, including photographs, films and 
slides, and based on what he sees and hears he forms the opinion (on January 
1st) that Bugsy is dangerous. On June 1st Elmer receives another piece of 
information which makes him less sure that Bugsy is dangerous. Salmon 
asks us to consider two questions: (a) Before June 1st did Elmer believe that 
Bugsy Wabbit is dangerous? (b) If so, does he continue to believe that after 
receiving the extra information on June 1st? Salmon says that the questions
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should be answered ‘yes’ and ‘no’ respectively and that the Elmer’s 
cognitive states are paradigm examples of such states. Given what we have 
so far, these claims cannot reasonably be denied. But things are not as clear 
as they seem.
Salmon elaborates his story to include the following information. Shortly 
after January 1st Bugsy learns that he is being pursued, and in order to avoid 
detection he undergoes extensive plastic surgery. He also has his voice 
surgically altered and adopts different mannerisms. In short, he becomes 
unrecognisable. He does, however, retain his name. Elmer finally, on April 
1st. catches up with Bugsy after these alterations, makes friends with him, 
but never learns this man’s true identity. Elmer sees some of Bugsy’s 
behaviour and in particular his interactions which another man who appears 
to be frightened of him and comes to think to himself “I’d better watch my 
step, this Bugsy is a dangerous fellow”. On June 1st, as we have already been 
told, he receives the extra FBI information which leads him to say to himself 
“Maybe Bugsy is harmless after all”.
The puzzle arises when we consider the question ‘Once Elmer has received 
the extra information on June 1st, how does he stand with respect to the 
information that Bugsy is dangerous?’ Does he believe it or not?
Focus first, though, on Elmer’s beliefs on April 1st. If we roll the clock back 
to before April 1st, Elmer certainly had the belief then that Bugsy is 
dangerous. The reasoning that Salmon gives that makes this seem 
compelling is that we had already decided, before we learnt the extra part of 
the story, that Elmer believed that Bugsy was dangerous, but all the 
additional information concerns events that take place after January 1st, so 
the original grounds for saying that Elmer believed that Bugsy is dangerous 
still obtain. On April 1st. Elmer formed the opinion that his friend Bugsy 
(whom he does not recognise) is dangerous. So we can say that he never 
changed his mind about Bugsy in the sense that he believed him to be 
dangerous and still does. There was never a point, before June, at which he 
gave up this belief. Now, when we turn our attention to the puzzle question
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about what Elmer believed on June 1st, we must admit that there seems to be 
no simple satisfactory answer to the question. For there is an important sense 
in which Elmer came to believe, in January, that Bugsy is dangerous but 
now suspends judgement about this. So, there is an important sense in which 
we want to say that on June 1st. Elmer neither believes that Bugsy is 
dangerous nor fails to believe it. But it seems completely unsatisfactory and 
misleading to leave matters there, for there is a very compelling reason to 
say that Elmer still believes that Bugsy is dangerous. As Salmon says, 
something exactly analogous to the grounds for holding that Elmer continues 
to believe that Bugsy is dangerous on April 1st. also obtains on June 1st. For 
Elmer has not relinquished the opinion that his friend Bugsy is dangerous.
On the other hand, if Elmer had decided on January 1st that Bugsy is 
dangerous and came to have second thoughts, as he actually did, but had 
never met Bugsy in the interim and come to have thoughts about him, then 
we would have no hesitation in saying that Elmer once believed that Bugsy 
is dangerous but believes it no longer. That is precisely what we did say 
when we had only the first part of the story. Salmon then argues in a way 
very reminiscent of what I emphasised was so structurally critical in 
Kripke’s argument. He says that all the information given in the first part of 
the story was enough to determine that Elmer no longer believes, by the 1st 
of June, that Bugsy is dangerous, and so that nothing else can undermine 
this, and then draws on a simple logical principle to validate this: If S entails 
T, then so does (S and S’).
So we seem to have compelling reasons for denying and asserting that Elmer 
believes, as of June 1st, that Bugsy is dangerous, and yet the story which 
gives rise to this is not itself inconsistent.
Salmon’s response to this puzzle is to say that we should in fact say that 
Elmer believes that Bugsy is dangerous all along. It is not true that Bugsy 
does not believe this, so that we avoid a contradiction in our belief 
ascriptions. Salmon is then faced with explaining our inclination to say that 
Elmer did not believe that Bugsy was dangerous on June 1st, by rejecting the
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apparently compelling grounds for denying him this belief and explaining 
why those grounds seemed compelling.
He does this by providing a new analysis of belief and belief ascriptions. He 
suggests that ‘believes that’ may be analysed in terms of a notion of 
disposition to inward assent to a proposition (conceived in the direct- 
reference way explained earlier) when taken in a certain way. The cognitive 
state underlying the truth of our belief ascriptions is a three-place relation 
holding between an agent, a propositional content and a way of taking that 
proposition. English does not have an expression expressing this relation, so 
Salmon invents one, ‘BEL’. Salmon then treats the logical form of a belief 
ascription ‘A believes that S’ as the existential generalisation of BEL, with 
the quantifier ranging over ‘ways of taking propositions’:
‘A believes that S ’ is analysed as ‘There is an x such that: A grasps S by means o f x and BEL (A, S, 
x).
Since ‘BEL’ is a theoretical concept, the terms in this analysans need 
explaining.
Salmon takes over the Fregean notion of grasping, although his 
understanding of what grasping involves must be different from Frege’s, 
since his notion of that which is grasped is so fundamentally different from 
Frege’s. Salmon does not give an analysis of grasping in more basic terms, 
and so it is to be taken as a primitive concept and understood as being a 
necessary ingredient in thinking a thought. A central epistemological thesis 
of Salmon’s is that one can grasp a proposition twice over, but fail to 
recognise the proposition as being the same one on the two occasions. The 
notion of recognition here is basically the same as, or at least derived from, 
the ordinary notion of recognising a material object. The singular 
propositions that Salmon thinks that belief is a relation to are propositions 
which involve material objects as constituents. One can then fail to 
recognise a proposition because one fails to recognise the material object 
which is a constituent of it. ‘Ways of taking’ propositions can then be
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understood as (roughly) analogous to appearances of individuals. So one can 
grasp and think a thought without recognising it as the thought one has 
already entertained if one fails to recognise it, and one can fail to recognise it 
because thoughts, rather like people, have different appearances.
Salmon does not give necessary and sufficient conditions for grasping 
thoughts, but he does say that Elmer is in a position to grasp the thought that 
Bugsy Wabbit is dangerous. Elmer grasps the proposition that Bugsy Wabbit 
is dangerous when he takes it one way and inwardly assents to it when he 
takes it that way. The way in question here is the way he thinks of Bugsy 
when he thinks of him as the man he overhears in a dispute about carrots. 
This is taken to be a basic cognitive fact about Elmer that, according to the 
analysis of belief ascriptions provided above, grounds the truth of the report 
‘Elmer believes that Bugsy is dangerous’.
The fact that there is also a way of taking the proposition, such that when 
Elmer takes it that way (that is, the way he takes it when he thinks of Bugsy 
as the source of the FBI files) he does not inwardly assent to it, is, Salmon 
says, simply irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the belief ascription. What, 
then, about the apparently compelling grounds we have for denying this 
ascription? Salmon says that what we really mean when we deny that Elmer 
believes that Bugsy is dangerous can only be perspicuously represented by 
invoking the three-place relation BEL. He says that ‘Elmer does not believe 
that Bugsy is dangerous’ is what we say when what we really mean to deny 
is that the BEL relation holds between Elmer, the proposition that Bugsy is 
dangerous and the relevant way of taking the proposition. But, says Salmon, 
given only the two place predicate ‘believes’ we are forced to negate what is 
really the whole existential generalisation. It is strictly speaking false, but 
the closest we can get to what we really want to say when we restrict 
ourselves to the two place ‘believes’.
Salmon also uses these theoretical resources to explain away the apparent 
difficulty with accepting a substitutivity thesis for names in belief 
ascriptions. Salmon is committed to the view that ‘Tom believes that
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Hesperus is shiny’ and ‘Tom believes that Phosphorus is shiny’ state the 
same fact, given that Hesperus and Phosphorus are one and the same. If they 
state the same fact, then they must have the same truth-value.
The real difference between the two sentences is a pragmatic, rather than 
semantic one, according to Salmon. Suppose Tom would assent to ‘Hesperus 
is shiny’ but dissent from ‘Phosphorus is shiny’, then the first ascription can 
convey, although it does not literally say, how Tom inwardly assents to the 
relevant thought. The idea is that the two distinct sentences, ‘Hesperus is 
shiny’ and ‘Phosphorus is shiny’ expressing the singular proposition 
correspond to two ways of taking the proposition, and that the use of 
‘Phosphorus’ instead of ‘Hesperus’ in the belief ascription conveys the 
information that Tom inwardly assents to the proposition when it is 
presented through the lens of the sentence ‘Phosphorus is shiny’, and in so 
far as it does this it is misleading, but not strictly false.
Salmon is very brief in applying his theory directly to Kripke’s puzzle. But I 
will briefly summarise how he intends to apply it. According to Salmon, 
‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ is true and so is ‘Pierre believes that 
London is not pretty’. He maintains that the reports are true together because 
they simply relate Pierre to the singular contents <London, is pretty> and 
<London, is not pretty>. Salmon thinks that these facts do not impugn 
Pierre’s rationality because, at the appropriate level of analysis it would be 
revealed that Pierre has diffferent ways of recognising London, but that 
these are not relevant to the truth of the belief ascription which by 
existentially generalising over the distinct representation washes out the 
specific information about Pierre inner representations.
3.4.2
Criticism of Salmon’s theory
I do not think that Salmon’s analysis can be correct. I think that the most 
serious objection to Salmon’s theory is one that has standardly been made
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against it: it has consequences which conflict with our intuitions about the 
truth-values of ordinary belief ascriptions. As we have seen, it implies a 
principle of substitutivity for belief ascriptions of the form ‘A believes that a 
is F’ with respect to the position occupied by ‘a’, when ‘a’ is a name or other 
directly referential expression. It is highly counter-intuitive to say that ‘Tom 
believes that Hesperus is shiny’ and ‘Tom believes that Phosphorus is shiny’ 
cannot differ in truth value at a given time. Moreover, with respect to 
Elmer’s situation and Pierre’s situation, Salmon’s theory has the 
consequence that ‘Elmer believes that Bugsy is dangerous’ and ‘Pierre 
believes that London is pretty’ are straightforwardly true with respect to the 
scenarios described, and that even in a context when we are focusing on 
Elmer’s indecision about Bugsy, and Pierre’s revulsion at the ugly part of 
London he finds himself in, we can truly say: ‘Elmer believes that Bugsy is 
dangerous’ and ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’, even though he 
would adamantly deny that the sentence ‘London is pretty’ is true.
Even stronger conflicts with intuition would arise, it seems, if we were to 
consider belief ascriptions involving identities, such as ‘Tom believes that 
Phosphorus is Hesperus’ which intuitively could surely be false even while 
‘Tom believes that Hesperus is Hesperus’ is, of course, true. And conflicting 
intuitions may be stronger still in the case of second-order belief ascriptions
• * ) isuch as ‘John believes that Tom believes that Hesperus is Hesperus’ . 
According to Salmon’s theory, this sentence expresses that John stands in 
the belief relation to the singular proposition about the proposition that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus to the effect that Tom believes it. Exactly the same 
fact is expressed by ‘John believes that Tom believes that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus’. But surely, intuition says, the former could be true when the 
latter is false.
It is plausible to consider that such results would count as a reductio ad 
absurdum of a theory of which they are consequences. Salmon is, of course,
21 Salmon (1986)
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aware of the counter-intuitiveness of these results, and devotes a large 
section of his book in trying to blunt the force of these intuitions.
We should remind ourselves that our objects of analysis are ordinary 
language belief ascriptions and intuitions about truth-values are generally 
taken as the data against which we test our theories. Any philosopher would 
agree that ordinary intuitions about the truth-values of belief ascriptions 
which describe aspects of ordinary situations are relevant, and sometimes the 
only real data we have to test our philosophical theories. But what exactly is 
the nature of this relevance? It would be too simplistic to say that what we 
find it natural to say about a given circumstance must always be true, 
because we know that we can always make mistakes. Salmon says, in the 
context of making a distinction between theory and data, that “the truth 
values of our pronouncements are not pre-theoretic data” and that “pre- 
theoretically, all we have is that we speak this way”. He goes on to say “only 
after we have decided on one theory can we determine the truth-value of our 
pronouncements”.22
Salmon seems to me to draw the line between theory and data in the wrong 
place. It is methodologically more usual to take as a datum the assumed truth 
of our ordinary pronouncements. We do not assume that we are infallible of 
course, but it does seem that when we are considering cases which are 
central cases of a given phenomenon and we take ourselves to be speaking 
literally, non-elliptically, carefully and reflectively then we must assume that 
we are right in the majority of cases. For if we did not adhere to this rather 
minimal methodological principle it would no longer be clear that we were 
really interested in this aspect of our ordinary language after all. Or is there 
an even more minimal principle which can still allow us to see what we are 
doing as investigating ordinary language? Perhaps a philosophical theory 
designed to explain some aspect of ordinary language could be acceptable 
even if it had as a consequence that we are strictly wrong about what we say 
most of the time, if it can give a theoretically satisfying account of some
22
These quotations are from Salmon (1986) pg. 119.
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core uses of a given bit of language and then additionally explain, in a non 
ad hoc way, how we can systematically account for the errors.
Even if this were the right methodological principle, I do not think that 
Salmon’s theory passes this test. For Salmon admits that we often need to 
specify how an agent takes a proposition. Less theoretically, we often need 
to know how an agent thinks of an object. It is commonly held that we need 
to have something like an agent’s view on an object if we want to know how 
the agent will behave in a specific situation, if we want to assess an agent’s 
rationality from their beliefs, or if we want to know what an agent could be 
expected to say on a given subject. These are some functions that belief 
ascriptions would normally be thought to be designed to serve.
If it is correct that belief ascriptions have the above as amongst their main 
functions, it seems strange that belief ascriptions semantically only relate 
agents to propositions individuated in a way that doesn’t allow them to serve 
this purpose.
It is commonly accepted that English has a locution which relates an agent to 
an object without specifying how an agent thinks of that object, for 
sometimes we may be interested only in knowing what object an agent has a 
belief about. This may be the case when the object of the belief is the topic 
of the conversation, rather than the agent being the topic of the conversation. 
These ascriptions are the so-called de re ascriptions, and are standardly 
supposed to have the surface form ‘A believes, of a, that it is F’. On a 
popular understanding of these utterances, these de re ascriptions 
characterise, rather than fully specify a content believed, in the sense that 
they say something about the proposition believed without saying exactly 
which proposition it is. Apparent evidence for this idea that de re ascriptions 
merely characterise, rather than specify a content comes from the 
observation that the term that occurs in the place of ‘a’ is open to
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substitution and existential generalisation because it occurs outside the 
context under the scope of the operator ‘believes that’.
What seems strange is that even if we accept that there are genuinely de re 
ascriptions which merely characterise a content, Salmon’s theory leaves no 
room for there to be a semantically significant difference between 
ascriptions which characterise and ascriptions which specify a content, as I 
shall now explain.
On Salmon’s theory, the distinction between de re ascriptions which merely 
characterise a content and belief ascriptions which fully specify a content 
collapses in the cases where it is a directly referential term replaces ‘a’. 
Salmon denies that de re ascriptions merely characterise a content. He thinks 
that they fully specify a content which is a singular proposition. For while it 
is often said that, in a de re ascription, the term ‘a’ occurs outside the context 
embedded under ‘believes that’, Salmon points out that although this is true, 
what is more relevant is that another singular term, a directly referential one 
(an anaphoric pronoun in ordinary locutions, and a bound variable in semi- 
formal existential generalisations), occurs within the scope of ‘believes that’. 
Consider a semi-formal existential generalisation: ‘There is an x such that: x 
= a and A believes that x is F’. If this sentence is true, then it follows from 
basic semantic principles that the open sentence ‘A believes that x is F’ is 
true under the assignment of ‘a’ to the variable ‘x’. Given Salmon’s simple 
relational analysis of belief ascriptions, the above open sentence is true if 
and only if Tom stands in the relation of belief to the content of the open 
sentence ‘x is F’. Since the semantic content of a variable under an 
assignment is the individual assigned, the semantic content of the open 
sentence ‘x is F’ is the singular proposition expressed by ‘a is F’.
If the claims and reasoning of the last five paragraphs are correct then there 
seem to be the following consequences. On Salmon’s theory, there is no 
distinction between de re ascriptions and content specifying ascriptions
23 In the final chapter I will try to cast some doubt on the idea that there are real de re ascriptions outside of 
artificial philosophy contexts.
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when the embedded term is directly referential. This means that there is a 
redundancy in ordinary English of the locution ‘A believes, of a, that it is F’, 
since it says the same as ‘A believes that a is F \  Moreover, while we have 
two locutions that say the same thing, we have no locution which 
semantically does what Salmon, by his own admission, says we often want a 
belief ascription to do, that is, say how an agent thinks of an object. So, we 
with ‘A believes that a is F’, we have a linguistic form which is redundant 
and insufficiently expressive, and conflicts with our ordinary intuitions 
about truth-values.
It would seem very plausible that if l ) ‘believes that’ functions in the way 
that Salmon says it does, failing to provide any information about an agent’s 
way of thinking of an object, or at least giving some kind of information 
about the agent that it not available from a merely de re report and that 2) we 
often need to know how an agent thinks of an object, then English would 
already contain some expression analogous to the BEL operator, but it does 
not, and that is why Salmon had to invent the operator. This seems to 
suggest that belief ascriptions are not to be understood in the notion-neutral 
way that Salmon suggests.
These considerations together provide at least a strong prima facie case 
against Salmon’s analysis of belief ascriptions. What then is to be said in 
favour of Salmon’s analysis?
It seems that Salmon thinks that one of the main considerations in favour of 
his theory is that it preserves what he says is “an intuitively appealing 
picture that is entrenched in philosophical tradition.”24 This is the picture 
that depicts belief as a type of inward assent to a piece of information, a 
content. I would suggest that the intuitive appeal of such a picture derives 
more from a picture in which propositions are conceived along Fregean 
lines, rather than as singular propositions.
24 Salmon (1986), pg. 80
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Salmon’s analysis starts from a certain notion of content according to which 
contents are singular propositions. This analysis of content is informed by 
considerations only having to do with the truth-conditions of simple 
sentences. Salmon then assumes, without any argument, that belief is a 
relation to such contents, and then further assumes that ordinary belief 
ascriptions specify this relation. These are exactly the moves which I tried to 
suggest are not inevitable in Section 1.2 of this chapter. We have now seen 
some specific reasons why the moves should not be made so quickly.
There is another criticism to be made of Salmon’s theory, which is that it 
seems to unable to account for the contextual-sensitivity. I will discuss this 
criticism in the context of discussing the next theory since the same criticism 
arises for the next theory I shall discuss and the advocates of the next theory 
have more to say on this point.
3.5.1
A more radical no-content theory: Erin Eaker and Joseph Almog
I shall look at a theory of belief ascriptions which abandons the orthodox 
assumption that belief ascriptions relate, in one way or another, agents to 
some kind of inner representation. In recent years, an alternative theory of 
belief ascriptions has been defended by Erin Eaker (2002 and 2004), and 
separately by Joseph Almog (2005). In their theory, they abandon the 
orthodox assumption that belief reports relate agents to any kind of inner 
representation or content. In this section I describe their theory and explain 
how radically different it is from orthodox views, and I will discuss some of 
its appeal, then I will discuss how they relate it to Kripke’s Puzzle, before 
criticising the theory by drawing out some of its undesirable consequences.
Strictly speaking, although Almog and Eaker have developed views on 
belief ascriptions that means that their ideas can be grouped together as 
belonging to a radically new way of thinking about belief ascriptions,
Eaker’s work has been more narrowly focused on belief ascriptions, while
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Almog’s work has focused on developing a new program for giving a 
content-free semantics for a range of sentence types. Almog looks at belief 
ascriptions as part of this program, and develops view about what he calls 
‘co-ordinative reports’ which are attitude reports of the form ‘A and B both 
think that a is F’, or ‘A thinks that a is F and B thinks that a is G’. It is Eaker 
who gives a more detailed account of the truth-conditions for belief 
ascriptions of the form ‘A believes that S’, and so it is her definition that I 
will discuss, but in situating her work in its contexts I will be using ideas 
that Almog has developed.
According to Eaker (2004),
A belief ascription o f the form ‘A believes that a is F’ is true iff A has, in thinking about the individual 
which is designated in the report context by the reporter’s use o f the singular referring expression ‘a’, 
ascribed to it the property o f being F
The first thing to note about this truth-condition is that, according to it, the 
belief report does not relate a thinker to a content or any kind of inner 
representation. Not only does it not specify a relation to anything like a 
Fregean thought, it does not even relate the agent to a de re content. The 
truth-conditions are, as Eaker calls them, ‘de re truth conditions’, but this 
should be understood as meaning that the function of the report is to relate 
the agent to the individual she thinks of, and specifies what property she 
ascribes to it, and that is all..
One way to appreciate the nature of this semantic account of belief 
ascriptions is to see how the account, at least in Almog’s hands, is part of a 
much larger semantic project of providing a new paradigm for doing 
philosophical semantics. The project entails rejecting the classical from of 
semantic theory which Almog says is ‘translational’ in the sense in such a 
theory each target sentence of the language under investigation is assigned 
an entity articulating ‘what it says’ or its ‘content’ . Almog instead intends to 
replace translation with non-translational truth-conditions. The truth- 
conditions provide the condition in which the sentence is true, but do not 
articulate what the sentence says. Thus liberated from having to articulate
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what is said, the semanticist can, in stating the truth-conditions, use concepts 
which the user of the sentence may not even have. Almog says that the truth- 
conditions are given by what he calls (following Donnellan 1974) ‘the 
omniscient observer of history’ (henceforth OOH).
The metaphor of the OOH is central to Almog’s picture of semantics so it is 
worth explaining what is involved. Almog says the OOH articulates the 
truth-conditions of the target sentence. This terminology is a bit misleading, 
for articulating the truth-condition clearly does not require omniscience. 
Omniscience would be required to know the truth -value of the sentence, but 
not to know its truth-condition. If it did we could never do semantics. What 
is meant, I think, is that the OOH has the conceptual resources to give the 
semantics that the ordinary language user need not have to use the sentence. 
The OOH will use such concepts as ‘causal chains of reference-preserving 
links’, ‘speakers intentions’, the ‘agent of the context’. The conceptual 
advantage the OOH has over the ordinary language user is less apparent in 
the case of the semantics for belief ascriptions, since the truth-conditions for 
these sentences does not seem to invoke any theoretical concepts. In fact, we 
will see shortly that Eaker is committed to the view that her notion of 
‘thinking about’ and ‘ascribing a property to a thing in thought’ are to be 
understood in an ordinary way. Nevertheless, the truth-condition does not 
articulate what is said. The OOH’s language then is richer than the ordinary 
language user’s since it contains extra theoretical resources. On the other 
hand, there are limitations on what the OOH can say. He cannot use empty 
names and cannot use definite descriptions referentially which there is no 
referent, he can only mention them in mentioning the sentence whose truth- 
condition he is giving.
3.5.2
The Application of Eaker’s and Almog’s account to Kripke’s Puzzle
Eaker’s response to Kripke’s puzzle is interesting because it is one of the 
few (or only) that questions the assumptions that belief reports relate 
thinkers to a content.
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Kripke begins his presentation of the puzzle by stipulating that the only 
reading of ‘believes-that’ reports that he is interested in are de dicto reports 
which give the content of an agents belief. He specifically says that he is not 
interested in de re reports (or de re readings of ‘believes that’ sentences). 
Eaker’s response is important because it reminds us that that the reports in 
questions are de dicto is an assumption that must be seen as defeasible in the 
discussion that the paper engenders. It is no less a defeasible assumption just 
because Kripke stipulates that it must be true. We should question whether it 
is even methodologically legitimate to make such a stipulation while 
simultaneously relying on ordinary intuitions about truth-values to guide as, 
for to do so could be seen as entirely begging the question, in the context of 
a debate about the semantics of ascriptions, in favour of a certain analysis.
Eaker, in effect, sees Kripke’s puzzle as a reductio of Kripke’s assumption 
that the belief ascriptions involved are to be understood as specifying a de 
dicto content.
Consider the following four sentences:
1) Pierre believes that London is pretty
2) Pierre believes that London is not pretty
3) Pierre believes that London is pretty and Pierre believes that London is
not pretty
4) Pierre believes that London is pretty and that London is not pretty
Eaker’s account first of all commits her to the truth of (i) and (ii), since the 
truth conditions for (i) and (ii) are, respectively, ‘Pierre, in thinking about 
London has ascribed to it the property of being pretty’ and ‘Pierre, in 
thinking about London has ascribed to it the property of being not pretty’. 
Intuitively, Pierre has fulfilled both these conditions. If (i) and (ii) are both 
true then so is (iii), since this is simply derived from (i) and (ii) by the law of 
conjunction. It is interesting to note that neither Eaker nor Almog comment 
on the truth-value of (iv). But even without any view on the truth of (iv)
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Eaker’s account endorses those reports whose truth has seemed to be 
incompatible with Pierre’s rationality.
According to Eaker, (iii) need not ascribe any cognitive flaw to Pierre, and is 
perfectly compatible with his rationality. The explanation that she and 
Almog give is essentially as follows. First they claim that description that 
Kripke himself gives of Pierre’s case, that is, the description that Kripke 
gives from an external OOH viewpoint by itself grounds the truth of the 
reports. The viewpoint is external in the sense that it does not involve 
ascribing and contentful mental states to Pierre. It avoids making any 
explicit assumptions about Pierre’s inner mental representations and indeed 
involves no explicit commitment to the claim that there are any. The 
external description uses such expressions as ‘Pierre is inclined to think that 
it is pretty’, ‘Pierre has not changed his mind’, and ‘Pierre is unimpressed
 so is inclined to assent to the sentence ‘London is not pretty’. It is on the
basis of such statements, and the rest of the story, which we can see is 
clearly compatible with Pierre’s rationality, that we can say that Pierre has, 
in thinking about London ascribed to it the property of being pretty and the 
property of being not pretty. But this is all, say Almog and Eaker, that the 
truth of the reports depends on.
Kripke pre-empts a response to the puzzle which resolves it by saying that 
the externally given description of Pierre is intuitively compatible with his 
rationality. He says:
In one sense the problem may strike some as no puzzle at all. For, in the situation to be envisaged, all 
the relevant facts can be described in one terminology without difficulty. But, in another terminology, 
the situation seems impossible to describe in a consistent way.15
The first terminology referred is the external viewpoint description. The 
other terminology, in which, says Kripke, it is impossible to describe the 
situation consistently, is the terminology of ‘believes-that’ reports. But 
Eaker and Almog have given a way to understand this terminology so that
15 Kripke (1988, pg. 102)
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the situation can be described in a consistent way. They do this by 
abandoning the de dicto content assumption and by making the semantics of 
the reports depend only on those externally given facts that Kripke admits 
are consistent with Pierre’s rationality.
Almog (2005) adds the point that the conjunctive belief report (iii) does not 
ascribe conflicting contents to Pierre, because it does not ascribe any 
contents at all. He says that only if (iii) ascribed to Pierre a conjunction of 
thoughts of the form ‘a is F and a is not F’, where ‘a’ has a uni vocal content 
would the report be incompatible with his rationality.
Before turning to my criticism of Eaker and Almog’s theory, I want to 
contrast it with Salmon’s theory which was discussed in Section 2.4 .1 do not 
want to underestimate the differences between the two types of account, and 
I will discuss one very important difference which will form the basis of 
reason to favour Eaker and Almog’s account over Salmon, but I will also 
argue that are more similar than might be supposed considering that that one 
relates agents to contents and one does not. For that sounds like a very large 
difference.
Eaker’s and Almog’s theory can sound very different from Salmon’s if we 
focus on the way they account for the compatibility of the truth of (iii) with 
Pierre’s rationality. Eaker and Almog say that there is no incompatibility 
because (iii) does not ascribe any conflicting thoughts to Pierre. Salmon’s 
account, on the other hand, says that (iii) does ascribe contradictory thoughts 
to Pierre, specifically it ascribes to him belief in the singular proposition 
consisting of London and prettiness in the appropriate order and in the 
singular proposition consisting of London, negation and prettiness in the 
appropriate order. These two propositions are contradictories. This makes it 
appear that Salmon now has a further explanatory task. He must offer an 
account of how an agent can have contradictory thoughts despite being 
rational. Eaker and Almog seem to have no such task. Superficially, then , 
the two types of account seem very different. But I suggest that we should 
look at exactly what is meant by this talk of contradictory thoughts. For it is
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not clear what is really at stake in an argument between Eaker and Almog on 
the one side and Salmon on the other side about whether or not belief 
ascriptions like (iii) ascribe contradictory thoughts.
Salmon says that having the belief that London is pretty is standing in the 
relevant relation to a singular content. Almog and Eaker say that it is not.
But what does it mean to say that an agent stands in the relation of believing 
to a singular content?
On the one hand, Salmon gives an account of believing according to which it 
is analysed as a disposition to inwardly assent to an entertained proposition. 
It is tempting to visualise what this involves and this leads to us thinking of 
a proposition as an inner object and assenting to it as an episode that we 
could perceive. But Salmon rejects the idea that a singular proposition is 
literally any kind of inner object, and rejects a phenomenological account of 
believing. More clarity is had when we step back from this metaphorical 
way of thinking of belief and look at Salmon’s semantic analysis of belief 
ascriptions. For Salmon ultimately thinks we can derive the thesis that belief 
is a relation to a singular content from an ordinary de re belief ascription of 
the form ‘A believes, of a, that it is F’, an assumption about the semantics of 
‘it’ and a natural assumption about the grammatical structure of an ordinary 
belief ascription. This argument has already been given in Section 2.4, 
where I said that the distinction between a de re belief ascription which 
merely characterises a content and a belief ascription that fully specifies a 
singular content collapses on Salmon’s theory. Salmon would presumably 
say that the de re truth-conditions that Eaker gives for ‘believes-that’ 
ascriptions actually specify relations to singular propositions. If ‘Pierre, in 
thinking of London, ascribes to it the property of being pretty’ is to be 
understood as paraphrasable into ‘Pierre thinks, of London, that it is pretty’, 
as seems natural, then Salmon will read this as a sentence which relates 
Pierre to the singular content that he thinks is expressed by ‘London is 
pretty’. This move depends only on two semantic assumptions. Firstly, that 
anaphoric ‘it’ in the truth conditions is directly referential (an assumption 
with which Eaker and Almog would agree) and secondly, that ‘that London
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is pretty’ is a term referring to the semantic content of ‘London is pretty’. 
Assuming that Eaker and Almog would not disagree that the singular 
proposition exists, then we can see the difference the difference between 
Salmon’s view that (iii) relates an agent to contradictory contents and Eaker 
and Almog’s view that it doesn’t does depend on any substantial difference 
in metaphysics, but on a different grammatical understanding of belief 
reports. If this is correct, then we can ask whether there is any further 
explanatory task that Salmon is faced with in accounting for Pierre’s 
rationality that Eaker and Almog do not face.
Salmon postulates distinct mediating representations to account for how an 
agent can have contradictory thoughts. In doing this he can be seen as 
holding onto one entrenched Fregean assumption that I isolated in Section 
2.2. These representations he calls ‘guises’ or ‘ways of taking’ propositions. 
He emphasises that they are not like Fregean modes of presentation which 
are integral to the semantic content of sentences and make up the thoughts 
that the sentences express. They may be psychological and subjective. 
Nevertheless, he says that they have conditions of individuation and are 
entities which are quantified over in the logical form of belief ascriptions. 
Why does Salmon postulate the existence of such entities? There seems to 
be a deep assumption at work here. It is the assumption that an agent can 
only have different attitudes to a given content only if he fails to recognise 
that he grasps the same content twice, and that this can only happen if he has 
different representations associated with the same content. Since, as we saw 
in Section 2.4, Salmon says that failing to recognise a content is parasitic 
upon failing to recognise an individual that is part of that content, let us 
focus on recognising an individual. Salmon thinks that if Pierre fails to 
recognise that Londres is London (as we might say) then he must have two 
ways of thinking about London, two distinct representations of London. 
Eaker casts doubt on this basic assumption. She says that even though we 
will often find differences between 1) how an agent who thinks that there are 
two entities when there is in fact just one is thinking of it when he is 
prepared to ascribe one property to it and 2) when he is not prepared to do 
so, we need not always be able to find such differences. All that need to be
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the case is that the agent thinks there are two entities. Pierre-like puzzles can 
arise even when there is no difference in information associated with two 
names of the single entity, for the agent need have no names for the object. 
There also need be no information associated with two encounters of the 
entity, two pictures of it, or two presentations of the same picture. All that 
needs to be the case is that the agent thinks there are two objects, when there 
is just one.
Almog’s and Eaker’s account does not involve a commitment to distinct 
mediating representations which in Salmon’s theory are quantified over in 
the logical form of the belief ascription. I think that this is a considerable 
advantage of their account. Nevertheless I do not think that their account is 
correct.
3.5.3
Criticisms of Eaker and Almog’s theory
I will now examine some difficulties for their account. First, their theory 
licenses substitutions of coreferring names in belief contexts. We have 
already seen why this is a problem. But, not only does their theory imply a 
principle of substitution concerning names, but it also implies a substitution 
principle for any co-referring singular referring expressions. So, on their 
account, if ‘John believes that Gordon Brown is no longer the Prime 
Minister’ is true, then so is ‘John believes that the current Prime Minister is 
no longer the Prime Minister’. We can acknowledge that there may be a de 
re reading of the latter ascription which is true, But Eaker and Almog do not 
say that. They would say that the sentence is true simpliciter. For they do not 
distinguish different readings of the sentence. Both Eaker and Almog give 
an interesting battery of examples to help to undermine the commonly held 
view that de dicto reports are to be taken as paradigmatic and de re reports 
are somehow deviant, or at least exceptional. But even if we are persuaded 
by their examples that de re reports are more pervasive that has traditionally 
been recognised, we still only have a reason to question the assumption that
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de dicto reports are paradigmatic. We have been given no good reason to 
think that de re reports are paradigmatic, since the literature is already 
replete with examples which suggest that the de dicto reading (or, more 
accurately, the reading on which we would not accept substitutions as truth- 
preserving) is also pervasive. But Almog and Eaker do not merely suggest 
that de re ascriptions are paradigmatic, they completely ignore any other 
readings.
Another apparent difficulty with Eaker’s truth-condition, although I do not 
mean to suggest that it is insurmountable, is that while the object language 
sentence ‘A believes that a is F’ will sometimes use a name that has no 
referent in place of ‘a’, the semanticist’s truth-conditions will not make use 
of such names. Nor can the semanticist even use a definite description which 
fails to designate an individual, given that the predicates in the truth- 
condition are ‘thinks about x’ and ‘ascribes to x the property F’, for these 
predicates presumably fall into the class of predicates that Almog describes 
as ‘existence-receptive’, meaning that their meaningfulness requires the 
existence, at the time of application of the predicates, of the subject to which 
the predicates are applied. Eaker acknowledges the existence of such a 
problem in a footnote, but does not suggest how the account can be modified 
to deal with the problem. She only suggests that for an account of thought 
ascriptions involving non-existents that is suggested by our everyday 
practices, we should look at Almog’s account. When we look at the relevant 
section in Almog, this is what we find.
Almog treats sentences of the surface form ‘A believes that a is F’ as 
essentially of the form ‘a is believed by A to be F’, in which ‘a’ is the logical 
subject. This way belief ascriptions are subsumed under his general truth- 
condition for sentences of the form ‘N is F’, where ‘N ’ is a subject term, and 
‘is F’ is any kind of predicate. The general truth-condition is:
A sentence o f  the form ‘N  is F’ used a context c is true at a time t iff the source o f  the chain traced by 
the OOH leading to our use o f ‘N ’ at c is F at t
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Almog does not define ‘source’, but I think that the intuitive idea is that the 
source is object or event which stands at the beginning of a causal chain of 
that leads up to our use of an expression. He gives as an example, in a case 
relevant to a belief ascription, Aphrodite, the non-existent goddess, and the 
belief ascription ‘Aphrodite is believed to be in town’. Regarding the source 
in this case, he says “I do not have enough information about the real source 
of our use; I take it to be Greek tales of an irresistibly alluring divine 
being.”16 The tales are the source then. So ‘John believes that Aphrodite is in 
town’ is true just in case those Greek tales are believed by John to be in 
town. This cannot be right. Similarly, with the predicates that Eaker uses in 
her truth-conditions, we have ‘John believes that Aphrodite is in town’ is 
true just in case John, in thinking about those Greek tales, ascribes to them 
the property of being in town.
It is not merely that Almog has given a wrong candidate for the source here, 
for whatever the source is plausibly thought to be it will be something, in the 
majority of cases, which is very remote from the agent in space and time, 
and furthermore something the agent has no inkling of. If he has no inkling 
of it, how can he ascribe, in thought, any property to it?
I have argued that Eaker’s account, as it stands, is not adequate to deal with 
the whole class of potentially meaningful belief ascriptions, specifically, not 
with those with non-existent subjects, and that the suggested direction is not 
clearly the right one.
Another possible problem with Eaker’s account arises because of the precise 
wording she uses in giving the truth-condition for the belief ascription. To 
remind ourselves, she says that a belief ascription of the form ‘A believes 
that S’ is true iff A has, in thinking about x, ascribed to it the property of 
being F. It is the italicised part of the truth-condition that I wish to focus on 
here. What I want to draw attention to is the fact that in the belief ascription 
we have a verbal expression that has a very different logical grammar from
16 Almog (2004, pg.412).
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the verbal expression in the truth-condition. While ‘thinks about x’ and 
‘ascribes to x ’ describe events that occur at specific points in time, or at least 
occur during specific intervals of time, ‘believes’, on the other hand, is a 
stative verb and expresses something that someone does not do at a specific 
time, or during a specific interval. Once this difference has been noticed, one 
might already be suspicious about whether a truth-condition which contains 
‘ has ascribed F to x’ could possibly be right for an ascription whose truth, 
on the face of it, has nothing to do with whether one specific kind of mental 
event has happened.
Strictly speaking, Eaker’s truth-condition has the consequence, for example, 
that John believes that Tony is bald if he has ever thought it, assuming that 
this is an acceptable (just more idiomatic) way of saying that John has 
ascribed the property of being bald to Tony, that it does not matter what 
properties he has ascribed to Tony more recently. Perhaps this response is 
correct, but superficial, since it might seem that Eaker could simply amend 
her truth-condition by simply adding the clause, ‘and A has not since 
changed his mind’. This, however, cannot be quite right because if the agent 
John has not changed his mind, he may simply have forgotten all about Tony 
and his baldness. In which case it would not be right to say that he believes 
that Tony is bald. Perhaps we could add to the truth-condition ‘nor has A 
forgotten about a and its F-ness’.
But it seems that adding qualifications to the truth-condition in this way 
misses the main point of the flaw in Eaker’s condition. The main flaw is 
related to the fact that there is the difference in logical grammar between the 
ascription and its putative truth-condition. To pre-empt a point that I will 
substantiate more fully in Chapter Four, and to connect back to a point I 
discussed in some detail in Chapter One, one consequence of using an event 
verb like ‘ascribes (to x)’ as giving the truth-condition is that it would seem 
to make the truth of a belief ascription depend on some one simple other fact 
about an agent in such a way that there is no conceptual bar on an agent 
having two conflicting beliefs ascribed to them in a conjunctive belief 
ascription of the type that is considered problematic in Kripke’s puzzle. This
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is due to the fact that this fact (about what an agent has ascribed to an object) 
is, according to Eaker’s account, sufficient grounds for the truth of the 
ascription, and so is not (and cannot be) made false by some other fact’s 
obtaining. In particular, it cannot be made false by the fact that the agent, at 
some other point, ascribed a conflicting property to the object. In Chapter 
One, I said that it was this notion of sufficient grounds which is essential to 
Kripke’s argumentative strategy. But why is this a problem? Eaker, after all, 
explicitly says that it is a virtue of her account that the conflicting reports are 
independent. In fact, she gives the following as a constraint: ‘the truth 
conditions for each report must not be given in such a way as to contradict 
the possibility that the other report is true”17.
I think that this is a problem because there is good reason to suppose that the 
belief ascriptions that a reporter can apply to an agent are not always 
independent of each other. In Chapter One, I presented a principle called the 
Principle of Reporting Rational Agents according to which reporters cannot 
correctly apply to an agent who is presumed to be rational any ascription of 
the form ‘A believes that S and that not-S’. If a reporter were to use such an 
ascription she would be trying to convey something about the agent’s 
irrationality. If this principle were correct, this would mean that, in a 
Kripke-style case, even if we had grounds to say ‘A believes that S’ and 
grounds to say ‘A believes that not S’, we could never have grounds to say 
‘A believes that S and not S’. If we accept that belief reports are contextually 
sensitive, we can intelligibly say that ‘A believes that S’ and ‘A believes that 
not S’ can both be true at a given time but are never true in a single context, 
when A is a rational agent.
It is in my view a weakness of Eaker’s account, and of Almog’s, that their 
belief report semantics leaves out the contextual sensitivity of belief reports. 
For them, a belief ascription is made true by a single cognitive fact’s 
obtaining, where the obtaining of this fact is not itself thought of as a 
contextually sensitive matter. For them, there must always be a univocal
17 Eaker (2004) pg.27
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context-free answer to the question ‘Does A believes that a is F? If A has 
ascribed F to a in thought, the answer is ‘yes’, if not, the answer is ‘no’.
But that there may not always be a univocal, context-free answer to the 
question ‘does A believe that a is F?’ can be illustrated by considering the 
question as applied to Pierre in two different specific contexts. Suppose that 
there are two belief reporters, Bob and Carol, and that they both omniscient 
observers of history, so that they agree on all the facts pertaining to Pierre’s 
mental life, in particular, facts about what Pierre would say when presented 
with certain pictures, sentences, questions, and any other behavioural 
dispositions which might be though relevant to knowing what an agent 
believes. Suppose that Bob is asked ‘Does Pierre believe that London is 
pretty?’ by an one of Pierre’s London neighbours who wants to know if 
Pierre is planning on staying in London, since he has noticed that Pierre 
looks a bit glum every time he steps outside his front door. Bob knows the 
purpose of the question and answers ‘no, he does not’. Carol is asked by 
someone who is responsible for designing the brochure that Pierre first 
looked at back in Paris ‘Does Pierre think that London is pretty?’ Carol 
knows that this person is only interested in whether or not she should take 
some new photographs of Buckingham Palace for the next edition of the 
brochure, or stick with last years. Carol answers ‘oh, yes, he thinks it’s 
beautiful.’
If we agree that Bob and Carol have both given correct answers, then we 
have a good reason to say that what they have said is true. Moreover, they do 
not need to disagree about any facts about Pierre, for by hypothesis they do 
not, and in fact accept all the same facts, yet still give opposite answers to 
the question ‘Does Pierre believe that London is pretty?’ The facts about 
Pierre then do not determine the answer that they each give. This does not, 
by itself, prove that what they say is true. But I think that it gives us good 
reason to build into the semantic account of belief reports the fact that belief 
reports are context sensitive and do not depend simply on facts about the 
agent.
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I said at the end of Section 3.4 that the criticism that belief ascriptions are 
not context-sensitive applies to Salmon’s theory and Eaker and Almog’s 
theory. The criticism applies equally to Salmon’s theory because he makes 
the truth of a belief ascription depend on whether an agent grasps a certain 
singular proposition via some guise or other and nothing more. There is 
nothing to suggest that whether an agent does this or not allows for belief 
ascriptions to be context-sensitive, since, presumably, given the little that 
Salmon says about grasping propositions, whether or not an agent does grasp 
a given proposition is a context-independent fact which suffices for the truth 
of a given ascription. If it suffices for the truth of an ascription, then a given 
ascription cannot be made false by the fact that some other independent 
cognitive fact obtains, namely, specifically that the agent grasps some other 
contradictory singular proposition.
Both Salmon’s and Almog and Eaker’s theories allow for the possibility that 
ascriptions of the form ‘A believes that S and that not S’ can be 
unproblematically true of an agent, and both in fact endorse such an instance 
of this in the case of Kripke’s Pierre. Yet, this seems to me to falsify a 
datum. The datum is that we would not normally make such an ascription in 
the case of Pierre. The fact that such an ascription is puzzling depends not on 
any particular theory about what makes two beliefs contradictory or why we 
can have or not have contradictory beliefs and yet be rational. It just depends 
on our intuition that such an ascription would seem to be very puzzling and 
is in fact very rare. Salmon’s and Eaker and Almog’s theories predict that 
such reports would be common and normal. But what we need is an 
explanation of why they are uncommon and puzzling. I sketched my 
explanation of this at the end of Chapter One.
3.6.1
Mark Richard’s contextualist account of belief reports
I now turn my attention to an important account of belief ascriptions which 
has been designed to take account of the context-sensitivity of belief
113
114
ascriptions. The account predicts the failure of substitutivity for belief 
ascriptions (at least in certain contexts) and also accounts for the contextual- 
sensitivity of belief reports.
I shall consider the theory put forward by Mark Richard (1990) in his book 
‘Prepositional Attitudes’. Richard’s theory begins with what I think is a very 
intuitively appealing idea: that the truth-value of a report depends not only 
on relating the agent to the objects and properties that he thinks about, but 
also on the words we use in the report itself and that in what way the words 
can affect the truth-value of a report can vary from context to context. 
Richard focuses on one example that I think manages to isolate the key 
feature of belief reports mentioned in the last paragraph of the preceding 
section.
We are to consider Mutt and Jeff who agree on everything that seems 
relevant to the question ‘Does Odile believe that Twain is dead?’ They do 
not however agree in their answers. When Mutt was asked this question it 
was because someone wanted to know whether or not Odile would list 
Twain in a list of dead Americans. Mutt knew that Odile accepted the 
sentence ‘Twain is dead’ and so said ‘yes’. Jeff was asked the same question 
by someone who could not understand why Odile who, in pointing at a 
picture of Twain, says that she wants to meet him. Jeff knew that Odile 
rejected ‘He’s dead’ (as uttered when pointing at the picture) and so 
answered ‘no’. I agree with Richard’s intuition that both Mutt and Jeff say 
something elliptical for something true. Richard’s account is built to allow 
us to honour this kind of intuition.
The following is a brief, but hopefully fair and adequate, summary of 
Richard’s theory. Richard claims that the ‘that S’ clause of a belief report 
determines an entity that he calls a RAM (an abbreviation for ‘Russellian 
Annotated Matrix’) which is a pairing of a natural language sentence with 
the proposition that it expresses, where ‘proposition’ is understood along 
Russellian lines, so that ‘Twain is dead’ is the singular proposition 
containing Twain and the property of being dead, in the appropriate order.
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There is then a thesis in psychology: each agent has a Representational 
System consisting of RAMS of all and only the sentences she accepts as 
true. There are correlation functions that map RAMS to RAMS in such a 
way that the content of the RAMS is preserved in the mapping. A context of 
utterance of a belief ascription provides restrictions on which correlation 
functions are acceptable. These restrictions are determined by the intentions 
and interests of the speaker and audience. A restriction is specified in such a 
way that it determines for an individual (the agent, A) what is to count as an 
appropriate translation of part of the agent’s RAM. A restriction can then be 
represented, for instance, as:
(R): A: ‘a’ -> ‘b ’.
where this means that when ascribing beliefs to A in the context in which 
(R) is operative, ‘a’ translates part of A ’s RAM that are expressed by only 
by ‘b \  (Since it is always the case, on Richard’s theory that Russellian 
content must be preserved in the mapping, this fact can be suppressed from 
the notation).
Finally, a belief report of the form ‘A believes that S’ is true in a context c 
iff there is an acceptable correlation function (in c) that maps the RAM that 
is determined (in c) by the ‘that-S’ clause of the report to some RAM in A’s 
Representational System.
How does this apply to the example of Odile? Mutt says ‘Odile believes that 
Twain is dead’ in a conversation about whether Odile would list Twain 
among deceased Americans. In this context, the restrictions on correlation 
functions are such that the RAM determined by ‘Twain is dead’ can only be 
mapped onto a RAM in the agent’s Representational System that contains 
the name ‘Twain’. This seems intuitively acceptable since what is of concern 
in this context is whether Odile would use the sentence ‘Twain is dead’. In 
terms of the notation for restrictions given above, we would have here
(R) Odile: ‘Twain’ ‘Twain’.
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Since, Odile does have the relevant RAM, the report is true. On the other 
hand, in Jeffs conversation there would be a different set of restrictions at 
work. Specifically, the restrictions would be such that ‘Twain is dead’ would 
not be an acceptable translation of the same RAM that made the other report 
true. So, in this context, the report would be false.
Richard’s theory has the flexibility to allow that in some contexts, at one 
extreme, it might be necessary to use the words that the agent would himself 
use, and that there may be contexts, at the other extreme, where there are no 
restrictions on correlation functions, so that any ‘that S’ clause which in the 
context of the report determines a Russellian proposition which is part of a 
RAM in the agent’s Representational System would be acceptable. In such 
contexts, the report could effectively be seen as the kind of report that 
Salmon says is the normal kind of case. In between these two extremes, we 
may have some restrictions on correlations. Which restrictions exist in a 
given context determine which terms can be intersubstituted salva veritate in 
that context. So, we have a more complex view of substitutivity here. 
Traditionally, substitutivity has been seen as an all-or-nothing affair, in the 
sense that either any substitution of co-referring terms is acceptable (in de re 
reports), or no substitutions are, unless they preserve sense. But Richard’s 
correlations are not translations and have nothing to do with the preservation 
of sense, or any other kind of conceptual content. This seems intuitively 
right.
Applying Richard’s account to Kripke’s Puzzle, it seems that his account is 
able to preserve much of what I suggest should be preserved. We want to be 
able to account for why 1) ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ seems true 
when Kripke takes us through the puzzle and why 2) ‘Pierre believes that 
London is not pretty’ also independently seems true, but why the 
conjunction of 1) and 2) seems false, and also why the question ‘Does 
Pierre, or does he not, think that London is pretty?, taken out of any natural 
context, and posed as a philosophical question, seems like a badly posed 
question.
116
117
It seems plausible to say, as Richard says, that one way in which restrictions 
on correlation functions become operative in a context is that if a speaker is 
focusing on how a speaker would express his beliefs, and thinks that his 
audience is focusing in this way also, then restrictions come to be operative 
in such a way that only a very limited range of ‘that-S clauses are acceptable 
representations of the agent’s RAMs. When Kripke takes us through Pierre’s 
story, focusing on the beliefs he has in France before he comes to England 
and which he would express in French, it might be reasonable to expect 
correlations to be restricted in such a way that ‘London’ can represent 
Pierre’s ‘Londres’, in which case, (1) ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ 
would be true in this context. Later in the account of Pierre the reporter and 
audience are focused on what Pierre thinks in England and what he would 
express in English, so it might be reasonable to expect the restrictions on 
correlations to be such that ‘London’ is mapped onto ‘London’, but not onto 
‘Londres’ in which case (2) ‘Pierre believes that London is not pretty’ would 
be true, and the fact that Pierre had the RAM < <‘Londres’, London> < ‘est 
jolie’, is p re tty »  would be irrelevant in this context. Moreover, as Richard 
says, the most natural way of interpreting a conjunction of (1) and (2), and 
especially natural for the report (3) ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty and 
that London is not pretty’, would be with a single correlation restriction 
throughout the report, so that the two reports would not be true together and 
(3) would always be false.
3.6.2
Criticisms of Richard’s theory
I agree with Richard’s view that the intuitions about the context-sensitivity 
of reports in the Mutt, Jeff, Odile example are solid intuitions that we should 
try to explain, rather than explain away, but I am not convinced that his 
account is correct. I now consider some objections.
There is one major objection that has been made by Sider (1995) and 
Soames (2002) and developed in some detail by Nelson (2005). This is a
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problem which arises from a rather technical aspect of Richard’s theory, 
specifically his claims about restrictions on correlation functions. The 
problem has been called ‘the problem of conflicting restrictions’ (Nelson 
2005). The problem can arise whenever the belief reporter is confused about 
the identity of the agent to whom the belief is ascribed in the belief report. I 
will show how the problem can arise in Kripke’s scenario.
Pierre is also known in certain settings as Peter. Suppose that a belief 
reporter, R, is unaware of this and thinks that when people are talking about 
Pierre, sometimes calling him Peter, sometimes Pierre, two different people 
are being talked about. Suppose that R thinks sees Pierre, in Paris, looking at 
a picture of London and saying ‘That’s such a pretty city’. Suppose he hears 
of Peter, who is normally now based in London, not realising he is Pierre, 
who says many negative things about London, including ‘London is such an 
ugly city’. Suppose that R finds himself in a context where is talking to those 
who know Pierre and wants to talk about his beliefs about London and 
contrast them with, as he would say, Peter’s beliefs. He might plausibly say 
‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ and ‘Peter believes that London is not 
at all pretty’. In the terms of Richard’s theory it would seem plausible R’s 
communicative intentions are such as to generate the restriction that for the 
former report R can use ‘London’ to represent the relevant part of Pierre’s 
thoughts which he would express with ‘this city pictured before me’, and 
that for the latter report, ‘London’ would translate the relevant part of 
Pierre’s thoughts that he would express with ‘the city I live in’.
The problem is that no correlation function can satisfy both of these 
restrictions. The former restriction requires that ‘London’ translates only as 
‘This city in the photo’ while the second restriction requires that ‘London’ 
only translates ‘The city I live in’. Clearly, no correlation can satisfy both of 
these incompatible restrictions. Given Richard’s truth-condition for belief 
reports, no belief sentence which has a term referring to Pierre in subject 
position and ‘London’ in the embedded subject position can be true relative 
to such a context, even the report ‘Pierre believes London is itself. The 
problem here does not depend on exactly what ‘London’ can be translated
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as, but only on the fact that it translates differently under the two restrictions. 
This is what makes the restrictions incompatible.
Nelson considers several possible solutions to this problem and discounts 
them. I will not discuss these here, but only focus on what he thinks is the 
idea that forms the basis for a genuine solution. What is the source of the 
problem of conflicting restrictions? On Richard’s theory, restrictions are on 
correlation functions that are functions from pairs of an individual (however 
conceptualised) and an annotation to an annotation. (All of the other 
responses to the problem retain this assumption, and that is why I think they 
do not work). When reporter is confused about the identity of the agent, 
thinking there are two people when there is in fact one, he can have two 
different sets of communicative intentions with respect to that individual. He 
might, as it were, think to himself, for Pierre I will use ‘London’ to translate 
this and for Peter I will use ‘London’ to translate that.
Nelson thinks that the correct solution requires that the correlation function 
embody this insight by not being determined by an individual and 
annotations but by an individual under a mode of presentation and 
annotations, so that a restriction would be represented as
(Rl) <A, a mode of presentation^ ‘a’ ->’b’.
So, as applied to the Kripke scenario above we would have:
(R2) <Peter, thought of as Peter>: ‘London’ ->’the city I live in’
(R3) <Peter, thought of as Pierre>: ‘London’ ->’the city in this photo’.
These restrictions can co-exist as they are not incompatible.
I do not think that this solution can be correct. In the scenario I described all 
that was required to generate the puzzle was that the reporter thought that 
Pierre and Peter were two people. It has already been claimed, in the 
discussion of Eaker and Almog’s theory, that an agent can think that there 
are two different people where there is in fact one without necessarily
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having distinct modes of presentation associated with the individual. Nor 
does it seem necessary for the reporter to have different intentions with 
respect to what he takes to be two individuals that he associated two distinct 
modes of presentation with the individual. But if modes of presentation are 
not generally available to they cannot be used as a general solution to the 
problem of conflicting restrictions.
Ulitmately, I think that the problem is an artefact of the assumption that 
there are distinct representations that the reporter must somehow be able to 
specify or provide a translation of. Without such an assumption, the whole 
idea of correlation functions cannot even be made sense of.
The problem as I see it then stems from the fact that Richard’s theory 
embodies the same assumption I see as underlying each of the theories of 
belief ascriptions that I have discussed so far as well as the overwhelming 
majority of theories I have not discussed. It is the central assumption that 
this dissertation aims to cast doubt on, namely that there are individuable 
internal representational states which ground the truth of ordinary belief 
ascriptions. In Richard’s theory, this is his system of RAMs. In Richard’s 
description of the psychological side, the agent accepts various sentences, 
each of which has a Russellian interpretation. For Richard, this set of RAMs 
encodes all the facts about the believer that are relevant to the truth of falsity 
of a belief ascription about her. There is, then, a prior psychological reality 
here that the belief ascriptions report on, and whether or not these RAMs 
exist in the believer’s mind is not itself a context-sensitive matter. The 
contextual-sensitivity comes in when we are restricted about how we can 
represent what an agent believes with our ‘that-S’ clauses.
I have two related worries about building such ideas into the semantics of 
belief ascriptions. First, there is an epistemological concern. Jennifer Saul 
(1999) considers the case of a contemporary of ours, Alice, who has just 
heard, in a philosophy class, that Hammurabi believed that Hesperus 
appeared in the evening and that Hammurabi did not believe that 
Phosphorous appeared in the evening. Alice can report these beliefs and say
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something that is intuitively true even if she is completely ignorant about 
Hammurabi, apart from knowing about these particular beliefs of his. She 
could even mistakenly think that Hammurabi would have used the terms 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’. In fact, he spoke only Akkadina and would 
not have known these names. But Alice takes his beliefs to be linked to these 
names. If Alice does make this mistake then it is plausible to assume that her 
intentions in making these reports determine a restriction on correlation 
functions in such a way that ‘Hesperus’ in her ascriptions must represent 
‘Hesperus’ as part of one of Hammurabi’s RAMs. But Hammurabi did not 
know this name and would not have had the relevant RAM. But this would 
imply that Alice’s report ‘Hammurabi believed that Hesperus appeared in 
the evening’ would be false. But intuitively it is true. Alice’s ignorance 
about Hammurabi’s language, and therefore, about his RAMs leads to her 
having intentions which restrict correlation functions in such a way that an 
intuitively true report turns out to be false.
This problem generalises if we assume that reporters are often ignorant 
about what sentences an agent accepts.
There is also an ontological concern. It seems to me to be incorrect to claim 
that an agent must have a relevant RAM in order for a belief ascription to be 
true of the agent. I think that having the relevant RAM is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for the truth of a belief ascription. I will only argue here that it 
is not necessary. Why I think it is not sufficient should become clear in the 
final chapter. But to give a hint. I think, and I will try to argue with a series 
of examples in the final chapter, that no one single fact generally determines 
the truth value of a belief ascription.
I think that it is not necessary because we often make intuitively true belief 
ascriptions even when we know that the agent does not accept any relevant 
sentences. The example I am about to give will be very controversial, and 
some will say that my intuitions about the truth of such an ascription are 
simply wrong. Nevertheless, I want to pursue the type of example that I have 
in mind because I think that it allows me to make a methodological point
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that I think it is important to remind ourselves that we are supposedly 
committed to, or should be committed to. The methodological point is that 
we should take very seriously our ordinary pre-theoretical intuitions about 
the truth-values of ordinary belief ascriptions. My example involves the 
ascription of a belief to an animal. Regarding ascriptions of belief to 
animals, Richard says:
“It is supposedly obvious that some dogs think that bones are fun to play with. All I can say is that 
many people cease to think it is obvious that dogs can have such beliefs upon hearing the argument, 
and most people acknowledge being made uncomfortable by the argument [that such beliefs require 
the concept ‘bone’ which dogs allegedly lack].”18
I see my cat, Mozzy, who has followed me into the kitchen and put the milk 
carton back into the fridge. Mozzy seems thirsty, making the sound that he 
always makes when he is about to start drinking but can’t get to his milk or 
water. He walks up to the fridge door, and makes a crying sound. The carton 
of milk was actually virtually empty and I had just left a few drops of milk 
to make a cup of coffee later. My housemate knows that the milk has all but 
gone. She comes into the kitchen and looks at Mozzy. She’s wondering why 
he’s crying. I say ‘Mozzy thinks that his milk is in the fridge’. What I say 
seems to me perfectly natural, perfectly true. Had my housemate come in as 
few seconds earlier and seen Mozzy following mew as I put the carton back 
into the fridge, she would also agree that what I said was true.
But, of course, Mozzy does not have a language consisting of sentences and 
so does not have any RAM consisting of a sentence that he accepts and its 
Russellian content, so on Richard’s account the report is false. Maybe this 
line of thought is too quick, because Richard only says that having a RAM 
involves accepting a sentence as a preliminary account of RAMs. What he is 
essentially committed to is the claim that for a report of the form ‘A believes 
that S’ to be true, there has to be some sort of isomorphism of referential 
content between ‘that S’ in the ascription and some inner state of the agent. 
He uses the term ‘referential content’ to name the relation that obtains when
18 Richard (1990) pg. 254
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for each simple constituent x of the ‘that-S’ clause there is a constituent x ’ of 
the agent’s inner state such that x ’ determines in the context of the ascription 
the content of x  in the context.
This notion is still rather vague because Richard does not (try to) specify 
what it is for a part of an inner state to determine a particular content. A 
complete account here would be an account that provides an answer to the 
question of intentionality and is a huge independent philosophical project. In 
the absence of such an account we can neither directly confirm nor refute 
Richard’s theory with the example of the ascription about my cat.
However, if we assume that having a state with a part that determines a 
particular content ‘m’ is the same as or entails having the concept ‘m’, as 
Richard seems to, then it could be argued that Mozzy does not have the 
concept ‘milk’ and that is why any ascription with ‘milk’ occurring in the 
embedded clause of an ascription will be false. Adapting an argument from 
Stephen Stich that purports to show that dogs do not have the concept 
‘bone’, we could give three reasons for thinking that my cat does not have 
the concept ‘milk’. First, Mozzy does not have enough of the same beliefs 
about milk that we who use the word ‘milk’, or any normal translations of it, 
do. Secondly, nothing in Mozzy’s behaviour suggests that he groups samples 
of milk into a single class which excludes other substances, in particular 
water. Thirdly, Mozzy is not able to distinguish ersatz from real milk.
The underlying problem, according to Richard’s view, would be that if the 
three claims were correct then it seems that no discriminatory capacity of the 
cat’s, which we would identify as its concept ‘milk’, determines an 
extension even remotely close to the extension determined by our concept 
‘milk’.
I am inclined to think that the three claims about Mozzy are correct and also 
that this gives us good reason to say that Mozzy lacks the concept ‘milk’. So 
I will grant these two assumptions. What I want to challenge is not the claim 
that Mozzy lacks the concept ‘milk’, but that the truth of an ascription
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including ‘milk’ in its ‘that-S’ clause does depend on Mozzy having that 
concept. If we take as our starting point the intuitive truth of the ascription in 
its context, then we can use the claim that the cat lacks the concept ‘milk’ to 
argue against the claim that the truth of the ascription depends on possession 
of the concept.
Returning to Richard’s quote about the attribution of a belief to a dog, I 
think that what Richard says here is actually consistent with my claim that 
the ascription that, say, ‘Fido thinks that this old bone is fun to play with’ 
can be true in many natural contexts of utterance. First, Richard does not 
even go so far as to say that people change their minds about the truth-value 
judgement of such an ascription, only that it ceases to be so obvious. 
Moreover, if one asks, after giving the argument about concept possession, 
‘But does Fido really believe that bones are fun to play with?’, we actually 
change the subject, and I dispute the relevance of the answer to this new 
question to the truth of the original question. First, the word ‘really’ is added 
in, and the question changes grammatical form from ‘Does Fido (really) 
believe that... ?’ to ‘Does Fido (really) have the belief that....? I claim that 
there is a change in context partly brought about the addition of the word 
‘really’ and the fact that a philosophical argument has just been given. If this 
is correct, then the fact that an ascription is false (or as Richard says: ‘not 
obviously true’) in one context, says nothing about whether it is true in the 
original, natural context. We must remind ourselves that Richard is 
committed to the context-sensitivity of belief ascriptions.
The change in grammatical form also signifies, I think, a change from a 
natural context to a change into a specifically philosophical or psychological 
context. As I suggested in Section 2.2, there is a difference between ‘A 
believes that S’ (understood as an ordinary market-place ascription) and ‘A 
has the belief that S’ (understood as a theoretical question). As support for 
the significance of this change in grammatical form, I would like to draw our 
attention to what would most naturally be understood by the question ‘Does 
Fido really believe that his bone is fun to play with?’. It does not, in this
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form, sound a question about animal concepts. It suggests the following 
(italicised) contrast ‘Does Fido think the bone is fun to play with or does he 
just pretend to keep his owner happy? ’
In Chapter Four I will say much more to support the truth of this intuitive 
ascription, but for now I have tried to suggest that our intuitive judgement 
about the truth of this ascription is correct and is even consistent with 
Richard’s quoted remarks, which he takes to count against the intuitive 
judgement. This concludes my argument that RAMs are not necessary for 
true belief ascriptions.
3/7
Conclusion
In this chapter I have evaluated four theories of belief ascriptions and have 
argued that they are each unsatisfactory as accounts of belief ascriptions. 
Although the theories and my criticisms of them are rather diverse, I think 
many of the criticisms can be unified by relating them to what is a common 
source. The common problem is that each theory assumes that a belief 
ascription reports on some single fact about an agent. In Frege’s theory there 
is the question about which sense the agent grasps and assents to; in 
Salmon’s theory there is the question about which singular proposition an 
agent assents to; in Eaker and Almog’s theory there is the question about 
which object an agent applies, in thought, a certain predicate to; in Richard’s 
theory, there is the question about whether an agent has a given RAM in her 
representational system. Each of these questions depends on some one 
cognitive fact which either obtains or does not obtain irrespective of any 
contextual considerations about the setting of a given ascription.
With Frege’s theory, there was the difficulty of knowing and specifying 
which sense an agent was related to, so that correct ascriptions became a 
mystery. With Salmon’s and Eaker and Almog’s theory, belief ascriptions 
became too uninformative, had counter-intuitive truth-values and were 
insensitive to ordinary facts about the ascription of contradictory beliefs.
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Each of the above theories made it the case that there should always be a 
univocal context-free answer to the question ‘Does A believe that S?’ since 
on each theory whether or not the relevant fact obtained is itself a context- 
free matter. Richard’s theory allowed for the context-sensitivity of 
ascriptions but still made them depend on a single cognitive fact about the 
agent. But I argued that the obtaining of such a fact was not generally 
knowable and was not necessary for the truth if a belief ascription.
Some desiderata for a positive account of belief ascriptions have emerged:
1. A theory of belief ascriptions should take seriously our intuitive truth 
valuations. Neither substitutivity nor its failure should be taken as the norm. 
Substitutions can often preserve truth, but failures of substitutivity are also 
too prevalent to be dismissed. (Salmon’s theory and Eaker and Almog’s 
theory are not fully adequate in this respect.)
2. Belief ascriptions are context-sensitive and this fact should be built into 
the semantics. (Frege, Salmon and Eaker and Almog do not allow for this in 
any clear way.)
3. We should not presuppose that belief ascriptions depend on a picture of 
the mind which is itself controversial. (Richard’s theory presupposes an 
account of the mind that denies the truth of some intuitively true 
ascriptions.)
In chapter four I aim to give the outline of an account which honours these 
desiderata, and will also gives a very central role to the role of a belief 
ascription in our day to day lives.
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Chapter Four:
Proposing an Account of Belief Ascriptions
4X)
Introduction
In this chapter I shall put forward my positive account of belief 
ascriptions, which, I think, avoids the problems of the other theories 
discussed in the previous chapter. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 set out the main 
desiderata for a semantic account of belief ascriptions. Section 4.3 
describes the general form of the semantic account that I give. Section 4.4 
describes what I think is a useful model for thinking about the semantics of 
belief ascriptions (that is, seeing each ascription as an answer to a specific 
question) and in doing so tries to say something about the function of 
ordinary belief ascriptions. The actual statement of the truth-condition for 
a belief ascription is given in Section 4.5 in terms of the model described 
in 4.4. Section 4.6 describes the metaphysics that is presupposed by my 
account, explains more about the kind of questions that belief ascriptions 
would normally be seen as answers to, and shows how the context- 
sensitivity of ascriptions arises within this setting. In 4 .7 ,1 present several 
examples in which I apply the considerations of Sections 4.4 -  4 .6 .1 try to 
use these examples to elicit intuitions about the truth-value of the 
ascriptions to support the claims made in the above sections. Each example 
will be used to highlight a different point and across the examples I will 
vary the different kinds of factors to show all the different sources of 
context-sensitivity of the ascriptions. Section 4.8 tries to explain the terms 
given in the statement of the truth-condition a little further and in doing so 
aims to defend my account against one intuitive objection. In 4 .9 ,1 
contrast my type of contextualism with Richard’s in order to show clarify 
how the context-sensitivity arises in my account and to show how my
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account is fundamentally different from those theories I criticise in 
Chapter Three. The de dicto/ de re distinction, generally given a very 
prominent place in the discussion of belief ascriptions is discussed in 4.10 
where I try to deflate its significance.
4.1 The central desideratum
This chapter aims to provide an account of belief ascriptions which 
abandons a widely held and rarely explicit assumption that I have tried to 
cast doubt on in this dissertation (in Chapter 3) and which I have argued 
underlies Kripke’s puzzle about belief (in Chapter 1). This is the 
assumption that a belief ascription depends (at least in part) for its truth on 
some one single context-independent cognitive fact about an agent. In 
Chapter Two we have seen theories (Frege’s, Salmon’s, Almog and 
Eaker’s) according to which some single cognitively specifiable fact, 
which is itself a context-independent fact about the agent, fully determines 
the truth-value of a belief ascription. We also saw a theory, Mark 
Richard’s, which gives a central role to the obtaining of some single 
cognitive fact about the agent, although on Richard’s theory, this fact does 
not by itself determine the truth-value of the report, since how a reporter 
represents this fact is a context-independent matter. In both types of 
theories, a central role is given to some single psychological fact about an 
agent which can be stated in a context-independent way. I have explained 
why I think this assumption is problematic.
Philosophers of language have tended to say that belief reports relate an 
agent to a proposition (whether propositions are conceived of as singular 
propositions containing individuals and properties, or as thoroughly 
conceptual entities), and may or may not specify what this means in more 
basic psychological terms. Even those philosophers of language who 
abandon the idea that belief ascriptions relate agents to any kind of 
proposition make the truth of a belief report depend on one single 
cognitively specifiable fact which can be stated in context independent 
way. Eaker and Almog, for instance, say that the truth of a belief ascription
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of the form ‘A believes that a is F* depends only on the fact that the agent 
has, in thinking about a, ascribed to it the property F.
Although I have not explicitly addressed the subject of belief as a topic in 
the philosophy of mind, rather than in the philosophy of language, it is 
worth noting that philosophers of mind (such as Ruth Millikan, David 
Papineau, and Fred Dretske) tend to think that believing something is a 
matter of having a representation of some sort in one’s mind. Again, the 
specification of the content of such a representational state is a context- 
independent matter. These philosophers of mind may say that they are 
concerned with the cognitive phenomenon of belief, and they may not be 
explicitly addressing the semantic description of belief sentences (as the 
philosophers of language do and as I try to do), but it is all too easy to 
conflate these projects and assume that what philosophers of mind are 
investigating is the cognitive grounding of our ordinary belief ascriptions. 
I suggest that the assumption which I have said lies behind all the theories 
that I criticise may encourage a conflation of what I think are two distinct 
projects: the study of the content inner representational states, and the 
study of ordinary everyday belief ascriptions. It is the latter only that I am 
interested in.
The central desideratum of my semantic account of ordinary belief 
ascriptions is that it should not make belief ascriptions depend on any 
single context-independent cognitive fact.
4.2 Other Desiderata
There are also the following desiderata that I want my account to answer 
to.
1.
I want my account to account for the intuitive truth-values of our ordinary 
belief ascriptions. Whatever burdens of explanation that my account 
accumulates, I do not want the burden of explaining away highly counter­
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intuitive and pervasive intuitions about truth-values. I take it as a sort of 
bottom-line methodological starting point that our intuitive evaluations 
should, at least for the most part (there will be some intuitions that I think 
are mistaken and shall want to explain away), be taken as the data to which 
the account should be ultimately responsive.
2 .
The account should give a central role to the context-sensitivity of belief 
ascriptions as a general class, and not merely of those which contain an 
obviously indexical element. This second desideratum really follows from 
the first. For I think that our intuitions about truth -values depend on how 
the context of a given report is specified. That this is the case is becoming 
increasingly orthodox in the literature on the subject, and has already been 
defended to some degree in my earlier chapters, but I will try to strengthen 
the case with a detailed discussion of some new examples in this chapter. 
The way that the contextual-sensitivity arises in my account will be quite 
different I think from the way it arises in other accounts, for in other 
accounts the contextual sensitivity cannot be explained, except in terms of 
the assumption that I have said in the previous section that I want to reject.
3.
The account should be psychologically realistic in the sense that making 
true ascriptions should not require that the ascriber have more knowledge 
about the agent than he actually does have; in particular, it should not 
require detailed knowledge of an agent’s mental representations (if such 
things there be) or an agent’s ‘way of thinking’, where this last is to be 
understood along Fregean lines.
4.
The account should recognise that belief ascriptions are used to serve 
specific purposes, such as explaining and predicting the agent’s actions.
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5.
This dissertation started with a detailed description of Kripke’s puzzle 
about belief and said that any theory of belief ascriptions must ultimately 
come to grips with it. So I want my account to come to grips with it, but 
not necessarily within Kripke’s strictures, since those strictures arise, in 
part, from what is, I think and have argued, a mistaken assumption. In 
application to Kripke’s puzzle, I want my account to i) account for why 
‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ is intuitively true when he first gets 
us to consider that report, ii) account for why ‘Pierre believes that London 
is not pretty’ is intuitively true, iii) account for why ‘Pierre believes that 
London is pretty and that London is not pretty’ is intuitively false even 
though the ascriptions referred to above are both intuitively true. I would 
also like to be able to iv) offer some principled rationale for rejecting 
Kripke’s question ‘Does Pierre, or does he not, believe that London is 
pretty?’ since it seems that we are, as Kripke insists, not able to give a 
simple and unproblematic answer to this.
43
Giving the truth-condition
Before giving a statement of my account I would like to make a general 
point about what sort of semantic project I see myself as engaged in. In 
giving my semantic account I will give a truth-condition for belief 
ascriptions. I will give a biconditional of the form ‘An utterance of ‘A
believes that S’ in a given context is true if and only i f  ’. What replaces
the dots will be an attempt at a statement of a condition necessary and 
sufficient for the truth of the ascription. The truth-condition will be a 
condition for the truth of the report but is not meant to be an analysis of an 
ascription. It is not an articulation of the content of the ascription, not a 
synonym, and does not give the logical form. This means, among other 
things, that the ordinary language user need not be able to give the 
condition himself. The vocabulary I use in stating the truth-condition is to 
be thought of as occurring in a philosophical metalanguage, not in the
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language of the ordinary belief ascriber, even though I will state the 
condition using ordinary English words.
Giving a truth-condition in this sense differs in a significant way from 
giving the content of a report. For when we give the content, it is 
presupposed that there is just one correct content which is the content of 
the report. However, there is no such presupposition when the aim is only 
to give a truth-condition. There is then a very real question about what is 
to count as an adequate account of the report, for there is no correct one. 
Of course, the truth-condition must be extensionally correct, but this is 
obviously not a sufficient condition. The following would be, although 
extensionally correct, completely uninformative: ‘A believes that S’ is true 
iff A believes that S. We would like our account to be informative, so a 
disquotational schema will not do. But what exactly should we expect the 
truth-condition to contain? Erin Eaker (2004) makes an interesting claim 
about giving the truth-condition for a belief report. Remember that Eaker 
said ‘A believes that a is F’ is true iff A has in thinking about a ascribed to 
it the property of being F. She emphasises that ‘thinking about’ occurs 
unanalysed in her semantics. In her defence she says that the task of 
providing an analysis of belief and of the thinking about relation is not a 
part of providing a semantic account of a ‘believes that’. She says that 
whatever may, metaphysically speaking, constitute having a belief, or 
thinking about an object, the semantics of the report is not the place for 
this theory to appear. She offers, apparently in support of this claim, the 
following analogy. She says that one would be surprised to see an analysis 
of vaporisation in the semantic theory for the sentence ‘The Martians 
vaporised Mary because they thought that she was an Earthling spy’. She 
then asks, rhetorically: ‘Why should we should we expect an analysis of 
Martian belief in the theory?’ I agree with the intuition, but I think that the 
analogy is not apt.
Our object of study is belief ascriptions. They have been selected as an 
object of study because we think that they form a natural semantic class, 
exhibiting what may appear to be puzzling logical behaviour and because
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they may be thought to shed some light on issues in the philosophy of 
mind. No doubt, if  we were interested in vaporisation-sentences (because 
we thought they formed a special class worthy by themselves of study), 
then we would like our semantics to tells us more about vaporisation than 
is given to us by the schema “ A vaporises B’ is true iff the relation of 
vaporisation hold between A and B \ I hope that my account will cast some 
light on belief, metaphysically speaking. The only plausibility that Eaker’s 
claim has is if we are trying to given the logical form of belief ascriptions. 
But I am not, and nor is she.
I do not think that there is any principled and general way of setting an 
upper limit on what a semantic account of belief ascriptions should 
include; there is only the lower limit discussed above. I would like to say 
as much as I can. And so I will have something to say about the 
metaphysical underpinnings of our ascriptions in Chapter Four.
4A
How to think about belief ascriptions
In this section I will state and explain my account of belief ascriptions in 
an abstract way, before looking in detail at examples in Section 4.7 in 
order to both illustrate and support my theory.
I suggest that it will be useful as a heuristic for understanding what I want 
to say about belief ascriptions that I make an idealising assumption about 
belief ascriptions. It is the following: a belief ascription is dlways an 
answer to a question. In the typical, or canonical, situation, there will be 
three parties involved; there is the agent who will be designated, as she has 
been so far, by replacements for the schematic ‘A ’ in ‘A believes that S’. 
There is the reporter who I will represent with ‘R’ in my abstract account. 
There is also the audience, a speaker who I will designate with ‘B’. B asks 
a question of R and R responds with an ascription of the form ‘A believes 
that S’. I do not think that there is a definite limit to the range of questions
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to which an ascription can intelligibly be thought of as an answer, but I 
wish to mention three central kinds.
1) Often the question will be of the form ‘Why did A do X?’ where ‘do X’ 
is to be replaced with some verbal phrase which expresses an intentional 
action or some non-intentional reaction of an agent to some situation. I 
assume that an answer in the form of an ascription, when it is given as an 
instance of a response presupposing an intentional action, is given as a 
reason-giving causal explanation. This question only arises when B 
assumes that A did in fact do X. Once the question has arisen it can either 
be rejected because R believes that A did not do X or it can be answered. 
There may be many forms of possible answer, but ‘A believes that S’ 
would be a central and typical form of response.
2) An ascription can also be given as an answer to the question ‘Does A 
believe that S?’ This form of question could again be a request for an 
explanation of some particular action in, for instance, a case where B has 
suggested an answer to his own ‘Why did A do X?’ question and is 
essentially asking if that is the correct explanation. For example, B has just 
seen A pour milk into the sink and asks ‘Does A believe that the milk is 
sour?’ More typically, however, B will want to be able to predict A’s 
behaviour or reactions in various situation or to various kinds of triggers.
B may be interested in what A would do in one specific situation or may 
want to know something about A so that he will know what A would do in 
various different situations. In the typical case, B will be interested in 
some aspects of A’s behaviour and not in others, although it may not be 
determinate exactly what aspects of A’s behaviour B is interested in. B 
will not have in mind a definite list of possible scenarios for each of which 
he will want to know what A’s expected behaviour . I consider this use of 
an ascription a very central case and most of my discussion of the 
examples to follow will be examples in which an ascription is given to 
provide information so that B can predict some of A’s behaviour.
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3) There is at least one other intelligible purpose that B may have in asking 
‘Does A believe that S?’, and that is to find out more about A, but not in 
such a way that we come to know what A would say or do in various 
situations. If B were to ask, for example, ‘Does John still believe that God 
exists?’, B may not be at all interested in any aspect of A’s behaviour. We 
are often interested in what people believe without being interested in 
anything else about them. Typically we may want to know about A’s 
character or personality or want to take a moral stance towards that person, 
or we may be interested in what they think about us, but not care about 
what they would actually say or do.
I shall concentrate on questions of the first two kinds (requests for 
explanations, and requests for predictive information) because I think that 
it is possible to trace the context-sensitivity to particular kinds of source in 
the case of these two kinds of questions. The basic idea will be that 
whether or not an answer to a question is a good answer depends on in part 
on the purpose of the question. When the question is a request for an 
explanation, a good explanation will be a good answer, and hence a true 
ascription. When the question is a request for predictive information, an 
answer will affords the right kind of prediction will be a good answer, and 
hence a true ascription.
4.4.1
Proper questions
I assume that a question arises for B only if B has a specific purpose in 
asking it. I will say that a question is proper when and only when it has a 
specific purpose. If B has no specific purpose, then even if she did for 
some reason ask ‘Does A believe that S?’ there would be no saying 
whether R’s response was a good answer, or even counted as an answer at 
all. I make this model of belief as answers to questions a central feature of 
my semantic account of belief ascriptions. I claim that a belief ascription 
can only be evaluated for truth or falsity at all if it is an answer to a proper 
question. As a corollary, considered in abstraction from a possible proper
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question, a belief ascription cannot properly be considered either true or 
false. This corollary may seem counter-intuitive, and I will try to account 
for its counter-intuitiveness in my discussion of Example 1 .1 also claim 
that a given ascription may be true when given as a response to one 
question and false when given as a response to another question, hence the 
context-sensitivity of belief ascriptions. This will be illustrated in 4.7.
The question (with its specific purpose) giving rise to the belief ascription 
is then a crucial aspect of the context in which an ascription is to be 
evaluated. What else must be included as elements of the context in which 
a belief ascription is evaluated? Apart from any elements which are not 
specific to the evaluation of belief ascriptions but are also required for the 
evaluation of utterances with other indexical elements, there is the shared 
background knowledge of B and R.
It is important to note that questions are not, for my purpose, to be 
identified with the particular interrogative form used in asking the 
question, for questions will be distinct when the purposes behind them are 
distinct, even though the same verbal form may be used to ask the 
question, (this will be seen in the examples of section 4.7). A question then 
should be thought of as including its purpose.
4.4.2
Contexts for belief ascriptions
A context consists of a time, an agent, a reporter and an audience, a 
question with a specific purpose, and the background knowledge of the 
speaker and audience.
4,5
Stating the truth-condition
In this section I will give a brief statement of the truth-condition of a belief 
ascription using the model I have described above, before fleshing out
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what kinds of factors are relevant to the asking and answering of questions 
to which an appropriate response is a sentence of the form ‘A believes that 
S’, looking at various examples of the relevant answer and question pairs 
and then defending the truth-condition against some likely objections.
An utterance of a belief ascription of the form ‘ A believes that S’ is 
true in a context c if and only if it provides a good answer to the 
proper question of its context.
What counts as ‘good’ depends on the goals of the reporter and audience 
and the background knowledge of the audience, and will explained via 
discussion of the examples of Section 4.7 and directly in Section 4.8.
An answer is good if it gives the questioner the information that he is 
looking for, which is determined by the purpose of the question.
M
The metaphysical background
The whole practice of asking questions about what an agent has done or 
will do in various circumstances and the practice of ascribing beliefs to 
answer these questions presupposes a very complex set of patterns to be 
found in an agent’s behaviour. Without some pattern we could not find 
each other intelligible at all. I now want to say something about such 
patterns as they play a central role in our belief ascribing practices, most 
obviously when we ascribe beliefs to answer questions which are asked by 
B, so that she can make some predictions about A’s behaviour. I now want 
to say something about these patterns before showing how they feature in 
belief ascription.
So far I have used the term ‘behaviour’, but what I want to consider is 
actually something much broader, which, for lack of a better expression, I 
shall call ‘an agent’s mental life’. An agent’s mental life exhibits certain 
patterns which are normally easily discernible to us. To say that an agent’s
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mental life exhibits certain patterns immediately raises two questions: 
‘Patterns in what?’ and ‘What kind of patterns?’ The patterns I have in 
mind are patterns in capacities and dispositions to do, say, think and feel 
certain things. Dispositions can be characterised by conditional statements 
of the form: if a certain condition C obtains, then an object O will exhibit 
property P. Roughly speaking, we can say that O has a given disposition 
just in case the relevant conditional is true. For example, paracetamol has 
the capacity to cure headaches when swallowed because it is true that 
when swallowed (condition C), the paracetamol (object O) cures a 
headache (exhibits P). For an example relating to an agent, John is 
disposed to get very irritable when trapped in the underground because it 
is true that when trapped on the underground he will tend to snap at people 
and huff-and-puff, say. Consideration of these examples invites immediate 
consideration of some complexities. The statements I have given as 
examples of dispositions may seem overly simplistic, for it has to be 
conceded (and it standardly is conceded in the literature on this subject) 
that conditional statements such as these are only strictly true ceteris 
paribus. It is very easy to concoct examples which C obtains but O does 
not exhibit P, and yet we want to say that O does have the relevant 
disposition.
Not all ascriptions of dispositions are couched in overtly dispositional 
language. Many commonly used dispositional predicates -  ‘is fragile’, ‘is 
soluble’, is malleable’, ‘is an acid’, ‘is irritable’, ‘is stubborn’, ‘is hot- 
tempered’, make explicit reference neither to disposition to manifest 
certain properties nor to the conditions in which such properties would be 
manifested. It may not even be possible for a competent user of such 
predicates to provide an analysis in overtly dispositional terms of the form 
‘if C then O will have P’. What, for instance, is an irritable person 
supposed to do and in what circumstances exactly?’It is not that we cannot 
think of anything to say in such cases, but that it is not clear exactly what 
conditions and manifestations should be included.
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Even in cases where a disposition is ascribed in overtly dispositional 
terms, there can be a significant difference in how specific the 
dispositional ascription is. Consider, for example, the differences between 
the following:
1. John is hot-headed.
2. John is disposed to respond very angrily to minor provocation.
3. John is disposed to shout and swear in response to minor provocations.
4. John is disposed to shout and swear in response to a trivial argument.
5. Ceteris paribus, John is disposed to respond angrily to minor 
provocations.
6. John is disposed to respond angrily to minor provocations unless he is 
drunk.
In (1) John is described with a predicate which is not explicitly 
dispositional. (2) might plausibly be thought of as an analysis of (1), but 
leaves it open as to what is to count as an angry response and what counts 
as a minor provocation. (3) might be thought of as including examples of 
angry responses and minor provocations. It is not clear what the entailment 
relations between these four sentences are. (1) might be thought of as 
entailing (2), and possibly as being entailed by it. (1) would probably not 
be thought of as entailing either (3) or (4) since there are other ways of 
being hot-headed. Whether (3) or (4) suffice for the truth of (1) may be a 
matter of dispute. (5) explicitly states that the manifestation of the 
disposition occurs other things being equal, and is intended to be 
equivalent to (2) which is assumed to implicitly be restricted in this way. 
(6) might be one plausible way of understanding (1). It explicitly refers to 
a condition such that if that condition obtained, then even if the disposition 
was not manifested, the general dispositional ascription would not be 
falsified.
The above brief discussion is intended to highlight two complications for 
any kind of account which understands some phenomenon in terms of 
dispositions and capacities, or at least gives them a central role in the
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account. First, there is the question of how dispositions are to be 
individuated. Is John’s hot-headedness one disposition or is it really a 
cluster of more specific dispositions, and if the latter, which ones exactly? 
Since dispositions can be specified to different degrees (consider the 
differences between (2), (3) and (4)), do we have different dispositions 
here or different specifications of a single disposition? Perhaps these 
questions pertaining to individuation could be given some definite answers 
if there was something like a normal, canonical form for dispositions 
statements. But I think that the variety of normal uses exemplified above 
suggests that there is no privileged form of disposition ascription.
It would seem that there is no determinate end to a list of more specified 
disposition ascriptions that are taken to be equivalent to a disposition 
ascription involving a simple predicate.
The above two points, (that there may be no principled way of 
individuating dispositions and no determinate list however we individuate 
them) would make certain kinds of accounts of belief or belief ascription 
given in terms of dispositions difficult. The features of disposition 
ascriptions would provide at least a prima facie difficulty for any account 
which said, for example, that ‘A believes that S’ is true iff A has all of the 
dispositions in a given list, most of them, or a certain number of them. Nor 
do I think that a belief ascription is equivalent to, implies, or is implied by 
any single dispositional ascription.
So far, I have considered a particular mental predicate, ‘is hot-headed’ and 
discussed some dispositional ascriptions. I now want to turn to an example 
more germane to my topic. Let us consider the predicate ‘believes that 
London is pretty’. There are dispositions that we ordinary belief ascribers 
are apt to associate with having this belief. I use the word ‘associate’ as a 
deliberately vague word because I want, for the moment, to remain neutral 
about exactly what the relation is between a given belief ascription and the 
dispositions that we associate with it.
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The dispositions that an ordinary speaker associates with having the belief 
that London is pretty are roughly those dispositions that she would cite, 
given enough time and perhaps some prompting, when asked the question 
‘What would someone who believed that London is pretty be likely to do, 
to say, to think and to feel and in what circumstances?’ This particular 
belief might be associated with the disposition to say that London is pretty, 
to assent to the sentence ‘London is pretty’, the disposition to draw certain 
inferences, given certain further information, for example the disposition 
to draw the conclusion that England has a pretty capital given the 
information that London is the capital of England, the disposition to feel 
some degree of surprise when someone says ‘London is a very ugly city’, 
the disposition to consider London as a possible place to visit.
This list could be continued indefinitely. I have merely tried to give some 
illustrative examples. It seems that for any arbitrary belief that we can 
think of, we seem to be able to produce a list of dispositions which we 
would associate with having this belief. That we are able to do this even 
for beliefs that we have never considered before shows that we do not 
learn lists of beliefs and dispositions that are to be associated with them 
one by one. However we do it, it seems that being able to do it is a 
necessary part of being competent with the locution ‘believes that’.
No doubt different speakers would if asked, produce different responses if 
asked for a list of dispositions associated with having a given belief, but I 
will assume that there would be considerable intersubjective agreement if 
speakers were presented with a candidate list for a given belief and asked 
of each disposition on the list, whether is should be associated with the 
given belief. I will assume therefore that we can meaningfully talk of the 
list of dispositions associated with a given belief. The list is the one that 
everyone would agree on, at least if prompted.
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4.6.1
Dispositions and belief ascriptions
Before saying exactly what role such associated lists of dispositions play 
in my semantic account of belief ascriptions, I want to say a few things 
about how such dispositions have traditionally been understood. Howard 
Wettstein, in his book, ‘The Magic Prism’, talks of such associated 
dispositions (he calls them ‘coherences’) and says that they have been 
given very different roles in the philosophy of belief and belief ascriptions. 
He says that ‘at one extreme’ is Frege, who sees ‘believing that p’ as 
standing in a particular relation to a grasped content, so that believing 
becomes not essentially embodied, so that the coherences are not essential 
to having a belief. At most, the ‘coherences’ are the causal consequences 
of having a given belief.
It is not really so clear, though, that Frege would have said that the 
‘coherences’ are causal consequences of having a given belief rather than 
constitutive of having it. Frege was interested in a semantic treatment of 
certain types of sentences, where semantics was understood, as we have 
seen, as having to do with the analysis of a sentence. He said that the 
referent of an embedded clause was a proposition, and said various things 
about the nature of such propositions, but his interest was not primarily 
metaphysical, so he could remain neutral about what it means to, say, 
stand in the relation of acceptance to a proposition. More recently, Nathan 
Salmon, has endorsed such a picture of belief and said a little more. He 
says that belief is a type of inward assent to a piece of information, “that to 
believe that p is to covertly concur with, to endorse mentally, to nod 
approval to the information that p when p occurs to you.” These are 
metaphors and perhaps they do suggest that having a given belief is matter 
of something internal to the mind which cannot essentially have to do with 
dispositions.
25 Scwitzgebel (2002) proposes a context-sensitive account o f ascriptions where what a person believes depends 
on what dispositions are relevant in that context. He does not, however, draw on the concepts o f explanation and 
prediction as I do, and his account has consequences that I do not accept. I am not sure that he sees belief
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At the other extreme, there are understandings of belief and belief 
ascriptions which give the ‘coherences’ as a very central role. Gilbert Ryle 
(1949), it is often said, held that ordinary belief ascriptions could be 
analysed in terms of dispositions to do, think and feel certain things. Ryle 
did not actually give many examples of such analyses, and in his short 
discussion of belief he gives lists of what seem like dispositions that a 
competent user of ‘believes that’ reports would plausibly associate with a 
given belief ascription, or at least agree with once she had been presented 
with them. He said:
“Certainly, to believe that the ice is dangerously thin is to be unhesitant in telling oneself 
and others that it is thin, in acquiescing in other people’s assertions to that effect, in
objecting to statements to the contrary, [....... ] .  But it is also be prone to skate warily, to
shudder, to dwell in imagination on possible disasters and to ward other skaters. It is a 
propensity to make certain theoretical moves, but also to make certain executive and 
imaginative moves as well as to have certain feelings”, (pg. 134-5).
But of course, in light of my observations above, these lists cannot be 
complete and are to some extent arbitrary. Geach (1957) pointed out a 
difficulty for any analysis of propositional attitudes in terms of 
dispositions. He observed that what an agent will be disposed to do, say, 
think, feel given a particular belief will depend on what other beliefs the 
agent has. This certainly implies that a simple atomistic analysis of belief 
in which a belief is paired off with a single disposition is a hopeless 
project. More recent developments in philosophy of mind are sensitive to 
Geach’s point and have resulted in considerably complicated analyses of 
belief. I won’t discuss these later developments here, but observe that they 
all claim that belief ascriptions can be analysed in terms of dispositions or 
are functionally specifiable (this would means that ‘A believes that S’ can 
be analysed in terms of dispositions to produce certain effects in certain 
conditions and to be caused by certain inputs).
ascriptions as ESSENTIALLY answers to questions, as I do. What he takes to be hard cases I take to be the 
norm.
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I do not think that any of these positions get the relation between ‘the 
coherences’ and the truth of belief ascriptions right. In my view, they make 
the connection between the coherences and the ascriptions too tight. For on 
each of these views, there is a list (maybe a very long and complicated 
one) which is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of a given 
ascription. On the assumption that whether or not these complex 
dispositional and functional descriptions apply to an agent is a context- 
independent matter, then the truth-value of the belief ascriptions will also 
be a context-independent matter. My discussion of the examples in the 
next section will try to defend further the claim that it is not.
I will now try to state what role the ‘coherences’ have in the semantics of 
belief ascriptions. Belief ascriptions are not to be understood as 
semantically equivalent to any ascriptions of dispositions to an agent. So 
that one cannot say, in general terms, that ‘A believes that S’ is true if and
only i f    where the blanks specify some list of dispositions, however
the dispositions are spelt out and with whatever caveats.
I think that the coherences are presupposed by our general practice of 
ascribing beliefs, in the sense that they are metaphysically necessary for 
the practice to be possible at all. Without the coherences, we could not 
predict, explain or understand agents, and belief ascriptions play a central 
role in these phenomena.
4.6.2
Dispositions and asking questions: two sources of context-sensitivity
Let me focus on a question asked by B whose purpose is to obtain an 
answer which will allow B to make predictions about an agent. I assume 
that in the typical case B will not want to be able to predict all of an 
agent’s actions and responses in all possible scenarios, for we all know 
that this is not possible. It is not possible because they are too many factors 
relevant to determining what an agent will do in a given situation. I assume 
that the question ‘Does A believe that S?’ arises only when B has already
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made a significant number of assumptions about A, for without these 
assumptions, knowing whether or not ‘A believes that S’ is true provides 
no information about what A would do. This is for the reason mentioned 
above, given by Geach, that a given belief cannot by itself be expected to 
issue in any particular behaviour. Assumptions must be made about the 
agent’s other beliefs, desires, and other attitudes, as well as assumptions 
about his environment. Some of these assumptions are normal across most 
contexts of question. For example, it would be normal to expect that a 
person does not want to be severely injured and knows that if he were to 
be hit by a car he would be seriously injured. It is on the background of 
such assumptions that one can make predictions about an agent’s likely 
actions if given the further information that he believes that he is crossing 
a dangerous road. Some assumptions would be peculiar to a given context 
of a question. For example, it is only if we know that A believes he is with 
someone who understands English that he is likely to express his beliefs to 
them in English. Whether a belief ascription allows us to predict a given 
range of actions depends on other assumptions. What other assumptions 
are made will vary with the context of the question. Whether a given belief 
ascription allows us to predict a given range of actions then is a context- 
dependent matter.
The same goes for explanations. A belief ascription does not explain an 
action simpliciter. Explanations, like predictions, are essentially situated in 
a context.
What explains in one context will fail to explain in another context. And 
what fails to explain in one context can explain in another context. I shall 
discuss belief ascription as action explanation in Example 7.
This sort of context-sensitivity of predictions and explanations described 
above is one source, I will argue, of the context-sensitivity of belief 
ascriptions. But there is another very important source which arises only in 
the case of belief ascriptions used to allow predictions of an agent’s 
behaviour. There is an important asymmetry between explanations and 
predictions, which is obvipus enough once pointed out. It is that
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explanations are explanations of a specific action as it falls under a given 
description, or perhaps of why a certain kind of action or response is 
instantiated in a given situation. Sometimes prediction is like this, and 
sometimes it is not. Sometimes we want to know whether A will do some 
particular kind of thing in a specific situation, but sometimes we want to 
be able to predict a range of an agent’s actions and responses in a range of 
circumstances, and we may not always have a precisely determinate range 
in mind. But I consider that the question ‘Does A believe that S?’ arises 
typically for B only when B is interested in some aspects of A’s behaviour 
and responses in some restricted range. I claim that belief ascriptions are 
tailor-made for such cases and will try to explain this more fully in my 
discussion of Examples 3-6. This variation in range of behaviour and 
responses that is the focus of B’s interest between different speakers is 
another important source of context-sensitivity in belief ascriptions which 
are responses to requests for predictive information.
4.7 The examples 
Example 1
My first example is one which concerns what I will call an ideal agent. He 
is ideal in the sense that he is perfectly logically rational, behaves 
rationally and never even makes the kind of mistakes that Kripke’s Pierre 
does. He never misidentifies things, never thinks that what is one thing is 
actually two, and vice versa. The ideal agent is intended to be understood 
in such a way that it would be correct to ascribe to him any disposition that 
would typically be associated with having a certain belief. Suppose that 
this agent, A, replaces Pierre in Kripke’s scenario. Unlike Pierre, A knows 
that the city he has previously called ‘Londres’ is the same city he now 
lives in and calls ‘London’. He would not assert contradictory statements 
about London, and would come to think that parts of London are pretty 
and that parts are ugly. Let us suppose that although he finds parts of 
London pretty and parts of it ugly, he thinks that overall he can discount 
the ugly parts, because even the most beautiful city has its less attractive
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areas. He assents to ‘London is pretty’, buys tickets for his friends to visit, 
recommends to others, etc.
Now, if Kripke were to ask, concerning this agent, ‘does A believe that 
London is pretty?’ then it seems clear that the answer would be ‘yes’. This 
might not seem to be a very interesting result, but it might seem to be in 
tension with my earlier claim that a belief ascription is a response to a 
proper question, and can only be evaluated with respect to that question. 
But in asking ‘Does A believe that London is pretty?’ I have not specified 
a purpose and it does not seem to be obvious from the context of my 
asking what the purpose is, so how can we feel so sure that the answer to 
the question is ‘yes’? My response to this is to say that in some cases, 
specifically those cases of ideal agents, who can be correctly described as 
having all the dispositions associated with a given belief, the ascription of 
the relevant belief will be true in all contexts. Even without having yet 
given any account of how the context of a question ‘Does A believe that 
S?’ narrows down the range of dispositions that is relevant to the ability of 
an ascription to allow B to predict an agent’s behaviour and responses, we 
can see that if the agent has every disposition that is associated with a 
given belief, then any subset of associated dispositions which would 
suffice for the truth of the ascription in its context is to be found among the 
agents’s disposition. I do not know how common ideal agents are, but I 
suggest that it is by focusing on ideal agents that has made it seem as 
though the truth or falsity of a belief ascription is a context-independent 
matter. The appearance of context-independence is, I suggest, an artefact 
of focusing narrowly on such examples. But instead of saying that the truth 
of an ascription to an ideal agent is a context-independent matter, we 
should simply say that we know a priori the meta-linguistic truth that for 
ideal agents the ascription will be true in all contexts.
1 now turn to look at examples of agents who are less than ideal in order to 
show how I think context-sensitivity arises in realistic cases. In Examples
2 and 3 I will be focusing on the context-sensitivity that arises from 
differences in B’s interests, not from differences in B’s background
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knowledge. So, in these examples I hold the background knowledge 
constant across the different contexts that I will look at. I will vary the 
background knowledge only in Examples 6 and 7, while holding constant 
the focus of interest there.
Example 2
There is another structurally similar example, originally provided by Eric 
Schwitzgebel (2002). In this example, Ellen has been learning Spanish for 
years and based on her exposure to the language is willing to sincerely 
assent to and assert that all Spanish nouns ending in ‘-a’ are feminine, 
which is the rough-and-ready rule that she has been taught. Ellen, has, 
however, come across certain words ending with ‘-a’ which are not 
feminine, but masculine, and she has learnt to use these words correctly 
with the appropriate grammatical agreements. She treats them as 
masculine. If one of the counter-examples to the rough-and-ready rule 
came to mind, she would not assent to nor assert that all nouns ending in ‘- 
a’ are feminine, but the counterexamples never come to mind when she is 
considering the question in the abstract. Clearly, Ellen is not, then, in my 
terminology, an ideal agent. Perhaps this is because she is not, at least in 
this matter, sufficiently reflective.
Consider the question ‘Does Ellen, or does she not, believe that all Spanish 
nouns ending in ‘-a’ are feminine? I say that it depends on the context. 
Suppose that B is asking the question because he wants to know whether 
she is likely to give a good oral presentation in Spanish on some topic, say, 
what she did in the summer holidays. B asks R ‘Does Ellen believe that all 
Spanish nouns ending in ‘-a’ are feminine?’ R knows that this is why B is 
asking the question and she replies ‘No, she does not believe that all 
Spanish nouns ending in ‘-a’ are feminine. This answer allows B to make 
the correct relevant predictions about Ellen’s behaviour, and so is a good 
answer. This is, therefore, a true report. I think that if B were to find out all 
the relevant facts about Ellen’s dispositions and capacities then he would 
say that R had spoken truly when she answered his question.
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Suppose now that the context is altered so that R and B are talking about a 
lesson that Ellen has been asked to give to some new students of Spanish 
who are beginners. B wants to know how Ellen will perform as their 
teacher, then the same question ‘Does Ellen believe that all nouns ending 
in A in Spanish are feminine?’ would elicit a different correct answer. In 
this context, the true report would be ‘Yes, Ellen does believe that all 
Spanish nouns ending in ‘-a’ are feminine. I think that if B were later to 
find out all the relevant facts about Ellen’s capacities and dispositions, 
then he would agree that this had been a true report.
Example 3
I suggest that Kripke’s Pierre is an example of a non-ideal agent much like 
Ellen in the previous example. Again, this means that he does not have all 
the dispositions and capacities associated with a given belief, in this case, 
the belief that London is pretty. Pierre is, admittedly different from Ellen 
in an important way. Intuitively, Ellen could come to have more of the 
associated dispositions merely be reflecting on her knowledge and 
behaviour, at least in principle. Pierre could not come to see, merely by 
reflection, that the city he calls ‘London’ and the city calls ‘Londres’ are 
really just one city. I do think that this difference can, in some contexts, be 
semantically relevant to what belief ascriptions are likely to be true of an 
agent in various contexts. I shall return to this point at the end of the 
discussion of this example.
Pierre has some dispositions that would be associated with the belief that 
London is pretty, and some that would be associated with the contradictory 
belief. In a context where the first set of dispositions was relevant the 
report ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ would be true. In a context 
where the second set of dispositions were relevant, the same report would 
be false. Imagine, as an example of the former, someone asking ‘Does 
Pierre believe that London is pretty?’ where this person works for the
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tourist board and is responsible for the design of the brochure that Pierre’s 
view of London was originally based on when he was back in Paris. What 
the questioner wants to know is whether Pierre like the pictures of London 
in the brochure, would he be likely to recommend London (at least, the 
famous parts) to others, would he be likely to look at and use the brochure 
again in the future? He may not have an absolutely determinate list in 
mind, but he is interested in at least these sorts of things. If R knew his 
intentions in asking, he could say ‘Yes, Pierre believes that London is 
pretty’. I believe that in this context the report would be true. But if the 
context were one in which, back in London, one of Pierre’s neighbours 
asked ‘Does Pierre believe that London is pretty?’ because he wanted to 
know how Pierre feels when he walks around the neighbourhood and what 
he would say about London on the ‘phone to his family back in France 
then, it would be right to say ‘No, Pierre does not think that London is 
pretty’. It would be a true report. I think that the reporter would give this 
answer even if he were aware of all the relevant facts, so it is not the case 
that he gives the report out of partial ignorance.
What about Kripke’s question to the reader of ‘A Puzzle About Belief: 
‘Does Pierre, or does he not, believe that London is pretty?’? Kripke, as 
we have seen, thinks that any answer to this question is unsatisfactory. It is 
this fact that leads Kripke to say that Pierre’s case “lies in an area where 
our normal apparatus for the ascription of belief is placed under the 
greatest possible strain and may even break down”.
I suspect that the appearance of a breakdown of the practice has more to do 
with Kripke’s asking a question which would not normally arise in the way 
that Kripke has posed it. Why does Kripke ask this question? What is it 
that he wants to know about Pierre? The answer is, strangely, nothing.
This, I think, is exactly where the problem with Kripke’s question lies. 
There is nothing that Kripke wants to know about Pierre that he does not 
already know. Kripke is omniscient with respect to Pierre’s dispositions 
and capacities. If the truth of ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ 
depended on some context-independent fact about Pierre that is not given
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in the story, such hidden fact about an inner representation, then even 
given all the other facts about Pierre, the question might still arise, but it is 
just this view of what the truth of a belief ascription depends on that I have 
been concerned to reject. If, on the other hand, a belief ascription is merely 
a convenient way of summarising some other information about Pierre’s 
possible behaviour and responses in various situations, then since we 
already have that information, and know that Kripke has it, the question 
would not really arise. It is not, in the terminology developed earlier, a 
proper question. If I tell you everything there is to know about Pierre’s 
dispositions, and you still ask me ‘Yes, but does Pierre, or does he not, 
believe that London is pretty?, then I have to say that I do not understand 
your question.
It might be said, in response to this, that the question could still be asked 
by someone who did not know about Pierre’s dispositions. But, if there is 
no determinate purpose in the question, the question is not proper and 
should be rejected. If, as seems possible, the questioner simply wants a 
summary statement of Pierre’s overall cognitive situation, then this is 
where we have to leave the vocabulary of belief ascriptions. If there is a 
breakdown it is here. But it is important, I feel, to acknowledge that the 
breakdown occurs because of a combination of the fact that Pierre is not an 
ideal agent with the particular purpose of the question.
In my next two examples, I want to discuss the issue of the relevance using 
a particular name in a belief ascription, but before I do that I want to say 
something general about the related issue of substitutivity, then I will use 
the examples to illustrate and support what I say.
I think that most of the debate about substitutivity occurs on the 
background of a framework that I reject, and, furthermore, one that is 
rejected by an increasing number of philosophers working in this area. It is 
a dominant view that belief ascriptions are opaque, at least on a certain 
reading. Opacity is a property of an open sentence, that is, a sentence with 
a space that requires a singular term or other expression to produce a
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grammatically complete sentence. I will focus on the case where a singular 
term is required because that is what has dominated the discussion. Let the 
open sentence be represented by ‘... is F \  Suppose that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are 
arbitrary singular terms that refer to the same item, then if ‘a is F’ and ‘b is 
F’ can differ in truth-value, then ‘... is F’ is an opaque construction. If an 
open sentence is not opaque then it is transparent. Substitutivity (of 
referring singular terms) is said to hold for transparent constructions and to 
fail in opaque constructions. The open sentence ‘.... is so-called because 
of his size’ is a classic example of an opaque construction. ‘.... is tall’ is 
an example of a transparent construction. These two examples are standard 
and I do not dispute them.
But how can it be meaningfully asked: ‘Are belief ascriptions opaque?’ 
Belief ascriptions on the view here are context-sensitive. How is the 
question to be couched so that it accommodates this fact? If an ascription 
is true or false only relative to a context, then we cannot talk of the truth- 
value (of an open sentence when completed with a singular term) 
simpliciter. I suggest that we only talk of the truth-value of a particular 
utterance of a belief ascription sentence. The same idea of substitution 
does not quite make sense in this context, but we can talk about what the 
truth-value would have been had a different term been used. This seems 
like a perfectly natural extension of the idea of substitution. Moreover, 
there is no a priori reason to assume that if an ascription would change 
truth-value on substitution of co-referring terms in some contexts that it 
could do so in all contexts. Perhaps in some contexts a ‘substitution’ of ‘b’ 
for ‘a’ would change truth-value, and for other contexts it would not. This 
is what I think is the case, and I will try to illustrate this in the following 
two examples.
Example 4
The Roman orator Cicero is also called Tully, but only relatively rarely 
and by those who are classically educated. Suppose that A would dissent 
from ‘Cicero is Tully’ because she thinks that in the relevant settings these
152
153
names are used to refer to two different people. She would assent to 
‘Cicero was bom in 106BC’. Suppose B asks R, ‘Does A believe that 
Cicero was bom before 1OOBC?’ If the context were one in which it was 
wondered what A would say in her school quiz, then the answer to the 
question should be ‘yes’. And I take this to mean that ‘A believes that 
Cicero was bom before 100BC’ would be true in this context. But what 
about the answer to the question ‘Does A believe that Tully was bom 
before 100BC?’
It seems to me that consideration of standard examples of belief 
ascriptions in the context of debates about substitutivity would incline us 
to say that the answer to the latter question is ‘no’. Sometimes it is said 
that the fact that A would assent to ‘Cicero was bom before 100BC’ and 
dissent from ‘Tully was bom before 100BC’ is sufficient to say that ‘A 
believes that Cicero was before 100BC’ is true and ‘A believes that Tully 
was bom before 100BC’ is false simpliciter. Such claims have been made 
against a background assumption of context-independence. I think that the 
most we are entitled to say so far is that there may be some contexts in 
which switching the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ in the question would lead 
to different and opposing correct answers; ‘substitutions’ would fail. But 
that the substitution would alter the truth-value in some contexts, 
obviously does not imply that it would do so in all contexts. I think that, in 
fact, regarding the second question, ‘Does A believe that Tully was bom 
before 100BC?’, the context is so far inadequately specified to give a 
definite answer.
If I am correct in my claim, which I will try to substantiate in the next 
paragraph, that the context described above is inadequately specified to 
assess the truth-value of the ascription in question, this shows that what 
matters to the truth-value of a belief ascription goes beyond what the 
purpose of the report is, for in this example, I have already fixed what the 
purpose is. In this case, R and B are focused on A’s verbal dispositions, in 
particular, on how she will perform in her quiz. It might be tempting to 
think that since the focus of interest is on her verbal dispositions, and since
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her verbal dispositions vary precisely with respect to the two sentences 
‘Cicero was bom before 100BC’ and ‘Tully was bom before 100BC’, that 
this means that in this context, as it has been specified so far, ‘substitution’ 
of one name for the other would alter the tmth-value. But it is not so clear.
Example 5
Suppose it was assumed by both R and B that the quizmaster was most 
likely to ask questions about Cicero using the name ‘Cicero’, then I think 
that ‘A believes that Cicero was bom before 100BC’ would be true, while 
‘A believes that Tully was bom before 100BC’ would be false. This means 
that the substitutions in this context fail to preserve tmth. But suppose 
instead that R and B both standardly use the name ‘Tully’ for Cicero, and 
furthermore, that they both know that A is confused in thinking that there 
are two different people here. In that case, given the assumption about the 
purpose of the report, I would say that the ascription ‘A believes that Tully 
was bom before 100BC would be true’, her dissent to ‘Tully was bom 
before 100BC’ notwithstanding. It would be tme in this context because it 
would, given the relevant assumptions shared between R and B, lead B to 
make the correct predictions about the behaviour of A ’s in which he is 
interested, at least if all things worked out as they should.
I think that of the three assumptions,
(1) The question will be asked in the quiz using the name ‘Cicero’
(2) R and B normally use the name ‘Tully’ for Cicero
(3) A is confused about the identity
they are individually necessary for the tmth of the ascription, and, given 
the purpose of the ascription, jointly sufficient. If (1) were abandoned, the 
report would be false since it would lead to the wrong prediction; it would 
lead to the prediction that A would get the question in the quiz correct, but 
she would not. If (2) were abandoned, the use of ‘Tully’ in the embedded 
ascription would tend to generate the prediction that A would assent to
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‘Tully was bom before 100BC’, but she would not. Regarding (3); in many 
contexts, especially those specifically focused on an agent’s verbal 
dispositions, such an ascription would lead to the expectation that A would 
assent to ‘Tully was bom before 100BC’, but the background assumption 
about A’s confusion forestalls that possible implicature in this context.
It may be objected to my discussion of the previous two examples that it 
not really so clear that the intuitions that I have said I have are universally 
shared. A number of people I have discussed the examples with agree with 
my intuitions, but a number have also said that they have less clear 
intuitions. In response to this I would say that even if there are doubts 
about the intuitions that I have regarding the above two examples, if the 
doubts are provoked by the changes in the contexts that I describe, then we 
can explain the shakiness of the intuitions as being due to precisely the 
complexity and abundance of factors that the belief ascriptions are 
sensitive to. This would mean that some of my more specific hypotheses 
about how various factors influence the tmth of an ascription are wrong, 
but would still allow me to maintain my more general claims about the 
kinds of factors that are relevant to the tmth of an ascription.
I now want to look at an example of a belief ascription as an explanation 
of an action.
Example 6
Suppose that B sees A suddenly hide behind a wall. R who also sees this 
sees their nephew Mike pick up a stone and move as if to throw it at A. B 
also sees Mike, and recognises him, but does not see what he does with the 
stone. B asks ‘why did A just suddenly hide behind that wall?’ R answers: 
‘because she believed that Mike was about to throw a stone at her’. In this 
context, the ascription intuitively seems tme. The ascription seems tme 
even if we know that A did not know that it was Mike who was about to 
throw the stone, perhaps mistaking him for someone else or simply failing 
to recognise him, so she dissents from ‘Michael was about to throw a stone
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at me’. I think that the ascription is intuitively true because it explains the 
A’s hiding.
We can alter the context so that the ascription fails to explain the action. 
Suppose instead that B fails to recognise Mike in the street and thinks that 
he is inside watching TV, suppose that R knows that B mistakenly believes 
this. My intuition is that in such a context, the ascription would be false. 
The intuition is felt more strongly I think if we focus on the fact that A 
does not recognise Mike. I suggest that it is because in such a context, R’s 
response ‘A believes that Mike was about to throw a stone at her’ would 
leave B baffled. It would fail to explain the action.
How could R explain A’s action in this context? She could perhaps say ‘A 
believed that she was about to have stone thrown at her’, or perhaps, ‘A 
believed that the man in front of her was about to throw a stone at her’. 
What is relevant is that from A’s perspective someone within what she 
believes is stone-throwing distance is about to throw a stone in her 
direction. But there need not be any specific way she thinks this. We do 
not need to say this in our belief ascription, but the ascription must, in its 
context, allow B to infer it. I suggest that any way this could be achieved 
would render the ascription true.
The use of indexical expressions in the embedded sentence of a belief 
ascription is one very prominent way of making quite explicit the agent’s 
perspective. Castaneda (1966,1968) and John Perry (1977, 1979) have 
stressed that belief ascriptions containing indexicals are special. Perry 
gives examples of first-person belief ascriptions in which he says the use 
of indexicals to characterise the agent’s belief is essential. He describes a 
scenario in which he follows a trail of sugar on the floor around a 
supermarket to tell the person he assumes is accidentally spilling it to stop. 
He comes to realise, after some several laps, that it is his bag of sugar that 
is leaking. He says “I believed at the outset that the shopper with a tom 
bag was making a mess. But I did not believe that I was making a mess.
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[....] When I came to believe that, I stopped. My change in beliefs seems 
to explain my change in behaviour.
Perry says that in reporting this belief that he came to have the indexical is 
essential in the sense that replacement of it by any coreferring term, even a 
directly referential one, destroys the force of the explanation. For example, 
if he had said instead “I came to believe that John Perry is making a mess” 
then he would no longer have explained why he had stopped.
I want to understand exactly what it means to say that the indexical is 
essential in this explanation. Perry is slightly equivocal on a point that I 
think is crucial. Sometimes he says that using another term in place of the 
indexical destroys the explanation simpliciter. But sometimes he says, that 
it would destroy the force of the explanation, or at least requires certain 
assumptions to be made to preserve it. The caveat is important. Perry 
himself concedes that in order to explain his stopping with ‘I came to 
believe that John Perry was making a mess’ he would need to add ‘And I 
believe that I am John Perry’. He says that the only reason that ‘I came to 
believe that John Perry was making a mess’ seems to explain the action is 
our natural assumption that he did believe he was John Perry. He says that 
if he had said: ‘I came to believe that de Gaulle is making a mess’ that 
would not have explained his stopping at all, but that if he had added ‘and 
I believe that I am de Gaulle’, the explanations would be on a par. He 
concludes that ‘I came to believe that John Perry is making a mess’ does 
not explain the action at all.
The argument is fallacious. To show that given the assumption that he is 
de Gaulle, the explanations would be on a par does not show that they 
actually are on a par. For we do actually assume that he believes he is 
John Perry and that he is not Charles de Gaulle. I think that the correct 
thing to say is that whether or not a given ascription explains an action 
depends on such assumptions essentially. Explanations are essentially 
situated in a context. For even ‘I came to believe that I am making a mess’ 
does not explain the action unless we also make assumptions about what
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Perry was trying to do. If we had assumed that Perry was very pleased to 
see a mess and thrived in untidy supermarkets, that ascription would 
obviously no longer explain his action. The indexical in the ascription that 
explains the action in a context is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
ascription to explain the action. Indexicals are essential only in that some 
belief ascription, either the explaining one, or one assumed to be true in 
order to allow the explaining one to explain in its context must contain an 
indexical in the embedded sentence of the ascription.
I think that what is special about belief ascriptions involving indexicals is 
that given other very natural assumptions which form part of the necessary 
background context, the belief ascription is virtually guaranteed, whereas 
other, non-indexical terms substituted in their place would given only vary 
natural assumptions destroy the force of the explanation.
4JS
Defending and clarifying the meaning of the truth-condition
In stating the truth-condition for a belief ascription I said that an ascription 
is true if and only if it provides a ‘good’ answer to the proper question of 
its context. I would now like to clarify what is meant by ‘good’.
In my discussion of the examples I relied on the idea an ascription which 
was a good answer to one question could be a bad answer to another 
question and that the truth-value of the ascription would change 
accordingly. In the case of Ellen of Example 2 ,1 suggested that when the 
purpose of the question was to find out whether Ellen would make 
grammatical mistakes or not, ‘Yes, Ellen believes that all Spanish nouns 
end in ‘a”  was not a good answer (and so was not true), but when the 
purpose of the question was to find out what she would say about the 
grammatical rule about Spanish nouns ending in ‘a’, ‘Yes, Ellen believes 
that all Spanish nouns end in ‘a’ was a good answer (and so was true). 
Whether it is a good answer or not had to do with whether it allowed the 
audience to make the right predictions.
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All of the other examples implicitly employed the same reasoning, except 
for Example 6, which dealt with explanation rather than prediction, so that 
whether the ascription were tme or not depended on whether or not it 
provided a good answer to the question of its context, which amounted to 
whether or not it provided an good explanation of an action, since in this 
example the question was a request for an explanation of an action.
What I have not done so far is give an account of what constitutes a good 
explanation or affords the basis of a good prediction. Whatever I say by 
way of explication of such concepts I must not presuppose the notion of 
tmth, otherwise my account of belief ascriptions would be circular. For 
then I would be saying that a belief ascription is tme just in case it 
provides a good answer to its proper question and a good answer involves 
giving a good explanation or good basis for prediction when that is what is 
required, and that a good explanation must be a tme one, and a good basis 
for prediction must be tme. Such an account of the tmth-conditions of 
belief ascriptions would presuppose a prior grip on whether they were tme.
On the other hand, without presupposing the notion of tmth, I may face 
objections such as the following. Suppose John picks up an umbrella and 
someone who sees this asks ‘Why did John pick up the umbrella? We can 
suppose that this is a proper question arising out of a desire for an 
explanation of John’s action. If I were to answer ‘John believes that it’s 
raining’ that may seem like a good explanation. It seems like a plausible 
explanation and may satisfy the questioner. Nevertheless, intuitively, the 
ascription may be false. For intuitively, John may have believed that Mary 
had left the umbrella behind and wanted to take it to her. So how can I mle 
out the first ascription as a good explanation without presupposing the 
tmth of some particular ascription? (The difficulty arises because it is 
standardly thought that good belief explanations presuppose the tmth of 
the ascription which explains, whereas I want to account for the tmth of an 
ascription in terms of whether it explains).
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I am unable to give a complete answer, but I think that ‘John believes that 
it’s raining’ cannot count as a good explanation because it would mislead 
the questioner about what else to expect in John’s behaviour, even though 
such future behaviour was not required in the question. For to assume that 
the ascription is false, we must assume that most of John’s other behaviour 
would not be consistent with the ascription. To count as a good 
explanation, the ascription has to be able to account for John’s other 
behaviour. Is there a difficulty in suggesting this response however? For 
have I not already implied that in asking a proper question which is a 
request for prediction, the audience is only interested in certain aspects of 
an agent’s behaviour, rather than the whole of an agent’s behaviour?
If we consider Ellen again, we cannot require that the ascription is 
consistent with all or most of her behaviour since we have assumed that 
conflicting ascriptions can be true of her, depending on the interests of the 
audience.
My response is to say that we must treat explanation ascriptions differently 
from prediction ascriptions. In the case of an explanation request, the 
ascription must not suggest that the agent would exhibit other behaviours 
that he would be unlikely to. In the case of prediction ascriptions, the 
ascription can in fact only be sensitive to what the audience is interested 
in. He will not be mislead about other aspects of an agent’s behaviour 
since he in asking a question understood to be a request only for 
predictions about certain aspects of the agent’s behaviour.
I think that such claims are given some support by considering whether the 
audience would, later apprised of all the facts about the agent’s 
dispositions, say that the report was a correct answer to his question or not. 
It is my intuition, that he would say that ‘John believes that it is raining’ 
was not a correct answer because it suggests that John would do other 
things that he would not in fact have done. In the case of a request for 
information about whether an agent would act in some particular way, an 
answer would count as correct if it allowed the correct prediction, whether
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or not it was consistent with other aspects of the agent’s behaviour, for the 
proper question is already understood as making much of the agent’s 
behaviour irrelevant.
4 9
How my form of contextualism is different from Richard’s
I have presented and discussed several examples of belief ascription 
scenarios in order to support the view that the truth-value of a belief 
ascription depends on contextual factors. But, even some of the theories 
that I see as falling under my target of criticism imply that belief 
ascriptions are context-sensitive. I now, therefore, need to explain how the 
context-sensitivity in my account is of a quite different kind from the 
context-sensitivity from the context-sensitivity of the theories that I 
consider fundamentally mistaken. Since I have discussed Richard’s theory 
already, I will draw the contrast explicitly between my theory and his.
According to Richard’s theory, belief ascriptions can vary in truth-value 
between contexts, specifically according to what counts as an appropriate 
translation of an agent’s representations, which depends in turn on the 
communicative intentions of the belief reporter. But although the 
communicative setting of the ascription is given a central role in Richard’s 
theory as it is in mine, the role is really quite different. For in Richard’s 
theory the intentions determine what counts as an appropriate translation 
of some determinate and independently specifiable cognitive fact, 
specifically a fact about what representations the agent has in his mind.
We only need to look at the way the restrictions on correlation functions 
are stated to see that his account presupposes that there is a simple fact of 
the matter about what representations an agent has in his representational 
system. Richard begins his description of the representational system as 
being like a blackboard with writing on it (what is written on it being the 
representations), but this is only a metaphor, and so cannot really convince 
us that the representations are something that we really have a prior grip 
on. He talks provisionally about sentences that an agent would accept, but
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then realises that this will not serve his purposes, and he finally talks about 
‘representations’, but does not explain how we determine what 
representations an agent has nor how ordinary belief ascribers come to 
know this.
My account however gives no role to mental representations at all, and 
does not assume that there is some single fact about an agent which a 
belief ascription manages to specify, whether directly or via some 
translation. On my account the contextual sensitivity arises from the fact 
that belief ascriptions are answers to specific questions, and what counts as 
an answer is itself a context-dependent matter.
When a belief ascription is an explanation of an action, the context- 
dependence of the ascription derives from the fact that what counts as an 
explanation varies from one context to another; we saw in the discussion 
of Example 6, for instance, that whether an ascription explains depends in 
part on background assumptions of the audience. What explains in one 
context can fail to explain in another, when only the background 
assumptions of the audience are varied. Sometimes, a belief ascription is 
an answer to a question which is a request for an explanation, so that it is a 
good answer, and is true, only when it is a good explanation. The truth- 
value of a belief ascription can therefore vary according to differences in 
the audience’s background assumptions.
When an ascription is given as an answer to a question which is designed 
to elicit information to allow the audience to predict some range of an 
agent’s possible actions, whether the ascription counts as a good answer 
depends on whether it allows the agent to make the right predictions, so 
again the truth-value of the ascription depends on an agent’s background 
assumptions and on his focus of interest. She will be interested in some but 
not all of an agent’s potential behaviour and reactions.
There is no single fact about the agent which is relevant to the truth of a 
given ascription in every context. What facts about the agent’s mental life
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are seen as underlying a given ascription is itself a context-independent 
matter. That is how my account differs from Richard’s and why it can be 
seen as abandoning the central assumption that I have, throughout the 
dissertation being trying to cast doubt upon.
The facts about an agent which are relevant to the truth of an ascription are 
a motley variety of facts about an agent’s dispositions and capacities and 
are only selected by the context of the report itself.
4.10
De dicto and de re
Much of the literature on belief and belief ascriptions foregrounds a 
distinction between de dicto and de re belief and between de dicto and de 
re belief ascriptions. I will not discuss the distinction as it applies to belief 
directly, and focus only on the alleged distinction as it applies to 
ascriptions. So far in this dissertation I have scarcely mentioned this 
distinction, except in connection with Nathan Salmon’s theory in Chapter 
2. This might seem strange because it is so central to most discussion in 
the literature of ascriptions, and is intimately bound up with issues 
concerning substitutivity, and in particular, because it might be thought 
that my discussion of my examples and of the intuitions about truth-values 
that they are designed to elicit depend on how we read the ascriptions, on 
whether we read them as de dicto or de re. It might have occurred to a 
reader of my discussion of Example 6, for instance, that whether we think 
the ascription ‘A believes that Tully was bom before 100BC’ is tme or 
false depends on whether it is read de re or de dicto. Might it not be tme 
read de re, and yet false read de dicto? So, shouldn’t I have clarified which 
reading I was thinking of?
I have deliberately ignored the distinction because I do not think that it 
should be seen as central to the semantics of belief ascriptions are it is 
usually thought of as being. I do not have any decisive argument against
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the coherence of the discussion, but I want to try to clarify the distinction 
and to try to cast some doubt on its relevance.
Sometimes the distinction is made syntactically, de dicto reports being of 
the form ‘A believes that a is F’, de re reports being of the form ‘A 
believes, of a, that it is F \  If that was all that the distinction amounted to, 
then de re reports would seem to be excluded immediately I said that I was 
interested in reports of the former form. But the issue is not really avoided 
so easily. The distinction is meant to be a semantic and logical one, rather 
than one having to do with surface syntax.
Often, the above syntactic form is merely intended to be a canonical form 
for a belief ascription for which certain logical rules are stipulated to hold. 
Specifically, the position represented by ‘a’ is stipulated to allow 
substitutions of co-referring terms salva veritate, and to be open to 
quantification, while de dicto reports not allow substitution of all co- 
referring terms salva veritate and are not open to quantification. Often, it is 
said that de re reports are those which relate an agent to an item and make 
no implications about how the item is thought of/ conceptualised, while de 
dicto reports are those which relate an agent to a propositional content 
which specifies how an agent conceptualises an item.
But these distinctions are not equivalent. It does not follow from the fact 
that a belief context is opaque that it is de dicto on the second distinction. I 
think that all of the ascriptions that I have considered in my examples are 
opaque, or more correctly, will not allow, in a given context, any co- 
referring terms, even co-referring names, to be substituted for one another. 
But that does not mean that they relate the agent to a thought-content. It 
does not depend on how it would affect which proposition might be 
expressed by the embedded clause; it does not depend on specifying how 
the agent conceptualises an item. According to my account, changing a 
term in the embedded sentence of a belief ascription can change the truth- 
value of a belief ascription because it can change a good answer to a 
question into a poor answer to the same question. The explanatoriness of
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an ascription can be sensitive to what terms we use in the ascription, but 
this need have nothing to do whether or not the change in terms preserves, 
or fails to preserve thought-content. Consider again Example 6. Whether 
or not ‘Mike’ can be intersubstituted for ‘the man in front of her’ depends 
on whether the audience, B, knows that Mike is the man in front of A. It 
does not depend on ‘Mike’ and ‘the man in front of her’ having the same 
content, or somehow managing to specify the same content. Failures of 
substitutivity do not imply that we have a de dicto ascription, if this is 
understood as meaning that we somehow convey an agent’s thought- 
content or say what an agent would say.
It is usually intended that the de dicto/ de re distinction is an exclusive 
distinction. It is less often explicitly said, but I think that it is intended that 
the distinction is exhaustive. If there is a real actually instantiated 
distinction here, I admit that it would be exclusive on either way of 
drawing the distinction above. But I obviously deny that it is exhaustive. In 
general, belief ascriptions are sensitive not to an agent’s way of thinking 
(at least as this is generally understood), but to whether or not the 
ascription serves its specific purpose in context.
The question for me is not whether we can ultimately make sense of such a 
category of de re ascription where this is understood to mean an ascription 
where the way the object referred to by ‘a’ is irrelevant to the truth of the 
report, but whether it is at all commonly used. I will try to suggest that it is 
not all common. Some philosophers argue that de re reports are common, 
or are even the norm. There are at least three forms of argument that might 
plausibly be thought to show that de re reports are quite common. I do not 
think that any of them are ultimately convincing.
First, there is the view of those who think that a belief ascription of the 
form ‘A believes that a is F’, where ‘a’ is to be replaced with a name, are 
de re reports even though we can that they relate an agent to a proposition, 
in this case a singular proposition. Such a view is possible because, as I 
argued in Chapter 2, the de re/de dicto distinction (at least drawn is the
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relevant way mentioned above) collapses when we are considering such 
singular propositions. But this view that de re reports are common comes 
from what I have tried to argue is an unwarranted theoretical assumption 
about the form of a belief ascription, without good empirical grounds.
Such theories run counter to the data in a substantial way.
The second form of argument is more empirically grounded. It is the form 
of argument used by Eaker and Almog. They provide many examples 
where substitutions of co-referring terms which differ in content preserve 
truth. They focus on terms which differ in content because terms which 
express the same content are expected are expected to preserve truth even 
on the de dicto assumption. However, even if substitutions of some terms 
that differ in content preserve truth, that, by itself, has no tendency to show 
that all do. But it is this latter that would be required to prove that the 
ascriptions are de re. If my theory is correct, the set of terms that can be 
intersubstituted salva veritate depends in each case on the context of the 
ascription, specifically on the audience’s background knowledge. In some 
cases, two content-equivalent terms could fail to be intersubstitutable, and 
in some cases, two terms which differ in content could be 
intersubstitutable. If an ascription were truly de re, every co-referential 
would have to be intersubstitutable in a given context. I have seen no 
convincing examples of such cases. Eaker and Almog’s from of argument 
seems to depend on the tacit assumption that if a report is not de dicto then 
it is de re. My examples show that a report may be neither.
Thirdly, it might be thought that ascriptions that employ names, pronouns, 
demonstratives and referential uses of descriptions do not aim to specify 
the content that the agent is related to, and are therefore de re. But this 
argument would only be valid if we assumed what I think is a false 
dichotomy. The alleged dichotomy is that we must either 1) specify how 
an agent conceptualises an object or 2) use a de re ascription. My examples 
can be used to cast doubt on this dichotomy. In Example 7, where A hides 
behind a wall, the ascription A believes that he (pointing at the man) is 
about to throw a stone at her’, may be true and does not specify how A
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thinks of him, and yet not any co-referential term could be substituted here 
salva veritate. An ascription can fail to be de re then if the wording matters 
to the truth of the ascription, without that being because the wording 
specifies an agent’s way of thinking of the relevant object.
Not only are the arguments for the widespread occurrence of de re reports 
not convincing, once we acknowledge that ascriptions are designed to 
serve very specific purposes and do not merely try to specify some 
descriptive psychological state of affairs, we would have to wonder what 
purposes a de re ascription could serve. I do not suppose it is impossible to 
imagine some contexts where we might want to do this, but outside of a 
philosophical context, I doubt that we would often want to do this.
4.11
Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented the beginnings of an account of the truth- 
conditions of a belief ascription. The truth-condition makes the truth of an 
ascription relative to a context. Belief ascriptions are seen as answers to 
specific questions. The purpose of the question and the background 
assumptions of the audience are two distinct sources of the context- 
sensitivity of ascriptions. I apply my account to examples which are used 
illustrate various features of the account and show how the truth of an 
ascription is sensitive to many different factors in the context.
I have shown how the truth of an ascription depends in a complex way on 
an agent’s dispositions and capacities to do, think and feel certain things, 
but have suggested that no reductive analysis of a given belief into specific 
dispositions is correct, so that my account cannot be seen as embodying 
the central assumption that this dissertation has been concerned to cast 
doubt upon, namely that belief ascriptions specify that a certain single 
cognitively specifiable fact about an agent obtains
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I have tried to show that the de re dicto is not an adequate distinction to 
describe real belief ascriptions. I have suggested that very few reports are 
de re, but that does not mean that most are de dicto, as this is traditionally 
understood.
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Conclusion
This thesis arose out of a consideration of Kripke’s puzzle about belief. I 
wanted to understand why Kripke’s argument seems (at least at a first 
reading) to work in spite of the fact that it leads to an apparent paradox. I 
wanted to try to identify the picture of belief and belief ascriptions that 
seemed to me to underpin it and much other semantic work on belief 
ascriptions. Identifying and articulating the assumption which underlies the 
picture was my aim in Chapters One and Three. In Chapter One I tried to 
make it plausible that such an assumption is at the heart of Kripke’s paper. 
Chapter Three aimed to show that such an assumption is shared by several 
diverse theories of belief ascriptions and that this assumption is a source of 
problems for these theories.
Chapter Two tried to focus our attention on what it is natural and unnatural 
to say using various expressions using ‘believes’and its cognates. The aim 
here was to suggest that perhaps the best way to understand belief ascription 
and the ordinary concept of belief is to focus on ascriptions and see how 
they actually behave in various real scenarios, rather than presuppose a 
metaphysical position according to which beliefs are reified or given a 
primary role and then assume that belief ascriptions talk about such ‘beliefs’.
Chapter Four tries to say something positive about how belief ascription 
works after the analysis and criticism of the first three chapters. The account 
I give there is intended primarily to take seriously our intuitions about the 
truth value of ascriptions as they occur embedded in specific scenarios, and 
to show that an account of belief, which is free of the assumption that I say I 
find everywhere else, can be developed.
I have not tried to give an analysis of belief ascriptions, but merely a 
condition for their truth. I realise that in doing so I have produced an account
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which does not adhere to many of the goals of other theorists working in this 
area. But I have hoped to give an account of belief ascription which is 
thoroughly context-sensitive, realistic and person-level oriented (as opposed 
to subpersonal).
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